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Abstract 
North Korea, which is the last purely communist and closed economy in the 
world, was experiencing a primitive and poor economy since the great famine 
happened in the mid 1990s. In regards to this problem, Pyongyang government was 
inevitably ‘forced，to open it up, slightly deviated from 'juche' rationale and 
developed its market liberalization since the last few years, e.g. the establishment of 
two Special Economic Zone. Because of this kind of uncertainty, Kim Jong-il needed 
a clear and acceptable guideline which can direct its reform path towards a 'slow and 
incremental opening，，of North Korea. Thus, a reform model is urgently needed and 
concurrently some ex-socialist countries in the Eastern Europe can provide some 
fruitful experiences for them to copy. In addition, there is an epistemic community in 
Europe called, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, who organized an annual 
EU-DPRK Workshop since 2004 and invited numerous European economists who 
have worked in transition economies to exchange experiences with North Korean 
officials who are now responsible for economic modernization in the DPRK. They 
had a formal contact with North Korean official may provide ‘knowledge-based‘ ideas 
or policy suggestion to them directly or indirectly. So, the central puzzling of my 
thesis is that how this channel being built and what this channel are helping and 
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Introduction 
North Korea, Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK), the last 
Communist and closed economy in the world, has experienced dreadful economic 
decline since the great famine in the mid 1990s. To solve this problem, Pyongyang 
government was forced to open up the national market and slightly deviated from the 
'juche' rationale. Since then, market liberalization has gradually sprouted, exemplified 
by the establishment of two Special Economic Zone. The country leader, Kim Jong-il, 
undoubtflilly is in need of some grand guideline to realize a 'slow and incremental 
opening” of North Korea. Many external players, including the former socialist 
countries in the Eastern Europe, can and would like to provide advice to Pyongyang. 
This research examines the networks of economists and experts emerging in the 
context of the current reforms in North Korea. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
(FNF), who organized an annual EU-DPRK Workshop since 2004 and invited 
numerous European economists who have worked in transition economies to 
exchange experiences with North Korean officials who are now responsible for 
economic modernization in the DPRK. They had a formal contact with North Korean 
official may provide ‘knowledge-based，ideas or policy suggestion to them directly or 
indirectly. So, the central puzzling of my thesis is that how this channel being built 
and what this channel are helping and directing the policy reform in North Korea. 
In general understanding on North Korea politics, viewed by the United States 
and South Korea through a political lens, the impression of political attitude and 
political aspiration in North Korea can be described as 'a hungry child knows no 
1 
politics’. 1 Before the NGOs came to North Korea, there was not much information 
released by the North Korean government and the world knows nothing inside North 
Korea. But, as the North Korea is gradually opened up since recent years, through the 
experience on humanitarian assistance and their lens on politics, the general image on 
North Korea is improving and more objective data and reliable information released 
by the government shaped and contributed to a more responsive regime as they have 
to take economic development and regime stability into consideration and therefore 
they decided to seek for possible support from the European counterparts. 
1. Theoretical background 
The research of this emerging and possible transnational political advocacy 
echoes/is a response to the new theoretical development in IR field. In classic IR 
theory, state was the predominant unit of study in international relations. All of the 
theories in international relations, including realism and liberalism, are exclusively 
focused on the action, reaction and interaction among states. But, the start of the 
1990s was a turning point of the study in international relations, as applied 
constructivism into the study of international relations, state was no longer the only 
actor of focus in international relations. Other than states, the rise of Non-state actor 
(NSA) was one of the reasons why scholars tend to broaden the scope of study in 
international relations. 
Under this paradigm, the traditional Westphalian nation-state is experiencing an 
erosion of power and sovereignty, and non-state actors are part of the cause. NSAs 
1 Synder, Scott. 1998. The NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, eds., 
Paved With Good Intentions: NGO Experience in North Korea. Westerport, Connecticut, London: 
Praeger, p.3 
2 
have challenged nation-state borders and claims to sovereignty. Facilitated by 
Multinational Corporations (MNCs) are not always sympathetic to home-country's or 
host-country's national interests, but instead loyalty is given to the corporation's 
interests. No-governmental Organizations (NGOs) are challenging the nation-state's 
sovereignty over internal matters through advocacy for societal issues, e.g. human 
rights and the environment globalization. 
The study of NSA arouses a heated academic debate in the last few years, 
especially about the unit of analysis in IR was transformed immensely. Scholars had 
extended their focus of study in the field of Non-Governmental Organizations 
(NGOs). NGOs, in this sense, represent the new agent of study as they're positionally 
different from government, financially independent, and without any government 
monitoring and censorship on their programs. The primary focuses on their works are 
on environmental issues, women's rights, human rights, and rural poverty. 
Other than NGOs, transnational Organizations (TNOs) are also gaining academic 
and diplomatic recognition as they're increasing tremendously in terms of absolute 
numbers and global influence. The agenda of transnationalism, defined by Thomas 
Risse-Kappen, is regular interactions across national boundaries when at least one 
actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national government or an 
intergovernmental organization.^ So, it's widely believes that the rise of TNOs in 
recent decades was contributed by the growing numbers of issues which were not 
only affecting domestically, but also spreading to neighboring countries and even 
2 Rochester, Martin J. 2002. Between Two Epochs: What's Ahead for America, the World, and Global 
Politics in the Twenty-First Century. Upper Saddle River, NJ: Prentice Hall, p.2 
3 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back in: Non-State Actors, Domestic 
Structures, and International Institutions. Cambridge ； New York, NY, USA : Cambridge University 
Press, p.3 
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globally, such as environmental issues, trade issues, human rights protection, 
international security etc. Within this new study, expert group was one of the new 
units of analysis in this field. 
World politics at the end of the twentieth century involves, alongside states, 
many nonstate actors that interact with each other, with states, and with international 
organizations.4 Within this relation, transnational networks are increasingly visible in 
global arena. Some involve economic actors and firms. Some are networks of 
scientists and experts whose professional ties and shared casual ideas underpin their 
efforts to influence policy.^ Others are network of activists, distinguishable largely by 
the centrality of principled ideas or values in motivating their formation. 
Transnational Advocacy Networks (TANs) are significantly influencing domestic 
and international politics in recent years. By cooperating and collaborating actors in 
civil societies, states, and international organizations, they built networks and 
channels of access to the global system and shaped political outcome. In these 
networks, they're relatively strong in issues related to environment, human rights and 
women's rights. Through normative and value commitment, members of the advocacy 
networks are bounded by shared values, a common discourse, and dense exchanges of 
information and s e r v i c e s . At the core of their objectives, TANs on one hand are 
proliferating and their goal is to change the behavior of states and of international 
organizations. Simultaneously, they also promote norm implementation, by pressuring 
target actors to adopt new policies, and by monitoring compliance with international 
4 Keck, Margaret and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca, N.Y.: Cornell University Press, p. 1 
5 Ibid 
6 Ibid, p. 2 
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standards. 
Other than advocacy networks, expert group is another type of transnational 
actor which tries to shape state's policy. Expert group is a network of professionals 
with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative 
claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. They are 
catching more and more attention in IR because as social constructivism provide 
knowledge as the means to power in the social reality. In the study of world politics, 
by having an authoritarian claim on knowledge, can exercise decisive power in the 
‘interaction game' of the construction of world politics. 
Moreover, the article by Thomas Risse-Kappen in 1994 also stimulates the study 
of the function of the expert groups played in global affairs.8 He mentioned the 
traditional power-structure, realistic and structural approach is totally insufficient to 
explain the shift in belief and brought a revolutionary change of economic policy in 
the Gorbachev era. (from planned, controlled economy to market economy 
(perestroika and glasnost)) The major argument in his article is that the rise of some 
transnational expert groups in U.S. (economists and scientists) transfer their 'new 
thinking' to the bureaucracy in USSR (especially to Gorbachev) contributed to the 
Moscow government commit in promoting reform strategy. Therefore, this revolution 
in foreign policy in Soviet Union was more or less affected by the expert groups. 
Therefore, the above case study provided by Thomas Risse-Kappen and the 
7 Haas, Peter. 1997. ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p.3. 
8 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic 
Structures, and the End of the Cold War. International Organization 48,2: 86 
5 
current economic crisis in North Korea stimulates my research curiosity as there may 
be some non-governmental forces which are providing ideation support and expertise 
assistance on North Korea in regards to the economic reform, as North Korea has a 
similar political and economic structure as the former Soviet Union. So, in referring to 
the case raised by the FNF, the action taken by this NGO and the expert groups, 
indeed, becomes the central field of study of this thesis. 
2. Research questions 
The main empirical questions this research is going to investigate are: 
1. In the background of North Korea's general external relations: what has EU 
been providing advice and learning of experiences of economic reforms 
toward North Korea? 
2. Except the influence via formal inter-govemmental channels, are there other, 
mostly non-governmental forces, that also been applied by EU? 
3. How to understand and explain the networks of experts initiated by the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation and flows of ideas generated by such networks 
which has possibly affected North Korean leaders’ thinking economic 
reforms? 
4. How and why does the channels and policy inputs from the groups of scholars 
in the EU-DPRK Workshops in providing ideas or practical policy suggestions 
toward the North Korean official? 
6 
5. What are the practical policy significances of the non-state channels on the 
North Korea economic reform? 
Other than empirical questions, this research is also going to resolve some of the 
theoretical puzzling are: 
1. What are the pre-conditions of a successful expert group in shaping state’ 
policy? 
2. Can non-government organization (NGO) play an initiative and mobilizing 
role in the consolidation of the expert group? 
3. How did ideas initiate by academic scholars transnationally diffuse to 
policy-makers in other countries and eventually shaped the policy-outcome? 
3. Explanatory Variables and Hypothesis: 
In my dissertation, as expert group is the object of my study, therefore, there are 
some of the variables which will affect the performance, momentum and policy 
influence of the community. 
Variables of the level of influence of expert group: 
1. Consensus: The influence of expert group depends on the extent to which the 
members agree on important issues in their field of study 
7 
2. Density: Transnational network tend to operate best when they are dense, with 
many actors, strong connections among groups in the network, and reliable 
information flows 
3. Resources: There are various types of resources which affect the performance of 
the expert group, including economic (e.g. money, personnel), communication 
(e.g. fax machines, computers with access to the internet) and organizational (e.g. 
secretariat, working groups) 
4. Uncertainty: It is widely believed that expert group can exert considerable 
influence if there is a high degree of uncertainty among policy-makers. 
Uncertainty can provide a window of opportunity for knowledge-based expert 
groups to exert influence. 
5. Institutionalization of advice/channel: The influence of expert group increases if 
they have access to policy-makers, or even become part of the bureaucratic 
structure itself. It is suggested that insider groups, particular those who enjoy core 
or specialist status, are provided with the most opportunity to influence 
policy-making. 
In addition, in this research, there are two sets of hypothesis that I'm going to test 
whether it is positively or negatively related: 
1. The influence of the groups of scholars of FNF is more likely if there is a high 
degree of consensus among the experts inside the groups. 
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2. If there is a higher need of policy-input for the future development and path in 
North Korea，the higher the degree of institutionalized of this kind of expert 
group channel of the FNF. 
4. Main Findings 
In the coming five chapters, gradual steps will be provided in analyzing why and 
how did the FNF shaped the economic reform programs in North Korea. First, as the 
background review, the history of North Korea economic development and the 
EU-DPRK relationship will be discussed. Second, in the analytical part, the expert 
group of the FNF will be the main focus of this part, with analyzed by the three 
dimensions, including consensus among members, density of the network and the 
resources of the organization. Then, under the general environment as North Korean 
government encountered a policy uncertainty, the FNF set up two respective expert 
groups and organized two EU-DPRK Workshops in 2004 and 2005. Afterwards, the 
focus of the study will be shifted and go deeply into the details of the Workshops, 
such as the ideas, channels and strategies. Lastly, in the concluding part, we will try to 
match the ideas and the practical policy outcome in order to bridge the two items 
together. 
In regards to the empirical questions, under our main findings, it will 
demonstrate there is somehow a substantial but unofficial channel developed by the 
FNF in Korea and they organized several knowledge networks with North Korea in 
recent years. This network, including the two annual EU-DPRK Workshops, plays a 
significant role in providing answers in knowledge and technical level to the North 
Korean officials when they're tackling their economic problems. 
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Beneath this transnational knowledge network, what we witnessed is that an 
expert group or an early-stage of epistemic community emerged during the two 
annual EU-DPRK Workshops in Pyongyang in 2004 and 2005. These expert groups 
was initiated and mobilized by the FNF and they presented their ideas in front of more 
than 100 North Korean officials. Through various communication channels and 
strategies, those ideas raised by the community members proliferated and shaped the 
mindset of the North Korean officials eventually. Hence, by looking at the policy 
changes and outcomes in recent years in North Korea, we can digest and analyze that 
there are some substantial policy influence from the scholars on the real policy 
outcomes. 
5. Research methodology 
Content analysis will be the major form of method in this research as most of the 
parts of this thesis is analyzing through different kinds of literature and articles. 
In the part of case studies, in regards to the linkage between the expert groups in 
the FNF with the North Korean officials, the literature that we're going to use are 
based on two written reports which recorded and published by the FNF in Korea. 
Base on these reports, we're going to analyze the ideas and articles which presented 
by the economic scholars in the groups, the detailed summary of the discussion that 
they conducted during the workshops and the off-conference activities during the 
three-day workshops, such as the field visits etc. 
Moreover, as it's indeed one of the limitations of this research as it's difficult to 
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find the first-handed data and reliable information which is released by the North 
Korean authorities. Therefore, most of the literatures of this research are grasped and 
collected through the South Korean government research institute, such as the Korea 
Institute for International Economic Policy (KIEP), and some scholars who are from 
Europe or United States which conducted research in North Korea, such as Dr. Hazel 
Smith from the University of Warwick. Furthermore, there are several academic 
journals which are specifically focused on issues related to North Korea, such as the 
Korea and World Affairs, Korea Focus and North Korean Review, and there are also 
some non-governmental organizations (NGOs) which are dispatching their 
humanitarian aid teams to North Korea and published their experiences and details 
into books and reports, for example the Red Cross and the Medecins Sans Frontieres 
(MSF). 
6. Research significance 
In the first place, this research can help us to combine the theories on epistemic 
community and transnational advocacy network and understand more on the early 
stage of an epistemic community and how it forms. Since the publication of the theory 
of epistemic community, this approach has raised a lot of cases application with 
different aspects. However, as Haas has never clearly defined how to measure the 
channels and networks that the expert group developed and what are the variables in 
affecting the ultimate policy outcomes. Moreover, as Haas failed to mention the early 
stage of the expert group can be initiated and invited by the non-governmental 
organizations (NGOs). In my case, Therefore, this study tries to provide some 
measurements on how to measure the networks and confined the expert group can be 
invited by NGOs. 
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This research, secondly, may raise the awareness of the unaware channel between 
the expert groups in FNF toward to the officials in North Korea. As what will be 
stated in Chapter 4，the linkage between the non-governmental level between EU and 
DPRK will be re-visited. It breaks the general belief that China is the sole player 
which can provide diplomatic and economic pressure on North Korea. However, this 
study explore another set of channel which show the influence of Europe, especially 
in terms of knowledge transfer and market ideology, should not be under-estimated 
and under-mined. Hence, this research is hoped to raise the alternative way of finding 
possible network which are providing ideation influence on North Korea. 
In the second place, it also fills the research gap in this academic field. In the past, 
since Haas developed his theory on the linkage between expert groups with the 
government officials, it has widely been used for understanding the relations in many 
countries and cases. However, as it's rarely believes that there is the possibility of 
such kind of relations can be built upon the Europe and North Korea. Therefore, this 
research tries to apply Haas theory into a new country case by using the renovative 
methodology in analyzing how did the European expert groups can provide the 
ideation and policy advice through this channel in affecting the mindset of the North 
Korean officials and eventually shaped their policy outcome. 
7. Structure of the thesis 
This thesis will be divided into 5 Chapters. In the next chapter, we will firstly 
review the literature of several theories which are related to this research, including 
the theoretical debate on academic ideas and practical policy outcomes, the value of 
'ideas' in international relations and how to bridge ideas with interests so as to enrich 
12 
the spectrum of analytical framework. Lastly, Haas's theory of epistemic community 
will be discussed, in order to provide preliminary understanding about the theory and 
how can it be discussed in this thesis. 
In Chapter 2，a historical review on the economic development in North Korea 
will be provided. In this Chapter, the general trend of economic development can be 
divided into several parts, such as the Cold War period, Post Cold War period, famine 
period and reform period. Apart from that, the idea of juche (self-subsistence) will 
also be analyzed and evaluate to what extend this idea shaped the economy in North 
Korea. 
In Chapter 3，the general review on the EU-DPRK relationship will be provided. 
This Chapter is primarily designs for a basic understanding on the relations between 
the two actors, including governmental and non-governmental level and in order 
demonstrates the relations is improving in recent decades. In governmental level, EU, 
base on the engagement ideology, started to build the diplomatic relations with DPRK 
in recent years. Concurrently, North Korea, also base on the open and pragmatic 
diplomacy, is willing to extend their political, economic and social cooperation with 
several European countries. In non-governmental level, EU and North Korea not only 
maintained a close and constructive relation, as there were various NGOs which have 
been providing humanitarian aids and assistance toward the North Korea, but also 
extended the cooperation into knowledge transfer level. 
By describing and analyzing the two EU-DPRK Workshops organized by the FNF 
is the major focus of Chapter 4. In this Chapter, based on the two written reports of 
the Workshops, ideas which derived from the presentation and discussion during the 
13 
Workshops will be raised and analyzed. Moreover, since the ideas were promoted, 
we're going to discuss the communication networks and channels and measure the 
level of institutionalization of such kind of communication strategies. 
Finally，in the Chapter 5，the central focus in this Chapter is integrating the ideas 
raised by the scholars in the Workshops with the policy output in North Korea. This 
captures the most important finding in this thesis that North Korea is following a 





In this dissertation, as stated in the introduction chapter, several concepts and 
theories will be drawn from different schools of thought and academic disciplines and 
applied to my case studies. Therefore, it is necessary to through the separate debates 
from the concepts that I borrowed from and explain the ideas in detail. 
One of the most important concepts that appear in this dissertation is idea matters 
in the field of international relations. There is growing of scholarship in applying the 
study of ‘idea，in understanding inter-state behaviors and actions. In the past, idea was 
on the verge of IR study as most of the academic focus was put on the rationalist 
approach, which is an interest-based perspective viewing countries as interest and 
wealth maximizers and undermining the importance of value. Thus, discussion will be 
made upon whether how to merge the concept of ideas and interests in analyzing the 
state's behavior and reviving the importance of 'value' in shaping countries' foreign 
policy. This kind of revival is highly relevant to my study as I have to justify the 
importance of policy ideas in shaping and directing the policy outcome in North 
Korea. 
In addition, in my dissertation, the target group of study is expert group, therefore, 
it is important to review the related academic literature in this field. Epistemic 
community, a non-governmental network of professionals or scholars with recognized 
expertise and competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to 
policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area, is becoming one of the 
15 
relevant players in influencing international politics in recent years. So, in my 
dissertation, I am going to assess and analyze one of the expert groups in Europe, 
which was invited by one of the non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in Germany, 
and more than 10-15 economists were invited to present their ideas to the North 
Korean officials during the workshops, and I will evaluate their power of networking, 
ideational influence and final policy outcome in this dissertation. Moreover, as these 
experts groups is organized by a political foundation in Germany called Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation, it is important and necessary to visit the literature on 
transnational advocacy network as it primarily focused on how NGOs normatively 
consolidated the civil societies and pressure the state's policy transnationally. 
1. Debate between ideas and interests in International Relations 
In academic literature, there are a growing number of scholars who turn to study 
how 'ideas' can be another variable in understanding states' policy, specifically the 
foreign policy change. In the past, the study of the impact of ideas on policy was 
marginalized and limited, simply because the impressive elaboration of rationalist 
explanations of behavior had been predominant for decades. At that time, individuals 
were primarily viewed as wealth-maximizers. Actors' preference and interest are prior 
to any ideas or beliefs and the latter are relegated into a minor role. However, recently, 
the old assumptions of the rationalism are called into question by the new 
development of ideas for policy studies. Therefore, there is getting wider acceptance 
of the conglomeration of the actor's interest and ideas in studying state's action. 
But, to be more specific, what is idea? Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane 
defined ideas as beliefs held by individuals, and they help explain political outcomes, 
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particularly those related to foreign policy. In addition, they mentioned that ideas can 
influence policy when the principled or causal beliefs they embody provide road maps 
that increase actors' clarity about goals or ends-means relationships.^ Hence, in this 
aspect, idea is a broad concept and basic belief which plays a central role in 
organizing and interpreting politics and shaping foreign policy. 
Moreover, once ideas have become institutionalized they play a role in 
generalizing rules and linking issue areas. When collective action requires persuasion 
rather than mere coercion, and when consistency of policy is demanded on the basic 
of principles institutionalized in the form of rules, reasons must be given for proposed 
courses of action; when reasons are required, ideas become important. 
1.1. Conceptualization 
In order to have a better conceptualization of ideas which can provide a concrete 
picture of it, we have to formulate or categorize ideas into three main beliefs, which 
are worldviews beliefs, principled beliefs and causal beliefs. 
Ideas have their broadest impact on human action when they take the form of 
world views. ^ ^Once ideas have a deep effect on human social life in a variety ways 
and across centuries, we would qualify them as worldview beliefs. For example, the 
idea of sovereignty, which rose after the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648, brought a 
revolutionary and international change of world order since then." After this idea had 
9 Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.3. 
10 Ibid,p.8 
11 Ruggie, John. 1983. Continuity and Transformation in the World Polity: Toward a Neorealist 
Synthesis. World Politics 35, 2: 261-85. 
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erupted, there were many states experiencing independence movement and creating a 
new set of international norms. Therefore, this dominant idea is one of the best 
examples of worldview beliefs. 
The second category of ideas, principled beliefs, consists of normative ideas that 
specify criteria for distinguishing right from wrong and just from unjust. ^ ^ In this 
category, beliefs are expected to be morally driven and protection of world interest. 
For example, it is proclaimed that 'slavery is wrong,' that 'abortion is murder', and 
human beings have the 'right of free speech'. When we look at the empirical case, the 
revolutions of 1989 in Eastern Europe completely and clearly illustrated an example 
of principled beliefs. People self-initiated and continued to go on street for risky 
demonstrations, at the same time they sacrificed their self-interest to be a 'free-rider' 
in this scenario. 
The last category, causal beliefs, is beliefs about cause-effect relationships which 
derive authority from the shared consensus of recognized elites, whether they are 
village elders or scientists at elite institutions. ^ ^This kind of causal belief provided a 
guide for individuals on how to achieve their objectives. Concurrently, they also 
inherit some scientific causal relationships which provided a knowledge authority on 
peoples' beliefs. For example, the reason why there was a great change in state's 
policy on production of CFCs was primarily due to the new scientific evidence about 
the hole in atmospheric ozone layer which would contribute to cancer and climate 
change. Thus, this scientific finding portraited as an authoritarian idea which showed 
a causal relationship between human behavior and climate change so that it demanded 
12 Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.9. 
13 Ibid, p. 10 
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a change of state's policy. 
1.2. How idea affects policy: three pathways? 
Ideas can motivate states and affect foreign policy outcomes in various ways. First 
of all, ideas can serve as a road map for policy development. Actually, once there is a 
need to policy change in an uncertain and confusing environment and future, ideas, at 
that time, can provide a guidance to policy-makers about what road should they take 
and by endorsing what kind of strategies. For example, when the Soviet foreign policy 
since 1985 required a non-incremental and rapid change with unclear road map, 
particular idea emerged in the Gorbachev era which leads his reform with new 
circumstances. 
Simultaneously, ideas can also serve as a 'focal point' which drives the best policy 
path in a multiple equalibria situation. Focal point, here, I mean that cooperative 
solutions or act as coalitional glue to facilitate the cohesion of particular groups” On 
this pathway, ideas can contribute to outcomes in the absence of unique equilibrium 
reduces them to focal points for policy convergence. Thus, the fact that actors will 
cooperate and the reasons why they want to cooperate are taken for granted. The 
remaining idea will become a signaling device for a new equilibrium. So, at that time, 
ideas will be important precisely because unique predictions cannot be generated 
solely through an examination of interests and strategic interactions due to the 
situation of multiple equilibria. For example, the European Community (EC) faced a 
14 Checkel, Jeff. 1993. Ideas, Institutions, and the Gorbachev Foreign Policy Revolution. World 
Politics 45, 2: 278. 
Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.17. 
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classic collective action problem in the 1980s about what route they should take in 
order to stimulate trade but avoid defect. In this case, parties around members referred 
back to the two embedded principle in EC which are principle of mutual recognition 
and the supremacy of the EC laws over domestic laws. The ideas in this two 
principled served as a 'focal point' for EC to get rid of and control the self-interested 
defective behavior of the members so as to achieve the collective gains. ^ ^ 
The last pathway which idea can serve as is institutionalization. Regardless of 
how a particular set of ideas comes to affect political outcome, the continue use of this 
ideas will gradually and incrementally changes on the existing rules and norms. After 
generations, once the ideas become embedded in institutions and then act as 
intervening variables mediating between the pursuit of interests and the policy 
outcomes, the institutionalized ideas will inherit and continue to influence the policy 
direction until next great shock. For example, Stephen Krasner, in his study of the 
origins of the nation-state system^disregarded the Treaty of Westphalia in 1648 was 
a clear delineation between old empire and sovereign states. In his study, he 
discovered that sovereignty existed long before the mid-seventeenth century. So, once 
this idea or norm institutionalized, the gradual change of state-system will be 
predicted. 
1.3. Interest matter? 
In the post-war scholarship the starting point for most theorizing about 
16 Garrett, Geoffrey and Barry Weingast. 1993. Ideas, Interest, and Institutions: Constructing the 
European Community's Internal Market. In Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. eds.，Ideas and 
Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.178. 
17 Krasner, Stephen. 1993. Westphalia and All That. In Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane. eds., 
Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 
p.235. 
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international politics has been power and national interest, with power understood 
ultimately as military capability and interest as an egoistic desire for power, security 
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or wealth. This is so-called the realist approach of the IR. Afterward, the 
mainstream rationale for International politics was to be dominated by this material 
and preference-driven theory which explained state's behavior from an interest-based 
aspect. 
In this aspect, scholars, such as Karen Orren and Theda Skocpol, emphasize that 
the notion of interest is treated as idea-free baselines which is viewed differently from 
ideational factor. ^ ^ When studying international politics, rationalists assume that the 
outcomes in international relations reflect the objectively definable interests of 
relevant parties, given their respective capabilities. Also, the core of rationalist 
explanations is the view that preferences and expectations generate behavior. 
Therefore, when a state changes its policies, for example, to promote free trade, we 
should first examine changes in interests, at either in international or domestic level, 
rather than focus on the ideas. 
As realists take agents' behaviors as interest-driven, they take ideas, beliefs and 
norms for granted in the unit of study. Under the assumption of the rationalists on 
human behavior, they regard human as an interest-maximizer and overwhelmed by 
material-driven mentality. Human beings will calculate their cost-benefit ratio and 
utility carefully and strategically and list down their preference of choices before 
taking any action. With this rational mindset, all of the physical individual actions are 
simply interest-determined and individuals view idea only matter in an priori sense 
18 Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p.96. 
19 Orren, Karen. 1995. Ideas and Institutions. Polity 28: 99. 
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with limited and even no influence on their actions?^ 
1.4. How is it formed? 
The study of interest in International Relations was traditionally the mainstream 
rationale for academic scholarship. Obviously, the realist argument was one of the 
most influential approaches which ignored ideas completely. In realism, the 
paramount of study is the 'interest of the state' in power-political terms. The state is 
understood as a unitary actor, whose national interest is heavily conditioned by the 
view that any one state's interest is construed mainly with reference to that state's 
71 
position in respect to other states. So, in realist view, the analysis of interests 
permits an objective, rigorous, and timeless explanation of international affairs. 
In realist theories in international relations, the concept of 'interest' is remarkably 
important. Realists of all stripes believe that states do what they do because it is in 
their national interests, and that the national interests is self-regarding with respect to 
security. Alexander Wendt described that 'the uniquely realist hypothesis about 
national interest is that they have a material rather than social basis, being rooted in 
oo 
some combination of human nature, anarchy, and or brute material capabilities.' One 
of the best examples, the famous quotation from the defense of national interest was a 
better source for explaining states' action is by Winston Churchill commented on 
Soviet policy: He explained the Soviet policy at that time was best to be explained by 
national interest in this way: 'Russia. . . is a riddle, wrapped in a mystery, inside an 
Finnemore, Martha and Kathryn Sikkink. 2001. Taking Stock: The Constuctivist Research 
Program in International Relations and Comparative Politics. Annual Review of Political Science 4: 
398. 
21 Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
22 Keohane, Robert. 2000. Ideas Part-Way Down. Review of International Studies 26: 125. 
22 
enigma; but perhaps there is a key. That key is Russian national interest.' He 
believed that national interest was the basic driven-power of Soviet foreign policy. 
In Waltz's conceptualization of realism, states all perform the same functions 
(internal order, external defense) and so are 'like units'. States vary in their 
capabilities and other attributes, but not functionally. Waltz says that units will be 
homogenous as long as the system is anarchic, and so the structure in international 
relations will drive states to be material concern and their basic interest is power and 
security. ^"^Therefore, the study of motivation is of utmost importance in realism. 
States is egoistic and self/national interest actors and they will behave rationally and 
be interest-maximizing. 
1.5. End of idealism and rationalism debate? 
The argument of this dissertation has been that the meaning of the distribution of 
power and interest in international politics, and the contrary side of ideas shaping 
state's behavior. Scholars for centuries have tried endlessly in bridging the ideas and 
interests together to study the action of states. Actually, ideas and interests are 
naturally not rival and incompatible at all. To be more specific, ideas and interests can 
somehow be inter-related and inter-dependent. For example, Odell commented that 
we could not conceive of changes of state's action simply in terms of state's interest. 
He studied U.S. international monetary policies that ‘an adequate explanation or 
forecast of U.S. policy content will require a combination of the three corresponding 
analytical perspective: International market conditions, the inter-state military and 
23 Lenart, Levente. 2003. Sir Winston Spencer Churchill and the Movement of the Unification of 
Europe. European Integration Studies 2: 20. 
24 Waltz, Kenneth. 1979. Theory of International Politics. Reading, MA: Addison-Wesley. 
23 
economic power structure, and the circulation of policy ideas through Washington.， 
Specifically, foreign policy is derived from a combination of material capabilities 
and interests, on the one hand, and ideas and values, on the other. That means 
International politics has been socially constructed by ideas, without denying the 
importance of state action, material forces, or rational calculation.^^ So, it is unwise 
and wrong to view that ideas matter more fundamentally than material forces and vice 
versa. 
So, according to Sikkink : 
...the separation of ideas and interests is fundamentally flawed. Political and 
ideological factor (i.e. ideas) influences the very meaning and interpretation of 
economic ideas and recommendations (i.e. material interest). Except in its 
crudest form, the comprehension and formulation of fact and interests implied 
the existence of a conceptual apparatus. To conceive of ideas as intellectual 
justifications of actions that people wanted to take anyway is to obscure the 
role of ideas in helping people grasp, formulate and communicate social 
realities. 
Odell, J. 1982. United States International Monetary Policy: Market, Power and Ideas as Sources of 
Change. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, p.344. 
26 Ibid,p.l35. 
27 Sikkink, Kathryn. 1993. The Power of Principled Ideas: Human Rights Policies in the United States 
and Western Europe. In Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohand, eds. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs. 
Institutions and Political Change. Ithaca, NY: Cornell University Press, p. 140. 
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Table 1.1 Relation between ideas and interests 
Action / \ Desires Beliefs 
\ / 
Evidence 
Refer to table 1.1，in studying state's action, according to the above paradigm, 
we can understand that every action taken by state should be composed of at least 
three components: desire, beliefs and action. Once every state has decided to take any 
action, behind that, we can see there should be a desire which drives state for specific 
interest of action. Concurrently, not only interest will be calculated, but we also have 
to deal with some beliefs inside our mind which are shaped by past experience. These 
beliefs will also be one of the variables for our action. For example, we go to grocery 
store for food when we feel hungry, and we have a desire for food and belief and that 
desire can be satisfied there. Therefore, this intentional explanation model from the 
r\ Q constructivist perspective can generally bridge and link the two rationales together. 
Moreover, another way which is possible to mix or bridge the concepts of ideas 
and interests together is by understanding the nature of interest. Alexander Wendt said 
28 Wendt, Alexander. 1999. Social Theory of International Politics. Cambridge; New York: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 130. 
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that 'beliefs can constitute desire: that is, beliefs that something is desirable play a key 
role in constituting interests.' Actually, when studying human reasoning about their 
preference and interest, ideas at that time constitute interest, by making particular 
potential objectives meaningful and rendering others less consequential. ^^Therefore, 
any interest of individual should have been socially constructed by ideas and should 
not be given. As a result, it implies that every choice taken by individual or state 
should be affected by ideational factor. 
The best example to illustrate the merge of conceptual frameworks of ideas and 
interests was to be found in the change of Soviet foreign policy in the mid-1980s by 
Gorbachev. Traditionally, scholars who studied Soviet foreign policy were long seen 
as reflecting both the geographical position of Russia, and the material resources at 
the disposal of the Soviet Union, on the one hand; and sets of ideas，both from 
Marxism-Leninism and from traditional Russian views of world politics.3! However, 
when Gorbachev brought a revolutionary and shocking change of Soviet foreign 
policy in 1985，scholars found that it was insufficient to borrow only the 
interest-based explanation to provide a full-picture of the change. Therefore, as 
Rissen-Kappen published his article in 1994, he provided an ideational factor which 
contributes to the shift in Soviet foreign policy. Certainly, in this case, or even to 
generalize into all the cases in international relations, we cannot analyze a change of 
state's behavior either from the perspective of ideas or interests. So, the best strategy 
is to merge them together which can help us understand the situation with a more 
29 Ibid, p. 133. 
Laffey, Mark and Jutta Wekdes. 1997. Beyond Beliefs: Ideas and Symbolic Technologies in the 
Study of International Relations. European Journal of International Relations 3, 2: 199. 
31 Keohane, Robert. 2000. Ideas Part-Way Down. Review of International Studies 26: 127. 
32 For details please read: Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational 
Coalitions, Domestic Structures, and the End of the Cold War. International Organization 48, 2: 
185-214. 
26 
comprehensive and broader scope. 
To conclude, this part shows a historical and theoretical debate on how to re-visit 
the importance of ideas in international relations. Traditionally, overwhelmed by the 
rational, interest-based and state-oriented paradigm, idea was not regarded as an 
essential factor in affecting state behavior and the factor to analyze state's action. 
Thus, in the study of IR, idea was long to be marginalized and state would only take 
national interest into consideration. 
But, as mentioned in the above part, the growing trend of re-evaluation of the 
role played by idea in this academic field in recent years. Since then, in the 
constructivist turn, ideas, culture and knowledge began to rise as a new study focus in 
IR and scholars also began to apply ideas as a variable in understanding state's 
behavior and its policy. 
In regards to this dissertation, one of the major arguments is that idea promoted 
by the expert group in FNF was essential in shaping the economic reform program in 
North Korea. Based on the finding by Risse-Kappen mentioned above, it's 
unsurprising that the policy change in communist regime is not impossible aroused by 
the foreign pressure and influence. Likewise, this foreign pressure can also be based 
on some ideational factor, which is initiated by some NGOs. Hence, in the following 
chapters, a deeper analysis will be provided as the North Korea economic reform can 
be shaped by some ideas raised and promoted by the expert group in Europe and 
therefore idea did play a constructive role in influencing state's policy and action. 
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2. Debate between epistemic community with other communities 
Epistemic community has been a new academic focus of scholarship in 
international relations (IR) in recent years while non-state actors (NSA) has become 
one of the relevant players in the international political spectrum. In the traditional 
study of IR, the state-centric was the dominant approach and state is the unitary actor 
in the global arena. However, since the early 1990s, when IR scholar Alexander 
Wendt developed the constructivist approach with the inclusion and justification of 
the importance and contribution of the non-state actors (NSA) and non-governmental 
organizations to the global politics，epistemic community has become one of the new 
developing non-state actors in shaping the national and transnational policy making 
process. 
In the study of epistemic community, Thomas Risse-Kappen was the very first 
scholar by making use of the idea of knowledge, values and strategic concepts, to 
reconceptualize the change of the Soviet leader's mindset by inviting the Western 
liberal internationalist community, which included the supporters of arms control as 
well as researchers in Western Europe. This transnational network with ‘new thinkers' 
-J in the foreign policy transformed the Soviet's Foreign Policy. 
After the pioneer works by Risse-Kappen, Peter Haas followed accordingly from 
the basic ideas developed by the previous scholars and generalized them into a 
detailed and concrete definition of what expert group is. Haas argued that modem 
decision-makers had faced growing technical complexity and uncertainties in 
Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1994. Ideas do not Float Freely: Transnational Coalitions, Domestic 
Structures, and the End of the Cold War. International Organization 48,2: 86 
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addressing policy issues, and thus increasingly had relied on knowledgeable experts. 
A network of such experts can create an 'epistemic community' in which members are 
professionals with recognized expertise and competence in a particular domain and an 
authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within that domain or issue area. 
They have a share of technical knowledge related to a particular field as well as 
normative principles, causal beliefs, and a shared conception of interests. Because of 
their claim to expertise, such expert groups can diffuse norms and values as well as 
technical knowledge and thereby influence policy outcomes. 
Therefore, in his book, he provided a concrete definition of what epistemic 
community means^'^: 
1. a shared set of normative and principled beliefs, which provide a value-based 
rationale for the social action of community members 
2. shared causal beliefs, which are derived from their analysis of practices leading 
or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then serve 
as the basic for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy actions 
and desired outcomes. 
3. shared notions of validity - that is, intersubjective, internally defined criteria for 
weighing and validating knowledge in the domain of their expertise 
4. a common policy enterprise - that is, a set of common practices associated with 
a set of problems to which their professional competence is directed, presumably 
out of the conviction that human welfare will be enhanced as a consequence. 
34 Haas, Peter. 1997. ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p.3. 
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The epistemic community factors in when we realize that these issue-centric 
experts meet their counterparts from other nations/organizations. They may meet at 
conventions or even be members of some international organizations focusing on a 
particular issue. Because the experts share the language and the understanding 
pertinent to the issue-area, they may soon begin to form stronger ties with their 
international colleagues.^^ Eventually they may begin to discuss possible solutions to 
given problems among themselves. At that point they are at the point of forming an 
epistemic community proper, (epistemic community literally translates as 
knowledge-society). In the figure below, such a community has already been formed 
(it should be remembered that it is not necessary to have any formal meeting 
arrangements for an expert group to be present). The community will devise their own 
solutions to problems that their respective superiors are formally supposed to solve. 
When the actor asks his/her experts how to go about solving a particular issue, the 
community solution will be suggested. 
35 Sundstrom , Mikel. 2000. A Brief Introduction: What is an Expert group?. Available at: 
<http ://www. svet. lu.se/j oluschema/epistcomm.pdf^. 
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(Source: Mikel Sundstrom 2000, p.l) 
2.1. How expert group works 
2.1.1. Uncertainty 
The necessity of the existence of such kind of epistemic community in the 
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international arena is the idea of uncertainty. According to Peter Haas, facing 
uncertainty means there is an inadequate information about the situation in hand/ 
inadequacy of available general knowledge needed for assessing the expected 
outcomes of different courses of action, the decision-maker 'lacks many of the 
conditions facilitating a focus on power...to identify their political allies and to be 
sure of what strategies are most likely to help them retain power...and poorly 
understood conditions may create enough turbulence that established operating 
procedures may break down, making institutions unworkable. 
In nowadays world, which is more complicated and transparent, a policy 
decision is made more or less relying on a concrete and objective study beforehand. 
However, somehow some decision-makers in the government lack such kind of 
specific knowledge or ideas on it. As a result, they are likely to demand for the 
provision of considerable scientific or technical expertise, and epistemic community 
is needed. 
2.1.2. Cause and effect relationships 
Under conditions of uncertainty, the decision-makers have numerous incentives 
and reasons for consulting epistemic community. Followed by a shock or crisis, 
epistemic community can elucidate the cause-and-effect relationships and provide 
advice about the likely results of various courses of action. Moreover, epistemic 
community can shed light on the nature of the complex interlinkages between issues 
Haas, Peter. 1997. ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p.13. 
37 Haas, Peter. 1997. ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p.15. 
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and on the chain of events that may proceed either from failure to take action or from 
instituting a particular policy. 
2.1.3. Define self-interests 
In addition, epistemic community can help to define the self-interests of a state 
or factions within it. During the process of interpreting the cause-and-effect 
relationships of problems, it can in fact leads to the relocating of the preconceived 
interests or to the identification of new interests. 
2.1.4. Formulate policy 
Epistemic community can also help formulate policy by providing policy advice. 
During the policy formulating process, their role in this regard will depend on the 
reasons for which their advice is sought. In some cases, decision-makers will seek for 
advice to gain information which will justify or legitimate a policy that they wish to 
pursue for political ends. In this regards, the role of the epistemic community will be 
limited to working out the details of the policy, assisting the decision-makers to 
anticipate the potential conflicts and interests which will emerge in a particular 
circumstances, and helping to build a policy consensus coalitions. However, in some 
less political affiliated issues, the policy influence of the epistemic community will be 
tremendously widened and deepened in various policy development stages, such as 
providing policy alternatives, selection of policies and building of national and 
international coalitions in supporting the policies. 
2.2. Difference between epistemic community with other groups 
33 
Apart from epistemic community, there are various political and social groups, 
governmental or non-governmental, national or transnational, highly connected or 
loosely connected. In order to distinguish the expert group from the other agents such 
as interest groups, advocacy coalitions and transnational networks, Peter Haas 
developed the following categorical table^^: 
Table 1.3 Distinguishing expert groups with other groups 
Causal beliefs 
Shared Unshared 





^ Disciplines and professions Legislators, bureaucratic 
^ agencies, and bureaucratic 
coalitions 
Knowledge base 
Consensual Disputed or absent 
^ Epistemic community Interest groups, social 
£ ^ movements, and bureaucratic 
O) 
coalitions 
38 Haas, Peter. 1997. ed., Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p.18. 
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(U ^ . . . 
'S Disciplines and professions Legislators, bureaucratic agencies 
D 
In the first figure, normative belief means that there are certain norms/ethics 
responsibilities for the epistemic community to be proactive and bring knowledge to 
lead the policy-making in the government. In addition, within the communities, they 
achieved a high degree of ideological consensus and agreement over the issue 
characteristics. Second, causal belief means that they are groups of scientists, which 
provide empirical and persuasive evidence to the public and bureaucrats. But, 
somehow，they are not needed to be made up of natural scientists; they can consist of 
social scientists or individuals from any discipline or profession who have a 
sufficiently strong claim to a body of knowledge that is valued by society. Also, 
they can deal with a single country, or they may in some cases become transnational 
through conferences, research collaboration, and a variety of informal 
communications and contacts. Therefore, epistemic community act to channel ideas to 
decision-makers and also circulate ideas between states, for example, the Network 
supporting nuclear arms control, ban on nuclear arms testing, a network concerned 
with the protection of stratosphere ozone, a network concerned with the spread and 
application of neo-liberal or central-pi aiming economic ideas, a network supporting 
the creation of a permanent international criminal court. 
2.3. How to affect policy 
In recent years, epistemic communities have been developing as a new coming 
agent which affects the domestic and international policy formulating process. 
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Through different channels or means, the communities can make significant 
importance and contribution to the government consultation process and finally direct 
the policy outcome. 
In Zhao's article, he mentioned there are several policy channels which the 
epistemic community can affect the policy outcome^^: 
First, through organizing some consultations with policy makers (such as 
invitation lecture, issue-oriented debate and discussions), the epistemic community 
with think-tanks and intellectuals on specific policy issues can provide essential, 
specific and practical thoughts on the how to reform and re-develop the government 
policy in those policy areas specifically. These kinds of interactions provide 
opportunities for scholars to exercise direct influence on the opinions of top leaders, 
and in some occasion, may have some policy impact. 
Second, a more traditional way for epistemic community to exert their influence 
has been through internal reports to top leaders. Some leading policy organizations 
and agencies in the government have their own research institutes. There are 
long-established channels through which scholars may submit research papers, policy 
analyses, and recommendations to various levels of policy makers, including, from 
time to time, to the top leaders. 
Third, another important channel for intellectuals and scholars to convey their 
opinions is through conferences and public policy debates. Research institutes 
39 Quansheng, Zhao. 2005. Expert group, Intellectuals, and Chinese Foreign Policy. Paper presented at 
the 3 4出 Sino-American Conference "Personality and the Changing Structure of Politics in Greater 
China", University of Virginia, April 29- May 1. p.7. 
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affiliated with universities and various governmental agencies are the likely host for 
policy-oriented conferences. They invite professors and research fellows from leading 
universities and research institutes and present their analyses on specific topic at the 
international conferences and debates. Generally speaking, these activities present 
excellent opportunities for researchers to voice differing opinions in front of the top 
leaders. 
Fourth, Policy NGOs are also one of the possible potential channels which the 
intellectuals and scholars can involve in the policy formulation process. This common 
practice is so called 'Channel 2 Diplomacy', which refers to the activities of retired 
government officials，scholars, and think-tanks members who actively participate in 
all kinds of forum, meetings and other activities. These forums or academic 
conferences set up an academic-to-official exchange network which fulfills the strong 
desire for policymakers to make some ideas exchange with the scholars in this 
circumstance. Moreover, after the forums, the reports or publications on the 
discussions will also provide a written channel for the scholars to influence the 
government's policy. 
Fifth, as the new media has been highly developing in recent decades, epistemic 
community can also, by making use of such kind of outside system discussions 
medium, voice out their opinions to the government officials. In the internet age, there 
is a growing concern on the news media discussion forum about the possibility to 
mobilize new kinds of intellectual movement through internet discussion debates. 
Sixth, epistemic community can further widen their power and strengths by 
coordinating with other overseas scholars in centralizing their network and 
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knowledge pool and power to make pressure on the government policy. Many 
professors and scholars, by making use of all kinds of network, organized themselves 
into academic exchange and professional networking organizations in order to play a 
constructive role in policy formulation. Through these kinds of academic activities, 
such as holding international conferences and international visiting programs, local 
and overseas scholars have the opportunity to conduct extensive discussions, with 
national and transnational perspectives, in order to widen the scope of policy 
discussions to push the government policy reform. 
Other than Zhao, Glaser and Saunders"^^ also suggest there are various pathways 
which the research institute can seek to influence the mindset of the policy officials, 
for example, internal reports, small group policy meetings, informal consultations 
with policy makers, internal conference, appearance in media, academic articles and 
books 
2.4. Transnational Advocacy Network 
2.4.1. What is network 
As a term that is widely used in several aspects in economics, sociology and 
political science, network are inherently difficult to define. In most general 
understanding, networks are simply collections of linked nodes. In social science, a 
fundamental difficulty of definition stems from the fact that networks can be seen as 
organizational structures or processes that bring actors together."^^And in addition, 
Bonnie S. Glaser and Phillip C. Saunders .2002. Chinese Civilian Foreign Policy Research Institutes: 
Evolving Roles and Increasing Influence. China Quarterly 171 (September 2002): 607. 
41 Perkin, Emily and Julius Court. 2005. Networks and Policy Processes in International Development: 
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management theorists Lipnack and Stamps describe as a 'networked organization' 
combines both the structural and the procedural elements of n e t w o r k i n g , � More 
recently, Riles addressed similar issues in the Network Inside Out (2001), she 
indicated that a network is both a means to an end and an end in itself, and that the 
role of actors is in part simply to validate the continued existence of the network. 
Based on these definitions, it is widely be accepted that network is formal or informal 
structures that link actors (individuals or organizations) who share a common interest 
on a specific issue or who share a general set of values. 
However, there are essential functions that are particularly well suited to the 
network structure. Network do have the capacity to foster the following items44: 
1. Communication: the multiplicity of links within a network allows for actors to 
communicate better. Hence, there is the potential for knowledge to be shared 
interactively across both horizontal and vertical dimensions. 
2. Creativity: free and interactive communication among a diverse range of actors 
offers a fertile climate for creative action. 
3. Consensus: networks can make use of their many links among diverse actors to 
build consensus, often circumventing formal barriers. They allow like-minded 
actors to identify each other and rally around a common issue. 
The word 'network' has come to be adopted as a buzzword in a wide range of 
contexts, and it is always enthusiastically acknowledged that networks have a 
a Literature Review. Working Paper 252 of Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 2. 
42 Lipnack, J. and J. Stamps. 1994. The Age of the Network. Essex, Junction, Vermont: Oliver Wight 
Publications, Inc., p.l 
Riles, J . 2001. The Network Inside Out. Michigan: University of Michigan Press, p.2 
44 Perkin, Emily and Julius Court. 2005. Networks and Policy Processes in International Development: 
a Literature Review. Working Paper 252 of Overseas Development Institute, London, p. 2. 
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significant role to play in modem s o c i e t y . I n the sense of the rising of importance of 
networks in nowadays, it can be concluded that globalization, governance and 
knowledge management are the contributing factors which support the growing 
importance of networks. Globalization demonstrates a fast growing importance on 
information and technology development and societal networks. Concurrently, 
governance shows there is a growing pressure on national governments and 
international organizations to link better with non-governmental actors and 
supranational actors in order to vertically and horizontally ensure legitimacy and 
effectiveness of the regime. 
2.4.2. What is transnationalism 
Transnationalism is a modem and even current term which often used to describe 
state-to-state policy and some global issues which affect not only for a single country 
but also spread into several surrounding countries as well. In defining what is 
transnationalism, Thomas Risse-Kappen, one of the most well-known IR scholars, 
mentioned 'transnational relations', is regular interactions across national boundaries 
when at least one actor is a non-state agent or does not operate on behalf of a national 
government or an intergovernmental organization.'^^ 
In addition, Joseph S. Nye and Robert O. Keohane also noted that 'interstate' 
interactions along with conventional diplomatic activity. Other interactions, however, 
involve nongovernmental actors — individuals or organizations - and we consider 
these interactions 'transnational'. Thus, a transnational interaction may involve 
45 McCarthy, H., P. Miller and P. Skidmore. eds., 2004. Network Logic: Who Governs in an 
Interconnected World? London: Demos, p. 5. 
46 Risse-Kappen, Thomas. 1995. Bringing Transnational Relations Back In : Non-State Actors, 
Domestic Structures, and International institutions. Cambridge; New York, NY, USA: Cambridge 
University Press, p. 2 
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governments, but it may not involve only governments: Nongovernmental actors must 
also play a significant role.47 
Therefore, 'transnational interactions' is to describe the movement of tangible 
(physical objects, money and persons) or intangible (ideas, beliefs and doctrines) 
items across state boundaries when at least one actor is not an agent of a government 
or an intergovernmental organization. 
In the aspect of international relations, transnational!sm represented a counter 
theory on classical realism in various aspects. According to table 1.4, it splits and 
analyzes the two major approaches in international relations: realist and 
transnationalist. Between the two approaches, transnationalist approach can be 
characterized as it focus on majorly about international cooperation and inviting 
actors which are not coming from the state level. Hence, it varies with realism as it is 
more optimistic on this non-state level collaboration. 
Table 1.4 Comparing realist and transnationalist approach 
Realists Transnationalists 
State-to-State relations Global politics 
Independent Inter-dependence, Universalism 
Power struggle between states International cooperation 
Anarchy Economic interdependence, 
International Organizations and 
Institutions 
47 Keohane, Robert O and Jospeh S. Nye. 1995. Power and Interdependence. New York: HarperCollins 
Publishers, p. 2 
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Pessimistic view on human nature Optimistic view 
Power Order 
Zero-sum interest Common interest/consensus 
In addition, transnationalism can also be categorized into two different levels: 
global and local levels. In the global level, it targets on some specific multilateral 
collectivities, such as United Nations (UN), the International Monetary Fund (IMF), 
the World Bank (WB), international non-governmental organizations (NGOs), and the 
global capitalist class. The aim of this global level is to seek to construct a global 
neoliberal contextual space, a 'new world order，’ to regulate transnational flows of 
capital, trade, people, and culture. 
On the other hand, local level targets on specific collectivities, local households, 
kin networks, elite fractions, and other emergent local formations, which actively 
pursue transnational migration to create and reproduce another kind of transnational 
social space, the 'trans-locality', to sustain material and cultural resources in the face 
of the neo-liberal storm. 
2.4.3. What is transnational advocacy network? 
Transnational advocacy networks (TANs) are the most informal configuration of 
nonstate actors. Networks are sets of actors linked across country boundaries, bound 
together by shared values, dense exchanges of information and services and common 
discourses.48 They are significant transnationally and domestically by building new 
48 Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. eds., 2002. From Santiago to Seattle: 
Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics. In Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, 
and Kathryn Sikkink.eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, 
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links among actors in civil societies, states, and international organizations, they 
multiply the channels of access to the international system. It is regarded as advocacy 
networks because they advocate plead the causes of others or defend a cause or 
proposition. Advocacy captures what is unique about these transnational networks: 
they are organized to promote causes, principled ideas, and norms, and they often 
involve individuals advocating policy changes that cannot be easily linked to a 
rationalist understanding of their interests.49 
Scholars in this field start to recognize the significant of these activists networks. 
Motivated by values rather than by material concerns or professional norms, these 
networks often reach beyond policy change to advocate and instigate changes in the 
institutional and principled basis of international interactions. ^^  Indeed, these 
networks are most prevalent in issue areas characterized by high value content and 
informational uncertainty, such as the anti-slavery movement, campaign for woman 
suffrage, human rights, environmental protection and labor rights. In addition, these 
non-traditional international actors try to consolidate their members' cohesion by 
shared norms and values and mobilize them to arouse the public attention on certain 
issues or even create new issues and categories and to persuade, pressure, and gain 
leverage over much more powerful organizations and governments. 
Major actors in advocacy networks may include the following^^ ： 
1. International and domestic nongovernmental research and advocacy organizations 
and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 7. 
49 Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p.8. 
50 Ibid, p.2 
51 Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p.9. 
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2. Local social movements 
3. Foundations 
4. The media 
5. Churches, trade unions, consumer organizations and intellectual 
6. Parts of regional and international intergovernmental organizations 
7. Parts of the executive and/or parliamentary branches of government 
Within these actors, international and domestic NGOs play a central role in all 
advocacy networks, usually initiating actions and pressuring more powerful actors to 
take positions. NGOs introduce new ideas, provide information, and lobby for policy 
changes. 
2.4.4. How Transnational Advocacy Network works? 
In the last paragraph, it is discussed that TANs are especially strong at working at 
issues related to human rights, environmental protection and women's rights and 
mobilizing social concerns transnationally and pressuring governments. However, in 
general term, TANs appear most likely to emerge around those issues where : 
1. Channels between domestic groups and their governments are blocked or 
hampered or where such channels are ineffective for resolving a conflict, setting 
into motion the 'boomerang' pattern of influence characteristics of these networks 
2. Activists or 'political entrepreneurs' believe that networking will further their 
missions and campaigns, and actively promote networks 
3. Conferences and other forms of international contact create arenas for forming 
52 Ibid, p. 12. 
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and strengthening networks. 
It's widely being accepted that 'boomerang' pattern play an essential part of 
justifying the importance of TANs in shaping state's policy transnationally and 
through non-governmental channel. When channels between the state and its domestic 
actors are blocked, the boomerang pattern of influence characteristic of transnational 
networks may occur: domestic NGOs bypass their state and directly search out 
international allies to try to bring pressure on their states from outside.^^ Therefore, 
the domestic NGOs form network with other NGOs transnationally and exchange 
their information, tactics and ideas. Once the NGOs in the other states successMly 
built up their power to pressure their corresponding government, state in other country 
will pressure the original state transnationally and shape the state's policy eventually. 
Transnational advocacy networks seek influence in various ways that similar to 
some other groups. However, as they are not as powerful as some traditional political 
group, they tend to use the power of their information, ideas, and strategies to alter the 
information and value contexts within which states make policies.54 In order to bring 
pressure the government to change their policy perception and outcome, persuasion 
and socializations are their major tactics which try to pressure the government in the 
following ways55: 
1. Information politics: the ability to quickly and credibly generate politically usable 
“ I b i d 
Khagram, Sanjeev, James V. Riker, and Kathryn Sikkink. eds., 2002. From Santiago to Seattle: 
Transnational Advocacy Groups Restructuring World Politics. In Sanjeev Khagram, James V. Riker, 
and Kathryn Sikkink.eds., Restructuring World Politics: Transnational Social Movements, Networks, 
and Norms. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 7. 
Keck, Margaret E. and Kathryn Sikkink. 1998. Activists Beyond Borders: Advocacy Networks in 
International Politics. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, p. 16. 
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information and move it to where it will have the most impact 
2. Symbolic politics: the ability to call upon symbols, actions, or stores that make 
sense of a situation for an audience that is frequently far away 
3. Leverage politics: the ability to call upon powerful actors to affect a situation 
where weaker members of a network are unlikely to have influence 
4. Accountability politics: the effort to hold powerful actors to their previously states 
policies or principles. 
Hence, the transnational advocacy networks have to carefully monitor the 
situation in different circumstances to catch and even create opportunity for potential 
networking effectiveness. 
2.4.5. What conditions do advocacy networks have influence? 
To evaluate the influence of advocacy networks, Keck and Sikkink identify the 
following types or stages of network influence^^: 
1. Issue creation and agenda setting 
2. Influence on discursive positions of states and international organizations 
3. Influence on institutional procedures 
4. Influence on policy change in 'target actors' which may be states, international 
organizations or private actors 
5. Influence on state behavior 
Networks generate attention to new issues and help set agendas when they 
56 Ibid, p. 35 
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provoke media attention, debates, hearings, and meetings on issues that previously 
had not been a matter of public debate. Moreover, networks also can be expected to be 
more influential when they can help persuade states and international organizations to 
support international declarations or to change states domestic policy positions. In 
addition, it also depends on how frequent of the targets of the network campaigns 
respond to the policy change, especially in the procedures. Finally, it's of utmost 
importance of the networks can exert pressure and shape states policies, not only on 
the target states, sometimes but also of other states and international institutions. 
3. Application to the North Korea case 
This part is essential in by drawing the three debates to the understanding of the 
case in North Korea, as the North Korean officials encountered a serious and 
consistent economic recession in recent years and without any possible and practical 
policy advice. Therefore, one of the European NGOs invited various economic 
scholars from Europe and organized two big workshops in Pyongyang in order to 
provide necessary knowledge and policy advice toward to the officials in Pyongyang 
authorities. As a result, in the following part, a general review of North Korean 
economy will be made and followed by analyzing the structure and ideation 
communication between the communities with the North Korean government 
officials. 
As mentioned in the first theoretical debate, ideas, as mentioned, is growing more 
importance in international relations. Since the rise of constructivism studies in IR, 
ideas, culture and knowledge began to rise as a new study focus in IR and scholars 
also began to apply ideas as a variable in understanding state's behavior and its policy. 
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In regards to the argument of this dissertation, it's designed to justify the ideas 
promoted by the expert group in FNF was essential in shaping the economic reform 
program in North Korea. Based on the finding, it's unsurprising that the policy change 
in North Korea cannot be shaped by outside forces. Likewise, the outside forces can 
also provide their influence ideationally. In the case study of this dissertation, one of 
the most influential NGOs, which have been working on North Korean affairs in 
Europe, organized numerous academic-to-officials workshops in Pyongyang and 
therefore expert groups was emerged since then. The ideas, which promoted by the 
academic scholars during the EU-DPRK Workshops, communicated through various 
institutionalized channels and strategies. After the ideas proliferated, the authoritative 
and research-based ideas shaped the mindset of the North Korean officials and altered 
the policymaking. Eventually, through various signs, we noticed that some of the 
policy outcomes in North Korea was shaped by the ideas brought by the economists in 
Europe through the EU-DPRK Workshops. 
In the second debate, discussion on epistemic community was conducted and the 
rising of this kind of community was mentioned as knowledge on policy suggestions 
is getting more and more important in recent years. 
Expert group is the major actor to be analyzed in this dissertation. It played an 
important role in affecting many policies changes and raised numerous issues to the 
general public and policymakers, such as transborder environmental problem, trade 
disputes, and human rights protection. In my case study, there were expert groups 
existed in between the EU-DPRK relationship. Within the non-government level 
contact, one of the European NGOs, called FNF, organized two huge workshops on 
providing economic knowledge and technical advice on the economic reform and 
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uncertainty in North Korea. During the two workshops，scholars from various 
European countries were invited and they delivered presentations on the topics which 
they're expert in. After various presentations and other means of communications, the 
mindset of the policymakers in North Korea was shaped by the ideas promoted by the 
European counterparts and eventually altered the policy outcomes in North Korea. 
In addition, in the debate on whether for or against the dialogue between scholars 
and policy makers in a normative sense, and whether the gap between the worlds of 
academic and policy making should be bridged, partly bridged or hard to be bridged. 
Ironically, this debate is highly relevant to the case study in this dissertation. It's 
unbelievable that knowledge community can play an effective role in a communist 
and repressive regime as the policy making in the government is completely 
dominated by the core group of high officials. However, the case study in this 
dissertation is going to disprove this myth and demonstrate that there are expert 
groups which are aim at providing economic knowledge and technical advice to the 
officials in Pyongyang. Moreover, these scholars within these communities are 
basically come from Europe, through transnational means of communication 
strategies, shaped the thinking of the policymakers in North Korea and direct the 
economic reform. Hence, in this case study, scholars' ideas and their community are 
extremely important and effective in affecting the policy output designed by the 
policy practitioners in North Korea. 
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Chapter Two 
North Korea Economy: General Review and Trend Development 
To North Korea, the end of Cold War meant not only the picture of the collapse 
of the Soviet Union, but also the loss of significant economic assistance More 
importantly, the collapsed of the USSR, her chief foreign ally and ‘brother’，China, 
also started to develop her diplomatic relations with South Korea. These diplomatic 
and economic pressures pushed seriously on North Korea, and eventually pursue to 
develop nuclear weapons in order to protect their fragile economy and treat it as a 
bargaining card to deal with United States for economic assistance. 
Since the mid 1990s, North Korea economic situation was further deteriorated. 
The bad harvests and consistent drought contributed to a great famine happened 
during the mid 1990s and more than ten thousands of people death from starvation. So 
as to push to re-build the economy, Kim Jong-il seeks to promote series of 
spontaneous economic reform in 2001 and finally developed a large scale of economy 
reform programs at July 2002. However, the effectiveness of the reforms was not that 
optimistic and successful enough to transform and rescue the poor economic situation 
in North Korea. 
1. History of North Korea 
In a classic article in 1941, Harold Lasswell defined 'the Garison States' as one in 
which 'the specialist on violence are the most powerful group in society,. North 
Korea has perfected Lasswell's idea: it is, above all else, the most astounding garrison 
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State in the world. The establishment of North Korea was demonstrated as a 
building of a arsenal in the northeast Asia as the DPRX Constitution calls for 'arming 
all the populace and turning the entire country into a fortress.^^ In terms of military, 
half of the North Korean population is in the military and with significant military 
experience. On the other hand, in terms of defense expenditure, it moved up 
incrementally from around $1 billion in the 1980s to more than $3 billion in the mid 
1990s. Hence, for decades, military play an important role in shaping the policy 
direction in North Korea. 
Tracing back to the origin of North Korea, the Korean War in the 1950s 
demonstrates a disastrous conflict between the North and the South inside the Korean 
peninsula and consolidate the power of the North Korean regime. In defining this civil 
war, there are several kinds of descriptions, such as a conventional war of aggression 
by the North Korean, 'another Munich' according to Truman and 'Stalin's war' 
according to researchers of Soviet documents disclosed after 1991. No matter which 
side you takes, it's an undoubtedly fact that in the summer of 1950, North Korean 
troop was mobilized and invaded on the South. According to the American 
perspective, this is one of the most disastrous wars after the second world war and the 
United States held the responsibility to protect its allies by dispatching her defense 
forces to South Korea in order to fight back the Pyongyang troops. According to 
Bruce Cummings, he noted the general belief on the North Korean soldiers during the 
war period as: 
The North Korean soldier must not be underestimated. He is a tough 
57 Cumings, Bruce. 2004. North Korea: Another Country. New York and London: The New Press, p. 1. 
58 Ibid 
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opponent, well-led, combines the infiltration tactic of the Japanese with the 
tank tactics of the Russian of the World War II. He is able to march and 
maneuver and to attack at night with cohesion with (MacArthur) has never 
been able to do. These are the troops who served in China... (the) tank work 
is extremely efficient and ski l l fu l . 
Since the end of this civil war in the Korean peninsula, the parallel line was 
drawn so as to split the two Koreas by territorial, economical and ideological sense. 
North Korea, with the fully supported by the Soviet Union and Communist China, 
started to build up its socialist system with self-subsistence economic structure. 
During the cold war era, USSR provided a security umbrella towards North Korea and 
even shared the nuclear development knowledge. Since then, North Korea began 
playing its nuclear bargaining card with the United States and contributed to a series 
political crisis in the Korean peninsula. 
2. Overview: From 50s to 2002 
The North Korean economy is one of the world's most isolated and bleak.^^ It 
was completely bypassed by the economic miracles of the past quarter century that 
brought modem economic growth and industrialization to South Korea, Taiwan, 
Singapore, and Hong Kong, as well as rapid growth and trade liberalization to China 
and Southeast Asian countries. The state-oriented and dominated North Korean 
economy can be described by state ownership of means of production, centralized 
economic planning and command, and an emphasis on military development. The 
59 Cumings, Bruce. 2004. North Korea: Another Country. New York and London: The New Press, p. 9 
Nanto, Dick K and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 2005. The North Korean Economy: Background and 
Policy Analysis. CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32493, p. 3 
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economic system is designed to be self-reliant and closed. However, the more it close, 
the poorer the economy it is and more reliance on the economic assistance from the 
international community. 
Five decades of North Korean economic development can be summarized by two 
decades of rapid growth and industrialization followed by three decades of slowdown， 
stagnation and decline.^^ Despite the devastating Korean War in the 1950-53, North 
Korea's initial industrialization was impressive. Thanks to the unconditional support 
by Soviet Union, including finance, knowledge and technology, North Korea received 
tremendous assistance from USSR during the 50s. Therefore, the early 
industrialization took place in North Korea was basically driven by USSR 
establishments and factory building in the North during the WWII and this advantage 
contribute to the consistent growth in North Korea GDP, which comparatively higher 
than South Korea at that moment. 
North Korea put emphasis on heavy industry, including the chemical, iron, steel, 
and machine tool sectors. The country could steadily increase its industrial output, 
producing steel, machine tools, tractors, trucks, bulldozers, and generators, and 
exported some to the developing countries. These set of economic strategies was 
further justified by the development of the idea called ‘Juche，，which can be fully 
described as the directive strategy in North Korea until now. 
1.1. Economic Philosophy: Juche 
61 Soo-Bin Park. 2003. The North Korean Economy: Current Issues and Prospects. Paper presented at 
the conference of the Association of Korean Studies in Canada held at the University of British. 
Columbia, Vancouver. (October 3-4, 2003), p. 3 
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The Pyongyang regime has pursued a policy of self-sufficiency and isolation from 
the world economy that they call ‘Juche, or self-reliance. Juche goes beyond 
economics as it has been used since the 1950s to perpetuate power by the central 
government and to build an aura of the supernatural around their supreme leaders Kim 
(Kim il-sung and Kim Jong-il).62 
On the one hand, the economic implications of Juche have minimized 
international trade relations, discouraged foreign direct investment, and fostered what 
it considers to be core industries, mostly heavy manufacturing. On the other hand, 
during the post Korean War period, North Korean government also emphasized the 
parallel development of military build-up with the support of concentration on heavy 
industries. 
As mentioned above, Juche placed military and economy simultaneously. 
However, the current leader in North Korea, Kim Jong-il, has given the highest 
priority to the military than any other thing else. That means under his rule, army 
placed ahead of the working class (revolutionary/ vanguard party). Compared with his 
father, Kim Il-sung's Juche ideology found equal importance on political 
independence, self-defense, and economic self-support capabilities.^^ Therefore, in 
years of development, the country formed the tradition on developing its industries 
within the context of a military-industrial complex linkage, and the whole societal 
forces were mobilized to support this ideology. 
62 Nanto, Dick K and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 2005. The North Korean Economy: Background and 
Policy Analysis. CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32493, p. 3 
63 Nanto, Dick K and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 2005. The North Korean Economy: Background and 
Policy Analysis. CRS Report for Congress Order Code RL32493, p. 4 
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Secondly, when Juche ideology links with central planning, a command economy, 
and government ownership of the means of production, economic decisions that in a 
market economy would be made by private business and farmers have to go through a 
few elite in Pyongyang .These decision makers may or may not understand or take 
some non-economic factors when making national economic policy, such as they 
would refrain in attracting foreign investment simply because the regime refused to 
being ‘exploited，by capitalists who seeks to make profits on their business 
opportunity in North Korea due to this kind of cultural mistrust on westerner as a 
precondition. 
1.2. 7Q-80S 
Even dominated by the Juche ideology, in the 1970s, North Korea made a 
large-scale purchase of turnkey factories from the West to upgrade its technology. But, 
due to a series of economic downturn triggered by the oil shock, the sinking of export 
prices on raw materials badly affected the balance of payment of Pyongyang and 
contributed to a massive trade deficit during the late 1970s. Since then, the country 
was virtually cut off from access to advanced technology and international capital, 
and its economy began to slow down to develop. 
The North Korean economy further deteriorated during the 1980s. In the early 
1980s, the North Korean economy started to show the classic symptoms of a 
malfunctioning planned economy. ^^  The shortages or inefficiency were seen 
64 Ibid 
65 Soo-Bin Park. 2003. The North Korean Economy: Current Issues and Prospects. Paper presented at 
the conference of the Association of Korean Studies in Canada held at the University of British. 
Columbia, Vancouver. (October 3-4, 2003), p. 5 
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everywhere, including raw materials, energy and hard currency. Furthermore, after 
years of development, some infrastructure decayed and machinery became out-dated 
and depreciated. However, unlike some socialist countries, North Korea refused any 
economic liberalization and stubbornly followed the centralized economic strategy. 
Then, consequently, stagnated economy was resulted. 
1.3. After the Cold War 
In the 1990s, North Korea's economic stagnation turned into a real crisis. Before 
the collapse of the former USSR, the existence and development of the North Korean 
economy was primarily depends on the economic assistance from Soviet Union and 
China. However, since 1991, the former USSR withdrew its support and demanded 
for payment in hard currency for imports.^^ In 1989-90, Soviet-DPRK bilateral trade, 
which provided the DPRK with many vital goods such as chemical fertilizers and 
crude oil, totally approximately $1 billion, but in the mid-1990s, it dropped to $80 
million. As a result, the DPRK consumption of primary energy declined from 25 
million tons of oil in 1990, to 17 million tons in 1995. These largely dropped also 
hindered the basic heavy industrial development in DPRK and most of the factories 
were forced to cease operation and caused a great problem of unemployment in North 
Korea. 
Table 2.1 Economic Trends in North Korea, 1990-2000^^ 
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presented at the Conference on Korea: The East Asian Pivot, organized by the Navel War College, 
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Economic Trends in North Korea, 1990-2000 
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China, even though stepped in to provide assistance and supplied food and oil at 
a concessionary price, but in 1994 China reduced its export to North Korea. Moreover, 
in diplomatic sense, China and the new-bom Russia also started to develop a formal 
diplomatic relations with South Korea in the early part of 1990s. These economic and 
diplomatic pressures further isolate North Korea and pushing it into the edge of 
collapse. 
In Table 2.1, it shows that the general trend of the economic performance in North 
Korea in 1990 to 2000. In terms of GDP, after the cut off the economic assistance 
from USSR, the GDP of North Korea dropped drastically from base year 100 in 1990 
to around 50 in 1995, which is from $23.1 billion to $11 billion. In addition, the trade 
volume was also decreased tremendously from $4.21 billion to only around $2 billion 
in 1996. Therefore, it demonstrates how the serious of the economic situation in North 
Korea after the cut-off of economic assistance from USSR. 
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1.4. Famine: 1995 
Because of the lack of food and resource assistance, North Korea response to even 
intensified the mal-ftmctioning domestic production, such as double-cropping, 
intensive and uncontrolled production. These measures led to serious soil depletion 
and lower yields, and the expansion of farm land into hillsides and other marginal 
land contributed to soil erosion, river silting and eventually, severe flooding.69 
In 1995, catastrophic floods destroyed a large part of the grain harvest and led to a 
full and comprehensive famine in North Korea. In the aftermath of the flood, it also 
destroyed a large share of North Korea's hydroelectric capacity and contributed to the 
collapse of the energy and industrial and manufacturing production. These 
circumstances consequently led to a chronic famine widespread took place in North 
Korea during 1995 to 1998. Estimates vary widely, but the most sober academic 
research suggests that between 1995 and 1998, the famine killed perhaps 600,000 to 1 
million people, or roughly 3 to 5 percent of the precrisis population of approximately 
2 2 mil l ion.70 
1.5. 2002 Reform 
Unlike most other commanded economies, North Korea did not introduce any 
fundamental reforms after the collapse of the Soviet Union. However, some market 
solutions emerged spontaneously and short-term in nature during the mid-1990s when 
69 Kokko, Ari. 2004. Economic Reforms and Skill Requirements in DPRK Paper presented at the 
Stanley Foundation. Available at: <http://vps.stanlevfoundatioiLorg/initiatives/eenk/papers/Kokko.pdf>. 
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the official economy failed to provide basic necessities for the population. However, 
these were, tolerated rather than encouraged by the national l eade r sh ip .The word 
‘reform’ was not used through officially or explicitly channel, since it automatically 
implied there were some internal flaw of the ‘juche，economy. 
It was not until July 2002 that an economic reform package was publicly 
announced. These reforms were the ever reform that North Korea introduced 
officially and with such a wide scope of coverage in history. Inside the reform 
program, it covered both microeconomic incentives and macroeconomic stability, 
with specifically targeted at the price and wages de-regulation, reform on the public 
finances system, raising the exchange rate into a realistic level, transforming the 
collective farming, restructuring the state-own enterprise and establishment of free 
trade zones. 
With the ideological and institutional burden, Pyongyang has been under-taking 
a centrally-planned economy for more than 50 years. In its economy, market 
mechanism was deliberately removed and all the economic decisions were made 
according to the government's wish and plan. But, by adopting measures to improve 
economic management on July 1，2002, Pyongyang appears to have chosen a new 
road by selectively invites some market mechanism into its economy but without any 
political reform. The July 2002 reform package consisted of five components: prices 
rising and increase in wages based on performance, enhancement of self-management 
of enterprises, devaluation of exchange rate, farm reform_and attracting foreign direct 
investment (FDI). 
71 Seliger, Bemhard. 2005. The July 2002 Reforms in North Korea: Liberman Style Reforms or. Road 
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1.5.1. Prices rising and increase in wages based on performance 
To recover the costs of production and cracking down the underground market 
activities, Pyongyang adopted far-reaching price reforms. It reduced distortions in 
relative prices between goods in the formal sector by raising the prices of basic 
necessities which had been heavily subsidized. For example, the sales price of rice per 
kilogram in the formal sector was raised from 0.08 won to 44 won, and the 
procurement price was increased from 0.80 won to 40 won so that the state would no 
longer have to incur losses on rice transactions. Moreover, the price of pork was 
increased from 7 won to 180 won per kilogram, and the price of electricity was raised 
from 0.02 won to 2.1 won per kilowatt-hour. ^^  In addition, according to the 
government announcement, the public distribution system, which used to provide free 
goods to citizens, no longer provided the most essential of basic necessities nearly 
free of charge. All transaction would be monetized. Therefore, under these measures, 
Pyongyang decided to re-install the market price system into its economy in order to 
reduce the market distortions. 
Furthermore, so as to give workers sufficient purchasing power to buy goods at 
new prices in the formal sector, their wages was raised. On average, workers' wages 
were increased by 18 times to 2,000 won per month. This wage increase was based 
upon a rationale that a typical four-member family needs around 4,000 won per month 
for living expenses. Different categories of workers received increases based on the 
importance and skill of their work, with soldiers, miners, and scientists receiving 
72 Wonhyuk, Lim. 2005. North Korea Economic Futures: Internal and External Dimensions. 'Paper 
presented at the Conference on Korea: The East Asian Pivot, organized by the Naval War College, 




larger increases than office workers. ？存 Performance-based incentives were 
strengthened as well. 
1.5.2. Enhancement of self-management of enterprises 
The economic reform in North Korea also gave greater autonomy to local plant 
managers. The Pyongyang government depoliticized economic decision making at the 
local level by transferring managerial rights from party cadres to plant managers. The 
scope of central planning was reduced to major indicators such as total industrial 
output, construction investment, electricity and steel production; and the authority to 
formulate detailed production plans (including labor management) was 
d e c e n t r a l i z e d ” Under this reform, enterprises can sell or export their products by 
themselves, and earn the capital necessary for their plan. Also, they were allowed to 
dispose of their products in the market, so long as they met general production targets. 
In other words, after fulfilling the production obligations, they were allowed to sell 
what they want and how much they want. Moreover, enterprises could also start any 
new branches or new businesses, such as hotels, restaurants or shops. Some 
enterprises even took loans from merchants and other more moneyed individuals to 
expand their business. 
More than that, Cabinet Resolutions No. 24 and No. 27, dated May 5，2003，officially 
recognized existing markets and stipulated the establishment of new markets as well, 
74 International Crisis Group (ICG). 2005. North Korea: Can the Iron Fist Accept the Invisible Hand? 
International Crisis Group Report No. 6 (25/4/2005). Available at: 
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with a view toward setting up more than 300 general markets around the country^^ 
The Cabinet Resolutions additionally allowed the state-owned enterprises and 
cooperatives to participate their economic activities in these markets. 
1.5.3. Devaluation of exchange rate 
Under the reform, the unrealistically high value of the North Korean won was 
abandoned. The official rate of exchange was lowered from 2.2 won to 150 won to 
$US1. This brought the official rate more in line with the underground black market 
rate. 
1.5.4. Farm reform 
In regards to this reform, farmers won the right to cultivate a piece of land, while 
the government keep owning the land itself, sticking to the socialist principle. This 
revolutionary market strategy included the idea of 'land contract' which the state still 
control the ownership of the land but by giving larger autonomy on farmers on the 
farmland. Under this principle, farmers can distribute their product according to the 
amount of their labor, after paying the fee, 15%, of their product. Furthermore, in 
collective farms in the north, farmland is allocated to individual farmers for 
cultivation, but what they produce cannot sell to the markets as they have to sell their 
excess food to the Government procurement agency. 
76 Wonhyuk, Lim. 2005, North Korea Economic Futures: Internal and External Dimensions. Paper 
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1.5.5. Attracting foreign direct investment 
A new emphasis has been placed on the establishment of various types of special 
economic zones designed to attract foreign investment. However, this is not an 
entirely new policy. The Rajin-Sonbong region in the north-east of North Korea was 
set up in 1991, and under an agreement with the South Korean conglomerate Hyundai 
‘ in 1998, a special tourist venture was set up at Mountain Kumgang.^^ Under the 
reform, one of the regions was opened up for foreign investment by the Pyongyang 
government, called Sinuiju Special Administrative Zone. Within this region, foreign 
investors were granted some additional investment preferences and protected by a 
well-developed legal system. Two months later, it promulgated the Kaesong Industrial 
Zone, with catering for small and medium companies from South Korea investing 
under implicit protection of Hyundai. This project was regarded as a strategy that 
would not only benefit the North Korean economy, but also push inter-Korean 
economic cooperation to the next stage. 
3. North Korean Economy in 2005-2007 
Actually, most Western observers have been disappointed with what has, or rather 
what has not, happened after the first set of reforms in July 2002. It is evident that no 
major steps have been taken, and，as mentioned, an obvious backlash occurred in 
2005 when a ban on private grain sales was implemented in an attempt to re-introduce 
a stringent rationing system. 
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3.1 Lack of substantial changes 
After the big reform package issued in July 2002, the Pyongyang government failed to 
implement any follow-up policy action and substantial policy changes in the 
following years. From 2005 to 2007，generally, the North Korea authorities were 
unable to launch large-scale projects, they are focusing on smaller projects of local 
value.79丁he reasons for the lack of substantial changes in North Korea economy are: 
3.1.1. Slow down the rapid change 
On 1 July 2002, North Korea proclaimed the adoption of a new reform policy of 
‘Economic Management Improvement'. Inside the reform programme, the North 
Korean government conducted and implemented a historical and comprehensive 
economic reform at both micro and macro levels. The reform itself demonstrated the 
North Korea authority risked it in rescuing its devastated economy, such as stimulated 
the labor incentive by raising wages and strengthening the compensation system, and 
raising the food prices to a more reasonable and marketable level. 
Other than the items listed above, there were over than 10 selected items which 
were addressed and re-adjusted so that contributed to the revolutionary change of the 
North Korean economy. Since then, the domestic economy has been undergoing 
gradually change and the marketing feedback was still carefully monitored by the 
government officials. Indeed, one of the most disastrous results was hyperinflation. 
The extraordinary drop in the official won/dollar ratio after 2002 indicated a one-time 
79 Asmolov, Konstantin, Suslina, Svetlana and Victoria Park. 2007. The Democratic People's Republic 
of Korea in 2006. Far Eastern Affairs 51. 
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shift of DPRK financial accounting from a notional to a more realistic level, 
recognizing that repressed inflation is more destabilizing than open inflation. 
However, the reports of a steady rise in market prices for food suggested that the 
Central Bank has the credit window wide open一a policy that can lead to 
hyperinflation in short order， 
As a result, the North Korean authority decided immediately to return to the 
original point and re-organized the whole set of reform programmes by a more 
cautious planning. Therefore, in recent years, the changes and transformation occurred 
in North Korea was rather slow and cautious. 
3.1.2. Focus on security/nuclear issue 
Handling North Korean affairs, it would be insufficient by considering the 
economic issues as a separate item without looking at the security aspects. As since 
October 2002 when North Korean official announced his intention to restart the 
nuclear program, nuclear issue was overwhelmed as an intervening and decisive 
variable in driving the attention of the North Korean authority as well as the 
surrounding Powers and the momentum in concerning the local economy was 
decreased respectively. 
To further complicate the issue, since 2005, North Korea has produced more 
vigorous and provocative activities and diplomatic pressure on the United States and 
the world by creating the nuclear crisis. In February and May 2005, Pyongyang 
Thumton, Judith. 2007. Benchmarking North Korean Economic Policies; Lessons from Russia and 
China. Conference Paper presented at "North Korea- Guideposts for Radical Economic Change 
(8/2/20027). 
65 
officials announced that North Korea had nuclear weapons and would indefinitely 
suspend its participating in the Six-Party Talks, and they had removed 8,000 fuel rods 
from the Yongbyon reactor for reprocessing. ^^  Even though the North Korea 
eventually made concession on agreeing to re-open the fourth round of the Six-Party 
Talks in late July 2005, the crucial disagreement between Pyongyang and Washington 
was remained and intensified when the U.S. Ambassador to South Korea Alexander 
Vershbow labeled North Korea as a ‘criminal regime' and likened the state to Nazi 
Germany for its criminal activities. 
The nuclear crisis was further intensified when North Korea raised its 
brinkmanship by unleashed a volley of seven missiles, included one intercontinental 
missile that failed 42 seconds after launch, and a mixture of short and long range 
missiles that did seem to work, in July 2006 and in addition to conduct a nuclear test 
o o 
in October 2006. Ironically, this provocative behavior was also coincided with the 
U.S. government by invoking the 'Patriot Act’ fingered a Macao bank called Banco 
Delta Asia (BDA) as Pyongyang's primary money laundering mechanism, which led 
to the freezing of some $24 million in North Korean accounts. These issues hindered 
the reform progress in North Korea; the government re-prioritized their policy focus 
from economic reform to security and nuclear issues. 
The onset of the nuclear crisis had two important economic effects: It first 
pushed security calculations to the fore and shifted the policy focus way from reforms; 
and second it substantially altered the external economic landscape. Sanctions, 
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financial shock associated with the BDA affair, and efforts to arrest illicit activities 
such as counterfeiting and drug trafficking had consequences. Even the Bank of 
Korea estimated that North Korean growth turned negative in 2006 for the first time 
since 1999.85 
3.1.3. Adverse feedback from the July Reform 
In July 2002, North Korea announced to implement a series of economic reform 
including price reform and depreciation of exchange rate. The most dramatic measure 
was a profound change in prices and wages. Subsidies were removed, the price of rice 
went up 549-fold. Wages were increased substantially but on a variable basis, and the 
won was officially devalued 74-fold. Since the reform implemented and executed, 
the instant result was not that successful and some of the data even showed that there 
was a downside effect of the rapid reform program. 
Several main features of the reform measures continued to have an adverse effect 
in 2005. The first was price reform, whereby the price of all goods in state-operated 
stores approximates the price in the farmers' markets, with the government making 
frequent adjustments to reflect the real prices. The immediate effect of this reform in 
2002 was hyperinflation, with prices jumping some twenty-five fold. 
Table 2.2: North Korea's July 2002 Reform Pricing Structure 
Before July 2002 After July 2002 
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Rice Procurement price 0.8 won/kg 40 won/kg 
Sale Price 0.08 won/kg 44 won/kg 
Maize Procurement price 0.49 won/kg 20 won/kg 
Sale Price 0.06 won/kg 24 won/kg 
Source: Hale 2006，p. 
In the above table, the pricing structure of rice and maize changed significantly 
after the economic reform in 2002. Before the reform, rice and maize in North Korea 
was paid up by the government from 0.8 won/kg and 0.49 won/kg to 40 won/kg and 
20 won/kg respectively. 
Furthermore, in order to raise the productivity of the farmers, the government 
also announced an incentive for farmers to produce more food for the public 
distribution system (PDS). Before the reform, the Pyongyang government paid 
farmers 0.8 won/kg of rice and sold it at PDS centers for the subsidized price of 0.08 
won/kg. But, since the July 2002, the government would procure rice at 40 won and 
sell it for 44 won, thus making a profit of 4 won instead of subsidizing rice. 
This market step was originally a positive procedure which allows the new and 
more market-oriented price system to better reflect market realities. However, 
unfortunately, as the government concurrently devaluated the won from its artificial 
rate of 2.15 to the dollar to the more realistic rate of 150 per dollar, in part to better 
reflect market realities. But, in the absence of a corresponding increase in commodity 
production has led to the unfortunate phenomenon of too many won bills chasing too 
88 Hale, Christopher D. 2005. Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 Economic 
Measures. Asian Survey 49, 6: 826 
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few goods: the resulting hyperinflation has led to the reappearance of a large gap 
between the official and black market price for food.^^ Therefore, the wage earners 
received wags from the state or industrial enterprises failed to buy any sufficient good 
while the price of commodity rose substantially to an unbearable level. 
Secondly, in the trend of decentralization of the industrial sector, the North 
Korean government began to remove its control and subsidy on industrial enterprises 
since July 2002. Since the reform, workers at industrial enterprises were taken off the 
state payroll after being given a one-time payment of 3,000 won to help ease the 
transition; they then became permanently dependent on the enterprises for 
wages.90Along with this, enterprises were also gaining autonomy and responsibility to 
purchase raw materials on the market and choose how to invest profit. Moreover, 
factory managers were also told to establish actual product prices, wages and 
production plan. These policy shifts was intended to encourage industrial enterprises 
to find their own ways to increase productivity and autonomy to develop their 
production plan. 
The market step which to provide more autonomy toward the industrial sector was 
originally a positive strategy. However, unfortunately, continued energy and raw 
material shortages have left the average operational rate of most factories at less than 
30%; as a consequence, most factories are currently unable to produce enough to pay 
a living wage.^^ 
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卯 Haksoon Paik. 2004. North Korea's Economic Reforms and Nuclear Programs and President Roh's 
Policy Toward North Korea. Paper presented at the Brookings Institute Conference on 'President Roh 
Moo-hyun 's First Year: Diplomacy and Domestic Reform. Washington, D.C. (23/3/2004), p. 9 
91 Hale, Christopher D. 2005. Real Reform in North Korea? The Aftermath of the July 2002 Economic 
Measures. Asian Survey 49, 6: 834 
69 
3.2. Detrimental Economic Situation 
In fact, the economic performance of North Korea failed to maintain the policy 
change momentum in 2002 and demonstrated a deteriorating trend since 2005. In 
2005, the overall indicators showed there was a moderate recovery as the food aid 
from China had soared in 2005 from 165,000 tons in 2004 to 146,000 in 2005.^^ 
While in the same period, the overall trade between China and North Korea increased 
20% in the first quarter of 2005 compared with the same period a year ago. In 
addition, the Pyongyang government also asked the World Food Program, which 
provided 90% of foreign food aid to North Korea, to shift the focus from food to 
development aid and is also asking all resident foreign personnel from 12 private aid 
groups to leave the country.^^ These issues seem like providing a new circumstance 
that North Korea is gradually recovering from its stagnant economy. But, what is far 
more controversial is the sign of improvement was ended in 2006. 
Ironically, 2006 was the year which broke the hope for measure to recover its 
economy. The first reason was due to the recurrence of the natural disaster. In the 
wake of a hurricane in July 2006, monsoon rains pelted the country with a savagery 
unknown since 1995，washing away farmland and leaving hundreds of thousands of 
people homeless. The International Federation of Red Cross and Red Crescent 
Societies (IFRC) reported that merely in countries where they had a presence there 
were 7507 completely houses, 12585 homeless families, and 13290 hectares of arable 
lands damaged by the floods.With more than 1.5 million hectares of arable land was 
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submerged, food shortages was occurred instantly afterwards and the magnitude of 
this disaster could match that in the summer in 1995. 
Another reason other than natural disaster was the missiles and nuclear test in 
North Korea in July and October, which highly intensified the hostility between North 
Korean government with the world community. Immediately after the nuclear test in 6 
October 2006，all financial transactions along the Sino-Korean border stopped as trade 
traffic waned.^^With South Korean aid already suspended after the missiles tests in 
July, Chinese government is also turned to be anger with the provocative activities by 
North Korea and decided to suspend the food and fuel aid to Pyongyang. These 
suspensions further intensified the disastrous environment in North Korea as 
Pyongyang has relied on foreign aid to maintain food subsistence for years, with 
Chinese aid in 2006 down about two-thirds from its 2005 level, and a humanitarian 
crisis began to loom again in North Korea. 
4. Conclusion 
In reviewing the economic situation in North Korea, it did experienced a fast 
growing industrialization as they received the unconditional support by Soviet Union, 
including finance, knowledge and technology during the 1950s. So, during that 
moment, the continued growth in North Korea GDP was even higher than South 
Korea. However, as the North Korean leader decided to close its national door, no 
foreign trade or contacts were allowed during the Cold War era. This 'self-protected' 
rationale was proved to be failure as after the collapse of USSR, the North Korean 
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economy encountered the greatest challenge which they never experience before: 
consistent drought and natural hazards. 
Mid 1990s was the turning point of the modem history of North Korea. The 
agricultural failure forced the Pyongyang government seek for international food 
relief and humanitarian assistance. Since then, foreign contact was re-established and 
the government also finally decided to open its market for foreign investment. 
Although the market opening in recent years was not that decisive and complete, it 
showed some signs of improvement and the irresistible trend of economic 
liberalization will continue to push the Pyongyang government in opening up its 
economy to the other world and re-engage to the international community. 
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Chapter Three 
EU-DPRK Relations: From Governmental to Non-Governmental 
Since the study on the security and political issues on the Korean Peninsula is 
explored, the EU is not considered to be a major player and hardly gets mentioned at 
all. When reporting on North Korea these days, the international media usually refer 
to Washington's efforts continuing to seek a diplomatic solution with the help of 
South Korea, Japan and China. Initial hopes that the EU's engagement course could 
facilitate and encourage a reunification of the two Koreas turned out to be overly 
optimistic. The prospects for a peaceful reunification, like the East and West Germany 
case, would not be practical enough when comparing to the situation on the Korean 
Peninsula, as the current socio-political indicators of North Korea show that the 
economy in North Korea is significantly much worse than East Germany a decade ago. 
Moreover, North Korea's concern at this moment is that it might be the next victim of 
a pre-emptive attack by the US. So, until now, what EU can contribute to the peaceful 
reunification between the North and South Korea is limited. 
Indeed, EU policy-makers claim that whether the EU can continue to seek to 
engage the DPRK entirely depends on Pyongyang, and its willingness to negotiate 
security and nuclear issues multilaterally. 
1. EU-Asia Relations: In general 
In general understanding, EU developed a comprehensive diplomatic relations 
with Asia for years since the mid 1990s. The European Commission first produced an 
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overall Asia Strategy paper in 1994 under the title 'Towards a New Asia Strategy’It 
was a first effort to take an integrated and balanced view of the relations between the 
EU and its Asian partners. Much of this is still broadly valid, but at the same time 
much has changed in both regions since then. 
In September 2001, the European Commission adopted a new strategic framework 
for relations with the region. Its core objective is to strengthen the EU's presence in 
Asia, raising it to a level commensurate with the growing global weight of an 
enlarged Union. It has six key points^^: 
1. Contributing to peace and security both in the region and globally 
2. Strengthening mutual trade and investment flows 
3. Promoting the development of the less prosperous Asian countries 
4. Contributing to the protection of Human Rights and to the spreading of 
democracy, good governance and the rule of law 
5. Building global partnerships and alliances with Asian countries 
6. Helping to strengthen the awareness of Europe in Asia. 
Subsequently, in July 2003, the Commission launched its New Partnership with 
South East Asia, which sets out a comprehensive strategy for the future EU relations 
with the sub-region. 
Politically, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CSFP) has its main 
objectives in order to on one hand safeguard the fundamental interests and integrity of 
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the EU, but also to strengthen and promote peace and international cooperation in 
Asia. Therefore, so as to build a secure Asia, at the summit level, the EU held regular 
meeting with China, India and Japan, while the biannual Asia-Europe Meeting 
(ASEM) brings together of the heads of states of 16 Asian countries with their 
European counterparts to discuss about the EU-Asia relations. In addition, at the 
ministerial level, regular meeting also be held with the Association of South East 
Asian Nations (ASEAN) and enhance the diplomatic cooperation with the countries in 
South East Asia, such as the EU cooperate with ASEAN to launch an economic 
sanction against Burma in 2007. 
Economically, the EU and Asia take the form of bilateral trade ties, 
region-to-region partnerships, and multilateral cooperation within the framework of 
the World Trade Organization (WTO). Regular meetings on trade and trade related 
matters take place between the EU and Asian countries during the ASEM and other 
ministerial meetings. For trade, in 2006，the overall trade with Asian partners by EU 
accounted for about 30% of EU trade, with China, ASEAN and Japan especially.^^ 
In terms of humanitarian assistance, The EC also provides substantial 
humanitarian assistance to Asia. Financial assistance can be provided to victims of 
conflicts or natural disasters in third world countries, solely on the basis of their 
humanitarian needs assessments. Over the five years from 2002 to 2006, an average 
of €138 million per year was provided in humanitarian assistance following natural or 
man-made disasters in Asia. This accounts for 23% of EU humanitarian aid efforts 
worldwide. Hence, in various perspective, EU has been deeply involved in Asian 
97 The European Union Commission. 2008. EU in Asia. (5/9/2008). Available at: 
<http ://www. delsgp.ec. europa.eu/en/ eu—in—asia/eu—asia. h t m � . 
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issues and consistently built a friendly and partnership relations with Asian countries 
as well. 
2. EU-DPRK: Historical review 
2.1. Cold War Era 
North Korea first looked to initiate relations with Western Europe in 1955 as part 
of its policy to move away from bloc diplomacy and to diversify its diplomatic ties, 
but only insofar as it enabled private-level trade and exchange. However, during the 
Cold War era, the confrontational ideology overwhelmed the global politics. 
Therefore, the linkage between the communist bloc and the capitalist bloc, no matter 
in governmental or non-governmental, rarely happened and the Western European 
countries had no political intention to form any diplomatic ties with socialist countries 
in East Asia. 
The diplomatic breakthrough between North Korea and the West Europe started to 
have some positive progress around 1970. This was partly because of the 
rapprochement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union, but a more fundamental 
reason was the active and aggressive efforts by the North Korean government to the 
European countries. 
There are two underlying reasons behind the rejuvenating behavior of North 
Korea. The first was economic. North Korea started its independent national economy 
based on the Juche ideology since the late 1960s. But, the first seven-year (1961-67 
development plan was not resulted positively and rejuvenated the poor economy. In 
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order to overcome this obstacle, North Korea needed the assistance from Japan and 
the Western European countries, including loans, capitals, technology and industrial 
machinery. So, there was a tremendous rise of bilateral trade between the North Korea 
with the West European countries in the early 1970s. 
Secondly, 'melting' of the freeze relations between the U.S and China created a 
favorable environment to improve the general atmosphere on the Korean peninsula in 
the early 1970s. Since then, the dialogue between the North and South Korea was 
intensified and resulted in the July 4，1972 South-North Joint Communique.^^Taking 
the advantage of it, North Korea further built its diplomatic ties with the Western 
European countries in attempting to develop the same diplomatic level as the South 
Korea, and raising its international status. These diplomatic efforts were quite 
successful in bridging the relations with those European countries, and they finally 
resulted in diplomatic relations with Denmark, Finland, Sweden, Norway and Iceland. 
However, although at that time North Korea was so eager and active to develop 
diplomatic ties with the Western European countries, most of the latter still put 
relations with South Korea first, and were very reluctant to improve relations with the 
North. Moreover, the partly success of the diplomatic re-engagement was faced with a 
critical challenge in the mid-1970s. Followed by the economic crisis and oil shock in 
the early 1970s，it exposed the poor competitiveness of the North Korean products 
and smashed their export industry to the Western European market. Consequently, 
relations between North Korea and Western Europe stagnated, both politically and 
economically. 
卯 Hak-sung, Kim. 2001. EU Involvement in the Korean Question: Background and Implications. East 
Asian Review 13, 2: 42. 
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2.2. Post Cold War era 
In around 1990, when North Korea witnessed the collapsed of the USSR and the 
downfall of communist regimes in the Eastern Europe, it once again felt a desperate 
need to resume ties with the Western Europe. Hoping to gain the support of the 
Western Europe, North Korea often dispatched deputy-ministerial level officials in 
Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs to the region.^^Since then, the economic ties 
between the North and the Western Europe gradually improved up to the mid-1990s, 
but diplomatic relations remained a standstill, especially while most of the former 
socialist countries in the Eastern Europe resumed its formal diplomatic relations with 
the South since the 1991 and tensions over North Korea's suspected development of 
nuclear weapons made European countries extremely cautious about dealing with the 
North. 
The critical issues which changed the attitudes of the European countries to the 
North happened in the mid-1990s. First, followed by the Germany's lead in 1995， 
Western European countries and the European Community began providing 
humanitarian aid to the North as there was a great famine took place in North Korea 
after the consistent drought (There will be a longer analysis in the later part). In 
addition, after the signing of the Agreed Framework in 1994 which signified the 
temporarily end of the nuclear crisis, European Union actively participated in the 
founding of the Korean Peninsula Development Organization (KEDO) as an 
Executive Board Member to help pay for light water reactors (LWRs) to be built in 
North Korea in replacing the original nuclear capacity. Since 1996, the EU has 
99 Berkofsky, Axel. 2003. EU's Policy Towards the DPRK: Engagement or Standstill? The European 
Institute for Asian Studies (BIAS) Publications BP 03/01, p. 9. 
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provided a total of $115 million Euro in funding for KEDO.^^^ With these actions, the 
influence and stature of the EU as a member of the KEDO Executive Board has been 
strengthened and its delegated authority to negotiate contracts with the KEDO 
Operation Office has also increased.^^^ 
More importantly, the EU has endorsed efforts to ensure peace on the Korean 
peninsula based on its fundamental position that it actively supports the reconciliation 
initiative between the two Koreas. In political sense, their relations started at the 
beginning in December 1998, when the first EU-North Korea political dialogue took 
place in Brussels. During the meeting, a variety of issues were discussed, such as 
security issue on the Korean peninsula, economic reform programs, humanitarian 
issues and transparent distribution of food aid. After the inter-Korean summit talks in 
2000，there was also a sign of acceleration of the improvement of the EU-North Korea 
relations. Formal announcements of the establishment of diplomatic ties between 
North Korea and European countries began to emerge after the Asia-Europe 
Meeting (ASEM) hosted in Seoul in October 2000. As of early May 2001, all EU 
countries except France and Ireland had formal diplomatic ties with North Korea, and 
even the European Union was considering establishment of formal relations. 
In May 2001, the Swedish Prime Minister Goeran Persson, EU Commissioner 
Chris F. Patten, and EU High Representative Javier Solana visited Pyongyang and 
1 八 
Seoul to meet the leaders of both Koreas. These events marked a significant 
progress in handling the North Korean issues. The EU Commission announced its 
100 Ibid，p.8 
101 Jae-Sung, Lee. 2005. Two faces of EU-North Korea Relations. The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 17, 1: 40. 
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decision to establish diplomatic relations with North Korea on May 14, 2001 and 
exchanged with North Korea a memorandum regarding the designation of an office 
for an EU foreign mission. ^ ^^  
2.3. After 9-11 
Since the Bush administration came into power, pressures have continually been 
pushing on North Korea, especially related to the issue of the suspecting of possessing 
nuclear weapons and WMD. The 9-11 terrorist attacks began to raise terrorism as the 
immediate and new threat to the US and forced the latter to respond militarily. 
Ironically, the terrorist attack transformed the established international order in the 
post-Cold War era, and created a new alliance system for a capable collective 
response against such threats. Nevertheless, the inclusion of North Korea in the ‘Axis 
of Evil' ideology further complicated the North Korean nuclear issue and the peaceful 
development of the Korean Peninsula. 
Since George W. Bush named North Korea as one of the 'Axis of Evil' and put 
them in the list of supporting terrorism, it undoubtedly deteriorated the peaceful 
atmosphere on the US-North Korea relations and also deeply affected the EU's 
proactive actions to improve relations with North Korea. Apparently, the EU did not 
seek to make any adjustment to its previous policy principles concerning Ask and the 
Korean Peninsula. Yet, it seems inevitable that the EU must implement considerable 
changes to it developed policy in the actual implementation. 
Followed by the general trend, there was a growing discontent and criticism on 
193 Ibid 
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North Korea inside the EU. Despite the rapid improvements in EU-DPRK relations 
during the 2000-2001 with a series of important political breakthroughs including the 
establishment of the diplomatic relations between the North and the EU, the lack of 
progress in changing the attitude toward and mind on North Korea disillusioned the 
EU continual assistance policy. One of the arguments in line with this criticism stated 
that since the EU rapidly increased aid or assistance to the North within a very short 
period of time, North Korea might have wrongly believed that through the EU it could 
simultaneously manipulate many European countries. Therefore, the EU needed to 
moderate future assistance activities in terms of quantity and speed of 
implementation. 104 
Throughout the EU-DRPK relations after the 9-11，EU was overwhelmed 
tremendously by the negative and slow response of the North Korean government, 
especially on the major issues in which the North refused to make any concessions to 
the EU. Undeniably, it is particular true about their conflict on the humanitarian issues 
with the EU has been escalating since 2002. In March 2003, the 59出 Session of the 
United Nations Commission on Human Rights adopted a resolution on the human 
rights situation in North Korea, an issue the EU had referred to the UN.^ ^^ The EU's 
proposal of the resolution arose from two arguments. They were generally 
disappointed by the North Korea's poor human rights record which it did not pay 
much effort to address. Moreover, the stalemate in dialogue over the North's 
humanitarian issues also further increased the dissatisfaction among the member 
states in the EU. Following the EU action, North Korea responded by condemning the 
Jae-Sung, Lee. 2005. Two faces of EU-North Korea Relations. The Korean Journal of Defense 
Analysis 17, 1: 41. 
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EU for intervening their political agenda. This issue was further deteriorated while the 
EU decided to propose a new UN resolution by strongly demanding for the North to 
fully cooperate with the EU on the humanitarian condition in 2004. Subsequently, 
North Korea disregarded this resolution as a justified means to interfere into its 
internal affairs and stated they would never tolerate the EU 'getting on its nerves'. 
Nevertheless, humanitarian assistance to North Korea has maintained at a stable 
level even though the political atmosphere was not that positive. In 2002, a total of 
170 million Euros was spent on humanitarian assistance to the North, of which 8 
million Euros was provided for the purpose of food aid. Additionally, the EU planned 
to build a "Euro-Korea Foundation Training Center" that would serve as a venue for 
the education of North Korean businessmen. ^ ^^  
3. EU-DPRK Relations: Governmental Level 
3.1. EU Perspective 
3.1.1. Motives 
What is the European Union's motive for increased interest and involvement in 
easing tension on the Korean peninsula? This, no doubt, is a question to be raised in 
contemplation of the EU's future policy toward issues concerning the two Koreas. 
First, it is apparent that with the increasing numbers of nations joining the EU, it 
• European Parliament. 2004. Humanitarian Crisis in North Korea: European Parliament Resolution 
on the Humanitarian Crisis in North Korea. Notice no. 2004/C 38 E/OOl, p.5 
82 
wanted to secure a role and position suitable for its status in the international platform 
in the century. Through this connection, it has been concentrating on building the 
global peace, such as to participate in KEDO as an Executive Board member, to 
provide a considerable amount of agricultural, food and market aid to the North, to 
mediate the peaceful talks between the two Koreas and to hold friendly dialogue with 
the North about the missile and nuclear development. These activities have shown 
that EU is going to make use of North Korea as a stepping-stone to transform its role 
as a security leader in the global arena. 
Second, the EU is aiming at building a political and economic foundation that 
will enable it to actively create channels into the Asian market, including both Koreas. 
Since the end of the Cold War, Asia has been regarded as the greatest potential for 
economic growth in the world. So, naturally, European countries are looking closely 
and paying a lot of attention to the Asian market. Consequently, the amount of foreign 
direct investment, infrastructure building, joint-projects and foreign trade between the 
EU and the Asian market has been increased tremendously in recent years. Even 
though the total amount of bilateral trade with the North is not that huge at this 
moment, what the EU is preparing for is the time when North Korean opens its doors 
and the two Koreas are finally reunited. In other words, the EU is now looking to 
secure an early chance to hold the unchallengeable seat for the trade with the North in 
the future. 
3.1.2. Strategy: Quiet and Engagement diplomacy 
The EU addressed its basic policy on North Korea in the Council Conclusion on 
the Korean Peninsula in July 1999, which was confirmed by the Council in the 
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following year. The EU announced that it would take into account the following 
conditions in improving its relations with North Korea: ^ ^^  
1. Whether North Korea takes substantial action toward inter-Korean reconciliation, 
along with the simultaneous implementation of dialogue with affected nations. 
2. Whether it acts responsibly regarding its nuclear and missile issues 
3. Whether it enhances its humanitarian record and complies with the various 
mandates of UN protocols and conventions on humanitarian issues. 
4. Whether it allows its populace access to foreign aid programs and ensures 
international NGO activity in the country. 
5. Whether it opens its economy and issues visas to European correspondents. 
The most detailed document that delineates the EU-North Korea relationship is 
'The EC-DPRK: Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004，’ which was published by the EU 
1 ^o 
Commission in 2000. In this document, the EU Commission outlined its 
perceptions of North Korea. Throughout the whole report, the EU Commission not 
only described the general economic, political and societal situation in North Korea, 
but also set out policy objectives in the following areas: 
1. Institutional support and capacity building for effective development 
2. Sustainment management and use of natural resources 
3. A reliable and sustainable transport sector 
4. Food security and sustainable rural development 
107 Jae-Sung, Lee. 2005. Two faces of EU-North Korea Relations. The Korean Journal of Defense 
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To achieve its policy goals, the EU is following an approach of 'quiet diplomacy" 
seeking to concentrate on policies and initiatives that do necessarily centre on security 
issues. Since the current nuclear crisis outbroke in October 2002, North Korea is 
suspected to restart its nuclear reactor and programs so as to manufacture nuclear 
weapons. By doing so, they expelled the UN weapons inspectors, quitted the Nuclear 
Non-Proliferation Treaty and started the missile testing in 2005. These developments 
seem to have put much negative pressure on the engagement policy by the EU. 
Nevertheless, the EU's engagement diplomacy towards the DPRK is seemingly 
considered by South Korea and Japan, and to a lesser extent by the U.S., to be positive 
and the EU is indeed regarded as an essential mediator as far as humanitarian and 
food aid is concerned. 
3.1.3. Political perspective 
3.1.3.1. Political dialogue 
During the Cold war era, there was not any political interaction between the 
European countries with the North Korea. Since the collapse of the Soviet Union in 
1989 and the withdrawal of economic assistance from her old partners, North Korea 
encountered a massive economic downturn and a great famine in 1995. Since then, 
European Union (European Community (EC) at that time) started to provide 
humanitarian aid and supply energy towards the North by participating into the 
KEDO. The gradual changing bilateral relations finally reached its climax by holding 
the first political dialogue with the North in Brussels in 1998. Through building a 
mutual trust and good bilateral foundation, the first dialogue was primarily focused on 
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economic issue, food aid and nuclear development. 
In December 1999, the holding of the second political dialogue in Brussels was 
also ended with no surprising result and no specific resolution was reached. However, 
there was a political breakthrough in 2000 while the third political dialogue was being 
held in Pyongyang and both sides were willing to talk about the possibility of 
reaching a mutual diplomatic recognition. Moreover, the scope of discussion topics 
was also widened into human right situation in North Korea, the banning of exporting 
weapons of mass destruction (WMD) and enlarging the bilateral trade. 
But, the 9-11 terrorist attack blurred the prospect for forth political dialogue 
between the North and the EU in October 2001. Even though both sides still were 
keen in discussing the issues related to economic assistance, human right conditions 
and missiles and nuclear selling, the EU-DPRK relation was seriously affected by the 
tense atmosphere around the Korean peninsula.謝 
The fifth political dialogue between the North and EU was re-started in June 
2002 through the leadership of the new EU-Presidency (Spain) to pay a diplomatic 
visit to Pyongyang for an 18-days visit. However, as the new nuclear crisis happened 
in October 2002, EU was failed to pursue its engagement policy toward the North 
until late-2003 when EU delegation started its sixth political dialogue in Pyongyang. 
Although there were several ups-and-downs in the EU-DPRK political relations, it 
was undoubted that holding political dialogue was the most effective and direct 
measure to build trust on North Korea. 
� 9 Chae-Bok，Park. 2003. EU-North Korea Diplomacy and Its Implications for South Korea'. Korea 
Focus, pp. 66-67. 
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3.1.3.2. Diplomatic recognition 
Since the late-1950s, North Korea began to develop its foreign relations with the 
outside world by starting to build diplomatic relations. But, during that period, only 
socialist countries like the Soviet Union, China and some East European countries 
were on its diplomatic agenda. However, since the collapse of the Soviet bloc in 
1990s, North Korea was facing a complete diplomatic isolation and the cut of their 
economic assistance. Therefore, it would be important for it to re-build its diplomatic 
network promptly, and Europe would be one of their utmost priorities. 
Although the EU itself - through its European Communities Humanitarian 
Office (ECHO), and individual EU member governments and non-governmental 
organizations — had become involved to varying degrees in providing humanitarian 
assistance and food aid to the North from 1995 onwards, these steps had not been 
complemented by any movement in the diplomatic a r e n a . T h e first breakthrough 
came with Italy's decision in January 2000 to recognize North Korea. Italy, which 
thereby became the first of the Group of Seven (G7) advanced countries to establish 
diplomatic relations with the North and gave over $5 million aid for economic 
assistance towards to North. 
The October 2000 Asia-Europe Meeting (ASEM 3) in Seoul, concurrent with the 
historic North-South Korea Summit in June 2000, contributed a gentle atmosphere for 
the European counterparts for any diplomatic action. Followed by the Sunshine Policy 
by the Kim Dae-jung government, most of the European countries, including 
Bridges, Brian. 2003. Western Europe and North Korea: New Openings and Old Problems. East 
Asia 20, 3: 92. 
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Germany and Britain, began the normalization talks with the North. By the end of 
2001, 13 out of 15 EU member states had diplomatic relations with the North. 
Eventually, with support from a mission of the European troika, Goran Persson, 
the Swedish prime minister and the president of the Council of Ministers, Javier 
Solana, the EU's high representative for Commom Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) 
and Chris Patten, the commissioner for external relations, visited Pyongyang and met 
Kim Jong-il and finally agreed to establish diplomatic relations in May 2001. 
3.1.3.3. Nuclear and security problem 
What EU contributed to the bilateral relations was not only in economic or 
humanitarian perspectives; security dimension was also included in the bilateral 
discussion agenda. In the Country Strategy Paper 2001-2004, the EU emphasized 
specifically that the security concern in Asia was at the top priority on their foreign 
policy agenda. In this point of view, North Korea was portrait as a potential threat in 
region and should be included in the foreign policy concern in the EU. 
As such, the EU's Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP) is designed to 
safeguard and enhance its shared interest and values, play a constructive role in global 
politics, and further upgrade its international standing. The promotion of cooperation 
with Asia, especially on the Korean Peninsula, is thus seen as a valuable opportunity 
for the EU to solidify its CFSP. 
The reason why EU actively participated and eventually became one of the core 
members of the Korean Peninsula Energy Development Organization (KEDO) was to 
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control the nuclear weapons development in North Korea. The EU, being aware of the 
importance of preserving regional stability in Northeast Asia，joined the KEDO as 
part of its policy to support international efforts to safeguard the nuclear 
nonproliferation regime. The EU contributed 15 million euros a year, or 75 million 
euros in total, to KEDO from 1995-2000. In addition, individual EU countries 
contributed another 7 million euros to KEDO,"i 
3.1.4. Economic perspective 
The EU was committed to promoting peace and security on the Korean peninsula 
as well as inter-Korean reconciliation. Even though the EU was not involved in 
discussions on security and nuclear issues on the Korean peninsula, indeed, EU was 
deeply interested in opening the bilateral trade and business opportunity in 
Pyongyang. 
3.1.4.1. Trade 
North Korea was long to be one of the poorest countries in the world. During the 
Cold War, the national economy in North Korea was completely isolated with the 
pursue of ‘juche’ ideology. Without a clear and well-designed state-planning, the 
North Korean economy deeply relied on the economic assistance from the USSR and 
China. However, since the collapse of the socialist bloc in the early 1990s, there was a 
severe decrease of the amount of North Korean trade. According to table 3.1, we can 
see that the trade amount decreased from $4.1 billion in 1990 to $2.5 billion in 1991. 
"1 Chae-Bok，Park. 2003. EU-North Korea Diplomacy and Its Implications for South Korea. The 
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One of the major reasons for the sharp decrease of the trade volume of North Korea as 
the cut off of the raw material assistance from Soviet Union contributed to the halt of 
production in North Korea, and the withdraw of capital inflow from the communist 
bloc also stopped the industrial development in North Korea. 
The great famine in 1995 even deteriorated the domestic economy from the edge 
of collapse. The consistent drought in North Korea destroyed the agricultural industry 
and energy provision. During that period, North Korea was completely short of a 
sufficient supply of food, electricity, energy, infrastructure and hard currency for 
importation. 
1 
Table 3.1: North Korea Trade Index: 1990-2002 (US Smillion) 
I I 
1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2002 
Export 1773 945 933 990 858 736 727 905 559 515 556 650 735 
Import 2437 1639 1622 1656 1242 1316 1250 1272 883 965 1413 1620 1525 
Total 4,170 2,548 2,555 2,646 2,100 2,052 1,977 2,177 1,422 1,480 1,969 2,270 2,260 
Table 3.2: EU-DPRK Trade Amount: 1989-2002 (US Smillion) 
1989 1990 1991 1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001 2C 
— ‘ — 
_ 56 100 119 173 117 115 92 110 99 130 62 117 70 87 — 
叩 on 140 139 147 159 176 202 216 223 229 224 137 170 241 30 
�—-— 
�tal 196 239 266 332 293 317 308 334 328 354 200 287 311 39 
^ ^ ^ — L L _ 
The EU, along with China and Japan, is among the major trading partners of 
North Korea. However, with the scale of bilateral trade amounting to only some $200 
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million to $400 million a year, from the EU perspective, North Korea does not rank 
among the EU's significant trading partners. Since 1996, EU was expanded to 15 
members. Regarding to table 3.2, it shows that the EU-DPRK trade gradually 
increased to a peak of $350 million in 1998. In 2000, while EU normalized the 
diplomatic relations with the North, there was a rapidly jumped on their bilateral trade, 
with 22.5 percent in 2001 over the previous year. 
3.1.4.2. Economic Assistance 
Through various channels, the EU has been supporting international efforts to 
ensure peace and stability on the Korean Peninsula by playing a positive role in 
promoting progress in inter-Korean reconciliation and providing assistance to help 
North Korea to overcome its economic difficulties. EU assistance to the North, which 
has included food aid, support for improvement of it agricultural sector and 
infrastructure, and humanitarian relief activities, amounted to $280 million as of the 
end of 2000.112 
3.1.4.3. Food aid 
Geographically, North Korea is surrounded by mountains, and the ratio between 
arable lands with population is one of the lowest in the world. This agricultural 
problem was further deteriorated while there was a great famine occurred in North 
Korea in the mid-1990s. However, this structural and policy crisis was failed to 
address because the North Korean government resisted engaging a huge amount of 
i�2 Ruediger Frank. 2002. EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason. International 
Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, 2: 92 
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import from the outside world. Therefore, it was undoubted that food aid was the only 
available method. 
Table 3.3: EU Assistance to the DPRK 1995-2002"了 
TOTAL 393 million euro 
Food Aid and Structural Food Security 222 million euro 
Assistance 
Humanitarian Assistance 115 million euro 
Technical Assistance 35 million euro 
Table 3.4: EU Food Aid to the DPRK 1997-2000^^^ 
DONOR BUDGET 
Bilateral 106 million euro 
Donations through WFP 50 million euro 
Donations via European NGOs 94 11 million euro 
TOTAL 168 million euro 
The EU has been providing sufficient food aid since 1990s, via the Food Aid and 
Food Security budget line, supporting vulnerable people in the DPRK and in response 
to DPRK's appeals for assistance after a severe period of natural disasters and 
structural economic crisis. For example, in regards to the Table 3.3, EU has been 
providing $222 million euro food assistance to North Korea from 1995 to 2002. In 
terms of donor strategy, from the table 3.4，we can see that most of the food aids were 
basically taken by bilateral donor, which is about $106 million euro. 
Berkofsky, Axel. 2003. EU's Policy Towards the DPRK: Engagement or Standstill? The European 
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Initially a food aid assistance program, it had increasingly become oriented 
towards agricultural rehabilitation and production with a view to a more sustainable 
approach towards increased food security. In 2000 and 2001 then, the EU has started 
to focus less on providing traditional food aid and has turned to provide agricultural 
support, including fertilizers, and put a focus on deforestation and water supply. 
3.1.4.4. Technological Transfer 
The previous paragraphs showed apparently that there was an immediate need to 
revive the national economy in North Korea. Due to the fact that there had been a lack 
of high-tech assistance, the North Korean government was by no means but to seek 
for any potential technological assistance from the foreign countries. Unlike China 
and Vietnam, where the governments seemed stable and economic reform is likely to 
be attempted in carefully planned steps, North Korea was more an industrial rather 
than an agricultural country so that it faced immediately some of the same problems 
as experienced by the countries of Central and Eastern Europe in upgrading the 
industrial infrastructure and adapting its scientific and technical capabilities for 
urgently needed civilian goods and equipments. Meanwhile, the collapse in 
agricultural production, environmental degradation and human health and privation 
problems needed to be r e v e r s e d , n， 
Therefore, the EC-DPRK Country Strategy Paper (CSP) set out the framework 
and objectives for technical assistance projects in North Korea. This project provided 
training in market economic principles and projects were designed to support and 
115 European Commission. 2005. The EC-Democratic People's Republic of Korea (DPRK): Country 
Strategy Paper 2001-2004. p. 20. Available at: 
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promote sustainable management, efficient use of natural resources in the DPRK, as 
well as institutional support and capacity-building. 
The National Indicative Programme (NIP), a followed-up and amendment of the 
Country Strategy Paper, covered a period of three years (2002-2004) and foresees 15 
million Euro for technical assistance projects.^^^ In the table 3.5，it revealed that 
inside the NIP，the major focus of their technical assistance project was the 
institutional support and capacity, as it was designed to train the local officials in 
understanding the international trade issues and market economy knowledge. 
Table 3.5: National Indicative Programme (NIP) Technical Assistance Projects: 
2OO2-2OO4I17 
Projects Budget Activities (Selection) 
Institutional support and 7 million Euro Training in key ministries, 
capacity building study tours to the EU; 
training for ministry 
officials on international 
finance, international trade, 
market economy principles 
Sustainable management 3 million Euro Training, technical advice 
and the use of natural and transfer of know-how to 
resources manage the energy sector in 
a sustainable way; training 
116 Berkofsky, Axel. 2003. EU's Policy Towards the DPRK: Engagement or Standstill? The European 
Institute for Asian Studies (EMS) Publications BP 03/01, p. 24. 
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to improve energy 
production and energy 
efficiency 
Sustainable rural 5 million Euro Training and transfer of 
development actions technical expertise 
promoting sustained rural 
development; training in the 
field of water resources 
management and soil quality 
production 
In fact, the first pilot project which EU provided to North Korea was given in 
February 2002. This pilot project was used to assess the technical assistance needs 
and to identify areas in which the Commission could launch other pilot projects. The 
results of the fact-funding mission were presented to a donor co-ordination meeting of 
Member states and other partners, such as the U.S., Japan, South Korea, Canada and 
Australia in Brussels on March 16, 2001 in Brussels. The expert group report 
identified the following the priorities with regards to North Korean needs 
參 Training, such with regards to institution-building 
參 Technical advice and assistance on how to run the DPRK energy system 
參 Rural development 
參 Transport and infrastructure 
118 European Commission. 2005. The EC-Democratic People s Republic of Korea (DPRK): Country 
Strategy Paper 2001-2004. p. 20. Available at: 
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Since then, there were various pilot projects started, such as the “Pilot Project in 
Training Institutional Support" with a budget of 940,000 Euro in February 2003, and 
‘‘Pilot Project in the Energy Sector" with a budget of 976，100 Euro in 2004. 
3.2. DPRK Perspective 
3.2.1. Motives 
Since North Korea has consistently sought to improve relations with Western 
European countries since the 1970s, it can be concluded that there are three 
underlying calculations behind such strategic move: Open its door and allow reform, 
maximized its diplomatic advantage and the feedback on the hard-line policy by the 
Bush Administration. 
In addition, it was surprising that Pyongyang agreed to consult the human rights 
issue with Germany during the formal ties establishment. Therefore, we can try to 
investigate what were the underlying motives of the North to start its diplomatic 
relations with the EU. 
First, one of the most important motives behind it was its intention to open its 
doors and allow reform. Considering the North Korea's domestic policies since the 
early 1990s, it was undoubted that the expectation of an open and engaging North 
Korea was not that optimistic. However, in the mid-1990s, the great famine and 
pro-longed economic problems accerlerated the demand of the North for economic 
assistance, technology transfer and even the possibility to invite some foreign 
investment and joint-projects. Therefore, through an active and engaging diplomacy, 
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North Korea could improve its national economy and political image with the help 
from the European countries. 
Second, most view that the real motive behind North Korea's recent EU policy 
was a part of its diplomatic strategy. The recalcitrant country's recent gesture was a 
careMly calculated tactic aimed at using recent developments in the international 
environment to maximize its advantages and maintain its regime. Pyongyang 
probably had two political motives: one was to try to soften down the hostile stance of 
the US on the North, while it could make use of the EU as a counter-balancing tool 
against the US. Moreover, through a deep and friendly consultation of the missile 
defense (MD) and the human rights issue with the EU, North Korea could gain full 
support from the EU and even the international community about the unjustified 
boycott by the US on those issues. 
Third, by fully utilizing the role and image of the EU, North Korea could look 
for a positive identity to enter the international community with the help from the EU. 
Since the end of the Cold War, the North had been completely overwhelmed by its 
relations with the US for a sovereignty recognition and national survival. However, as 
the current Bush administration was ironically taking a hostile view on the North and 
refused to make a diplomatic concession, the North, in order to find an alternative, 
could make use of the friendly and cooperative image of the EU which could help 
them further engage in the global community as a better replacement of the US in its 
diplomatic options�i9 
119 Hak-sung, Kim. 2001. EU Involvement in the Korean Question: Background and Implications. East 
Asian Review 13, 2: 42 
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3.2.2. Strategy: Pragmatic but gradually open 
Different from the United States, North Korea has adopted a 'pragmatic strategy' 
toward the European Union (EU). As discussed in the previous part, Europe was one 
of the most important allies and origin of supports for North Korea since the Cold War 
era. The Soviet Union provided endless supports, economically and militarily. 
However, since the collapsed of USSR and the political reform took place in Central 
and Eastern European countries in the early 1990s, the economic crisis and diplomatic 
support was intensified and cut-off so that the bilateral relations between Europe and 
North Korea was diminishing. 
But, as EU developed as a vital player in the world affairs, especially actively 
involved in the North Korea issues. It showed that it's strategically important for the 
North to rebuild its cooperative relations with the European countries. This intention 
was further stimulated as EU participating in the Korean Peninsula Energy 
Development of Organization (KEDO) project, which spearheaded its engagement 
first in North Korea's nuclear problem, then through food assistance, then economic 
relations, and finally through an improvement in overall relations. This thinking 
coincided with EU policy which decided to further participate in the Asian arena and 
the U.S. protagonist foreign policy toward to the North. 
3.2.2.1. Pragmatic policy 
Critics at times suspect that North Korea's interest in the EU is more 'tactical' 
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than ‘genuine, seeking to achieve greater international recognition.丨20 North Korea 
wants to take the utmost advantage of the EU with a view to softening the Bush 
administration's hard-line policy. That applies especially to the establishment of the 
EU-DPRK political dialogue, is being argued. This seemed indeed to be the case 
when Pyongyang urged the EU to put pressure on the U.S. to agreeing to talk to North 
Korea on a bilateral level in February 2003.'^^This rationale coincided with the 
general belief of EU as they promote multilateralism and protect the balance of power 
in world politics, North Korea believes that these factors will work in its interest. 
In facing the current nuclear crisis, Pyongyang expects the EU to take an active 
role. It is indeed that the last agreement that made between the U.S. and North Korea 
in the previous nuclear crisis in 1994 was only a temporal solution. After signing the 
agreement, North Korea would be able to maintain its regime through various crises 
that might occur in the course of a nuclear game, and it longs to break through its 
"I continuing food and economic problems by playing the new nuclear card. 
In recent years, the U.S. government, ruled by the Bush Administration, 
implemented various means such as economic sanctions and selective containment in 
nonmilitary fields so as to prohibit the further development of the nuclear capabilities 
in North Korea. Under these measures, it's highly probably that the U.S. would take 
military action against North Korea if the North decides to re-start its nuclear program 
or smuggles the nuclear materials to the terrorists. Therefore, the particular reason 
why North Korea wishes to maintain relations with the EU is a precautionary measure, 
Berkofsky, Axel. 2003. EU's Policy Towards the DPRK: Engagement or Standstill? The European 
Institute for Asian Studies (EMS) Publications BP 03/01, p. 14. 
Ibid 
124 Hun-Kyung, Lee. 2007. North Korea's Desired Strategy and Approach toward the European Union. 
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to prevent a stalemate between North Korea and the U.S.^^^It is also seeking an 
alternative in case any clash arises or there is deterioration in the U.S.-North Korea 
relations, so as to overcome diplomatic isolation and to extend its communication 
networks. 
On one hand, Pyongyang hopes that the EU will ease the Bush administration's 
hard-line policy stance on the nuclear issue. This expectation derived from the fact 
that the EU shows to certain extend of flexibility on the nuclear issue and take a 
serious dialogue and prefer a diplomatic and multilateral way in the process of dealing 
with the nuclear crisis. On the other hand, Pyongyang also expects the EU can 
perform as a mediator in bridging the cleavages between the North and the United 
States. On countries' basic standings, it's belief that the EU can play such a role at a 
critical moment when neither North Korea not the U.S. can make any compromise. It 
is also the fact that Pyongyang does not believe Japan or South Korea, both being on 
the U.S. side, can play such a mediating role which can get rid of the U.S. influence. 
Unlike those countries, EU might apply pressure on Bush administration as it believe 
that diplomatic resolution can pursue a better result than any other means. Therefore, 
in strategically speaking, Pyongyang selectively and pragmatically keeps a friendly 
relation with the EU as it can be a potential mediator in the nuclear crisis. 
3.2.2.2. Open Policy 
Concerning the relations between Europe and North Korea, given its historical 
background, it's essential that North Korea was able to maintain good relations with 
Central and Eastern Europe countries during the Cold War era, such as the North 
123 lbidp.52. 
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established diplomatic relations with Sweden, Norway, Finland, Denmark, Iceland 
and Portugal in the mind 1970s. 
In regards to the previous parts, since the end of the Cold War era, North Korea 
has pressed ahead to normalize and improve relations with Western European 
countries, which tried to move away from its lean-to-one-side diplomacy toward 
nations that were traditionally friendly to it, such as the socialist countries. So, after 
the collapsed of Soviet Union, North Korea developed its new open policy with 
improving its relations with capitalist European countries, which wanted to avoid the 
image of being portrayed as a rogue state. Therefore, after rounds of diplomatic 
discussion, the European Commission, in consultation with EU member states, 
decided to normalize relations with North Korea in order to facilitate the EU's efforts 
in support of conciliation in the Korean peninsula, and in particular to support 
economic reform and easing of the acute food and health problems in North K o r e a . i24 
To be sure, North Korea's rapproachment with the EU and obtaining economic 
assistance is one of the great steps which open its door to the European counterparts. 
Other than diplomatic opening, North Korea also pursues its open policy with the 
European countries in focus on obtaining food aid and other assistance. In light of 
North Korea's serious food situation and the death because of starvation caused more 
than several hundred thousands to 3 million people. It's noteworthy that the 
Pyongyang government called for food aid and food security programs from EU 
contributed to a huge amount of assistance when comparing with the other countries. 
The European Commission has become increasingly oriented toward humanitarian 
124 Hun-Kyung, Lee. 2007. North Korea's Desired Strategy and Approach toward the European Union. 
North Korean Review, Spring, p. 51. 
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assistance such as healthcare, medical care and agricultural rehabilitation with a total 
of $332 million Euro since recent years.^^^ One of the reasons why North Korea 
wants to obtain more and more food from the EU because it tends not to impose any 
political precondition on the humanitarian assistance. Therefore, North Korea has 
been focusing on luring humanitarian assistance from the EU. 
In addition, North Korea desires to open its economic relations with the EU in 
order to overcome its economic difficulties. It's because that unlike the American 
companies, EU firms are not subject to restrictions on investing in North Korea. For 
example, there were about 20 financial institutions and individuals, mostly from 
Europe, under the umbrella of the London-based Northern Development Consortium, 
have set up a capital company in North Korea to herald further reform of the secretive 
state's communist economy and signal increased openness toward foreign 
investment. 
Concurrently, North Korea also fully utilized its close relations and expanding is 
trade, including import and export, with the EU. North Korea has imported equipment 
from European countries, and has used their technical guidance on the rapid building 
of new factories and on factory modernization in order to develop its manufacturing 
base.^^^These policies were further consolidated in the EU-North Korea Country 
Strategy Paper (CSP) for 2001-2004. It showed that North Korea has high 
expectations for EU development assistance and long-term investment, concentrated 
on institutional support and capacity building, sustainable management and use of 
125 Ibid, p.53 
126 Ward. A. 2003. European Investors Move into N. Korea. Financial Times (21/11/2003) 
127 Frank, Ruediger. 2002. EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason. International 
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natural resources, and a reliable and sustainable rural development. ^ ^^  Furthermore, it 
has designated the euro, rather than US dollar, as the foreign currency in domestic 
circulation. All these measures will be important to assist North Korea economic 
recovery, contributing to the solution of its food crisis and modernize its agricultural 
and resource management. 
Therefore, in regards to the EU-DPRK relations, the pragmatic with opened 
rationale behind the North Korean officials can be based on two dimensions: taking 
EU as a diplomatic mediating role between US and North Korea, and open its 
economy, including trade and technology, in order to draw the EU humanitarian 
assistance and technological transfer for stimulating the economic recovery in North 
Korea. 
4. EU-DPRK relations: Non-Governmental Level 
In the last part, there is a deep discussion about how and why the EU-North 
Korea relations being developed from in governmental perspective. In the following 
part, we will turn the focus shift on the opposite side, considering the importance of 
non-governmental relations between EU and DPRX in recent years. During the past 
few years, Non-government organizations (NGOs), especially the aid agencies, played 
a significant role in affecting the bilateral relations between EU and DPRK. 
From those agencies' experiences, what they experienced in North Korea was 
differed significantly in numerous aspects from what they have previously 
experienced in humanitarian missions in other countries. No matter the working and 
124 Hun-Kyung, Lee. 2007. North Korea's Desired Strategy and Approach toward the European Union. 
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living conditions, negotiation practices and restrictions on freedom of movement and 
information accessing, showed clearly that those European NGOs encountered a 
situation that they never experienced and posed a great challenge on their missions. In 
the following part, we will briefly introduce the major missions of the European 
NGOs worked in North Korea during the last few years and what are the limitations 
and debates that they faced. 
4.1. NGOs and North Korea 
The rise of NGOs presence in North Korea was one of the most eye-catching 
issues as the transnational network began to establish between North Korea and other 
world in the recent years, especially after the famine happened in 1995. Inside this 
relationship, the North Korean government invited and welcomed some NGOs from 
various countries to establish their oversea branches in Pyongyang and start their 
humanitarian projects. 
In terms of countries, there is wide variety of countries which started their 
missions in North Korea, such as U.S., South Korea and Europe. However, in 
particular, NGOs from the US and South Korea are subject to continual suspicion, 
which among other things meant that they are not allowed a permanent working place 
in North Korea. South Korean developmental help organizations have received 
relatively good access to North Korea under the Sunshine policy, North Korea has 
concentrated significantly since mid 2002 on state research programs and fostered 
sharp distrust against South Korea NGOs. However European NGOs, which are 
deemed to be less dangerous, have enjoyed more freedom in comparison to South 
Korea and the US，for example, the privilege of having a permanent working place in 
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North Korea. 
A considerable problem for all NGOs in this area is not only the persistent state 
monitoring, but the limited access to the people. A need assessment, for example, of 
nourishment help can not be coordinated with the hungry; rather it must be worked 
upon within the state guidelines. The same goes for implementation analyses. 
Nevertheless it can be said that the work of foreign development help organizations 
has, up to now, averted a new famine. ^^ ^ 
In terms of projects, NGOs in North Korea focus on various types of missions. 
Primarily, most of the NGOs now working in North Korea are providing humanitarian 
aids and assistance to the local people, for example, Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF) 
and Oxfam. In addition, some other NGOs are promoting human rights protection, 
such as Amnesty International and Human Rights Watch. Moreover, there are some 
religious NGOs who are providing donations and development projects in North 
Korea in order to transform the living standard in North Korea, such as the Religious 
Society of Friends and Christian Friends of Korea. Lastly, some NGOs are also 
actively and consistently providing economic knowledge transfer towards the North 
Korean officials in recent years so as to assist their economic reform in the knowledge 
level, such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation. 
4.2. Humanitarian NGOs in North Korea 
129 Snyder, Scott. 2003. The NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and Scott Snyder, 
eds., Paved With Good Intentions: NGO Experience in North Korea. Westerport, Connecticut, London: 
Praeger, p. 5. 
Ibid 
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4.2.1. Period: 1995-1998 
Numerous European NGOs have been working with humanitarian efforts in North 
Korea. As of October 2002, eight European NGOs had resident status in the DPRK 
and one NGO was providing aid without having permanent residence in the country. 
Five other NGOs that had worked in North Korea in the past had decided to 
withdraw. 131 
NGO activities in North Korea started during the massive flooding happened in 
1995 and the Pyongyang government inevitably launched the international assistance. 
The first European NGO working in DPRK was Medecins Sans Frontieres (MSF), 
which conducted a health assistance program from November 1995 to January 1996. 
Generally, during the first phase of the NGOs engagement, European NGOs sent food 
and nonfood items (medicine, clothes, etc.) through the UN World Food Program 
(WFP). 
In 1997, nine NGOs received residency status in the DPRK, such as Children Aid 
Direct (CAD, UK), Concern Worldwide (Ireland) and Oxfam Great Britain (Oxfam 
GB) etc. Also, the majority of North Korean aid projects undertaken by European 
NGOs are supported by the European Commission's Humanitarian Aid Office (ECHO) 
and by public funds from individual European governments. ^ ^^ In tactical speaking, it 
is believed that the DPRK government tried to use the engagement of European 
NGOs as a counterweight to other countries considered ‘hostile，，such as United 
� Schloms, Michael. 2003. The European NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and 
Scott Snyder, eds., Paved With Good Intentions: NGO Experience in North Korea. Westerport, 
Connecticut, London: Praeger, p. 49. 
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States, South Korea and Japan. Therefore, during this phase, only European NGOs are 
granted to have permanent offices in Pyongyang. 
From 1996 to 1998, European NGOs were active in a variety of sectors. Food 
delivery and food security programs aiming to improve the nutritional status of 
beneficiaries in the short-and-mid-term were carried out by most NGOs.^^^ As most 
of them followed the requests of the DPRK authority, some of the NGOs worked 
closely with the government plan and located their project in response to the 
government request. But some other NGOs took a different approach by locate their 
projects in those regions of the country where the humanitarian situation was reported 
to be particularly difficult. 
Within this period, even though the European NGOs were the first international 
assistance which invited and requested by the Pyongyang government, it's by no 
means that NGOs still face numerous hindrances during their mission in DPRK. First, 
the NGO staffs were confronted with considerable constraints on movement. 
Movement within Pyongyang city was restricted; even driving a car without a driver 
was usually p r o h i b i t e d ] 34 i n this sense, the movement of the NGO staffs, especially 
those aid workers, received the hardest restrictions that totally prohibit their freedom 
to work under the inspection of the DPRK officials. Secondly, all international 
agencies, including UN agencies, had access only to specific DPRK counties. In May 
1997, for instance, 159 out of 211 counties were accessible. The remaining counties 
were off-limits.i35As the government stated clearly that due to the national security 
Ibid, p.50 
134 Ibid,p.51 
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concern, no aid workers or humanitarian distributions were allowed to work or carry 
out in nonaccessible areas. Thirdly, even in those accessible areas, the constraints on 
movement have remained. For example, when an agency requested access to a county 
where another agency was working, access was often denied. Moreover, all aid 
agencies were required to inform the Flood Damage Rehabilitation Committee 
(FDRC) one week in advance which institutions they planned to v i s i t . L a s t l y , on 
monitoring visits, NGO staffs were accompanied by local authorities and 
representatives from FDRC. Within the agency, the stock, including food, medicine 
and other materials were checked before any mission started, and the communication 
with individuals during monitoring visits was only possible through an interpreter 
assigned by the FDRC. In conclude, during this period, emergency rescuing was the 
major tasks by the European NGOs, which is the first NGO approached the DPRK 
soil, and the movement was kept under a tightly controlled by the local officials. 
4.2.2. Period: 1998 -1999 
After the first period of the European NGOs experiences in North Korea, there 
was a big change of their mission as some of them decided to quit their projects in 
DPRK in 1998-1999. MDM was the first NGO to withdraw from North Korea. It 
decided to end its project after 10 months of work. Not long after MDM, MSF also 
1 'yn 
made the same decision in September 1998. After that, a shocking issue noticed as 
one of the most influential European NGOs, Oxfam GB，also decided to withdraw 
from North Korea. The first two organizations were the only NGOs in the DPRK 
136 Schloms, Michael. 2003. The European NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and 
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focusing on emergency medical and nutritional programs, that is, short-term famine 
relief projects consisting of food and medical assistance. On the contrary, the Oxfam 
GB conducted long-term perspective programs such as water-treatment and sanitation 
improvement projects in North Korea. 
The withdrawn of the three organizations demonstrated a great shock to the whole 
assistance projects in North Korea. But, it's not completely unanticipated. As recalled 
1 T o one of the MDM nutritionist noted : 
Our aim was to bring assistance - in direct contact with the people - to a 
population in an emergency situation. However, we were deprived of the 
liberty of movement, of the liberty to communicate, and of the right to care 
for our patients. We had no access to the people and no access to 
information that would have allowed us to evaluate our programs. 
In their experiences, it seems clear that the European NGOs staffs wouldn't have 
any interaction with the North Korean counterparts. Because of this, the staffs 
witnessed a lack of knowledge and poor treatment skill of those doctors and workers 
in North Korea. 
Other than that, during the course of their engagement in North Korea, the MSF 
concluded that their nutritional programs did not reach the target group of severely 
malnourished children under the age of five.^^^ Moreover, as the MSF, requested the 
FDRC to give a list of all health facilities in each county. But, as the staffs from MSF 
�38 Ibid, p.55 
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saw there were some institutions that were not mentioned on the lists. Therefore, it is 
somehow the local officials cheated the MSF staffs in this circumstance. 
Oxfam GB, which provided different forms of assistance, was providing some 
long-term assistance to the local people in North Korea. Although the role that they 
played is much more important than those NGOs which were providing primarily 
food, it didn't mean that the respect paid by the Pyongyang authority was much 
higher than those emergency-oriented NGOs. Like those relief organizations, Oxfam 
GB came to conclude that a number of fundamental NGO principles were not 
respected in the DPRK contributed to their withdrawn. 14�This phenomenon was 
especially serious when they would like to conduct direct contact with the people in 
hospitals, consumers and households, and even they're told not to conduct any 
medical test on the water and covered the fact that the spread of water-brone diseases. 
Therefore, these organizations were deeply disappointed in the situation in North 
Korea. 
4.2.3. Period: 1998 to present 
The focus of European NGOs in North Korea has changed in recent years. After 
the withdrawn of MDM，MSF and Oxfam, no nutritional or therapeutic programs 
have been implemented by NGOs. In addition, food aid, compared to the first years of 
NGO engagement in North Korea, is playing a far less important r o l e . � I n regards to 
this, the WFP has taken up most of the workload and programs of food aid and 
14° Schloms, Michael. 2003. The European NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and 
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provide food rations to vulnerable groups in Pyongyang. 
In general, European NGOs now turn its focus from short-term food aid to 
mid-term rehabilitation projects. The main fields of activity are agricultural 
rehabilitation and food security programs. For example, the Children Aid Direct 
(CAD), a British NGO，provided projects including a food security program 
(rehabilitation and construction of greenhouse and delivery of seeds) and a winter 
support program (distribution of clothing and boots to children in inst i tut ions) ."2 in 
addition, CAD also carried out a rehabilitation program in the Hamhung Maternity 
Hospital 143 and a water and sanitation program. Another European NGO called 
Triangle-Generation Humanitaire, a French-based NGO, established an office and is 
providing agricultural support in North Korea. In South Pyongyang, Triangle assists 
nine cooperative farms with agricultural inputs and soil rehabilitation. i44 The 
program also included rehabilitation of irrigation systems and environmental 
protection projects. Thus, since 1998, most of the European NGOs started to shift 
their focus from providing instant food aid to a more long-term re-development 
project in North Korea. 
4.3. Debate among European NGOs: Hard-landing vs. Change through 
Rapproachment? 
In the previous part, we can conclude that European NGOs has done tremendous 
142 Schloms, Michael. 2003. The European NGO Experience in North Korea. In L Gordon Flake and 
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works in providing humanitarian assistance to North Korea during the last few years. 
However, we also witnessed there were some influential NGOs which eventually 
decided to withdraw their relief and development programs in North Korea. These 
facts truly revealed a great debate among two groups of European NGOs who are 
working in North Korea, whether skeptical towards the effectiveness of the 
humanitarian action or being optimistic on the aid programs would eventually help to 
make changes happened in North Korea. 
The 'Hard Landing' strategy, supported by a small group of large NGOs likes 
MSF and Oxfam，questions whether assistance to North Korea even makes sense. In 
the view of these organizations, international aid does not reach those in greatest need. 
In addition, the aid is a kind of perversion, in effect stabilizing the totalitarian regime 
and 'feeding the dictator'.^"^^Those NGOs advocated this standing argues the North 
Korean government uses humanitarian aid to stabilize its power and deeply suspected 
that about North Korea's willingness to integrate with the international community. 
One of the examples that they always cite is that government used the Public 
Distribution system (PDS) to distribute the food aid. Ironically, PDS is seen as the 
main instrument of controlling the North Korean society. Every citizens in North 
Korea received food and necessities from the government distribution and the amount 
of distribution is determined by his or her political loyalty and that of his or her 
a n c e s t o r s . 146 Since all food aid is channeled through the PDS, some of the citizens 
who are categorize as lower class or in the edge of starving to death doesn't mean 
they would receive more food assistance. Therefore, they were extremely 
145 Beck, Peter M. and Nicholas Reader. 2005. Facilating Reform in North Korea: The Role of 
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disappointed with the political reality in North Korea and finally withdrew from the 
assistance campaign. 
The 'Change through rapproachment' is the principle which describes the policy 
advocated by those European NGOs still providing aid to North Korea. As opposing 
to the above groups, the remaining European NGOs working in the country are more 
reluctant to issue public statements or articles on the sensitive political issues of aid 
distribution in North Korea. In theirs' mindset, the aid projects' impact is generally 
perceived as very positive. They regard the PDS as an efficient and reliable 
distribution mechanism and claims that assistance to North Korea is not only a matter 
of humanitarian impact but also of longer-term socio-political effects. "7 The major 
argument that they take is that through continued efforts, European NGOs contribute 
to a better relationship between North Korea and the international community and that 
is an important opportunity to open their minds. In addition，their works also can 
gradually create a situation in which the labeling of aid workers as ‘imperialists and 
crafty plunderers' finds no support in North Korea.^"^^Therefore, in this logic, their 
presence and works aimed at develop a new image of North Korea, whether relief, 
rehabilitation, or structural reform, are secondary. 
During the past few years, the European NGOs provided unlimited humanitarian 
assistance toward the North Korean, including food relief, development aid and 
rehabilitation projects. It is generally believes that the non-governmental contacts 
between the EU and the DPRK created a cooperative atmosphere for the 
governmental relations, especially as there was rising numbers of European countries 
147 Ibidp.75. 148 Ibid p.76. 
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started to develop their formal diplomatic relations with North Korea in recent years. 
Therefore, no matter the European NGOs in North Korea was proved to be a 
successful case or not, it's indeed true that the engagement of the European NGOs did 
addressed some of the immediate humanitarian crises in North Korea and provided a 
necessary platform for further socio-political cooperation in the future. 
5. Conclusion 
The bilateral relationship between the European Union and North Korea has 
always been underestimated as most of the attentions are paid on the strategic 
relations either the U.S.-North Korea or the inter-Korean relations. But, in this chapter, 
we can conclude that the EU-DPRK relations are well developed and institutionalized 
since the end of Cold War, especially when the Pyongyang government requested the 
international assistance on addressing its humanitarian crisis. 
Right after the normalization between EU and DPRK in 2001, this contributed to 
both sides to widen their agenda of bilateral cooperation, including mutual trade, 
technological transfer and even nuclear issue negotiation. Moreover, this peaceful and 
friendly atmosphere was also extended not only on governmental relations, but also to 
non-governmental level as well. The European NGOs provided numerous 
humanitarian aids projects, including the emergency food relief, rehabilitation and 
development projects. Therefore, comparing to other countries, such as U.S., Japan 
and South Korea, European countries maintained successful a positive relations with 
North Korea and mutual is going to build up gradually in recent years. So, in the next 
chapter, we will go to discuss this non-governmental contacts being further extended 
into the field of economic knowledge transfer. That is the ideas of one community in 
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Pushing the envelope: New forms of political advocacy generated by 
NGOs: Analysis on the two EU-DPRK Workshops organized by the 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
Throughout the last chapter, we specifically studied the bilateral relations 
between the European Union (EU) and the North Korea, including the governmental 
and non-governmental levels. Via this two-level relationship, EU, especially the 
non-government organizations (NGOs), provided a huge amount of economic and 
technical assistance to the Pyongyang government since recent years. This type of 
semi to unofficial economic cooperation provided a concrete and well-developed 
foundation for their future development. 
This chapter provides a deeper analysis explore the non-governmental interactions, 
with specifically looking into one of the most influential NGOs in this relation, the 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung (FNF) Foundation, a German-based European 
Foundation and its policy influence on the North Korean government. FNF is a 
transnational non-govemmental organization established in 1958 by the first German 
Federal President, Theodor Heuss. It is the Foundation for liberal politics from 
Germany. This foundation has been organizing numerous training workshops and 
study tours for the inter-cultural and economic exchanges between the scholars and 
officials from the EU and the officials in North Korea. Among of all the workshops 
that they have organized, the three EU-DPRK workshops on economic reform and 
development from 2004 to 2007 was meant to be one of the most successful 
contribution to the economic development path for the North Korean government. 
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Through the ideas and policy that the economics experts and scholars suggested and 
recommended during the workshops, it provided a new path and angle of 
development for the Pyongyang government and showed the channels and format that 
this transnational expert group used was strategically successful in providing a new 
set of ideas for the North Korean government for its economic development. 
1. FNF and the expert group generated by it 
In the introduction chapter, a detailed review was made on the theory of epistemic 
community and discussed its effectiveness on policy influences. Expert group has 
played a significant role in recent years as the academic-policymakers relations are 
getting closer. According to Peter Haas，he described epistemic community is a 
community which members are professionals with recognized expertise and 
competence in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant 
knowledge within that domain or issue area. They have a share of technical 
knowledge related to a particular field as well as normative principles, causal beliefs, 
and a shared conception of interests. 
In addition, their ideas can be realized as policy outcome while several networks 
can be built, including organizing some consultations with policy makers, convey 
their opinions is through conferences and public policy debates and making use of 
media as a discussion medium to voice out their opinions to the government officials. 
The Friedrich Naumann Foundation established in 1958 by the first German 
149 Haas, Peter M. 1997. Knowledge, Power, and International Policy Coordination. Columbia, S.C.: 
University of South Carolina Press, p. 3 
117 
Federal President, Theodor Heuss, is the Foundation for liberal politics from Germany. 
Its programs at home and abroad aim at promoting the principle of freedom of the 
individual in human dignity. ^ ^^  The Foundation sees itself as an agent of organized 
liberalism. It enjoys close links with Germany's Free Democratic Party (FDP) and 
Liberal International (LI). The Foundation follows the ideals of its namesake 
Friedrich Naumann: At the beginning of the last century the Protestant theologian was 
a leading liberal thinker and politician in Germany. He resolutely backed the idea of 
civic education. Naumann believed that a functioning democracy needs politically 
informed and educated citizens. According to him civic education is a prerequisite for 
political participation and thus for democracy. 
The Foundation has built various foreign offices in Africa, America and Asia. 
Enhancing political dialogue and providing political counseling are the Foundation's 
main activity both at home and abroad. Therefore, the chief activities which they are 
organizing are some relevant seminars, conferences and publications aimed at 
promoting international political dialogue and provides a discussion forum for a wide 
range of liberal issues. 
In close cooperation with the Center for Local Autonomy and the Graduate School 
for Local Autonomy at Hanyang University in Seoul, the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation supports research, the exchange and training of academics, civil servants 
and politicians particularly between South Korea, North Korea and Germany. One of 
the major achievements was providing three economic knowledge transfer and 
exchange platforms through expert study tours and international conferences and 
150 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). 2008. All About Us. Access at 16& of June, 2008. Available 
at: < http://www.fhfkorea.org/new eng/index eng.asp>. 
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seminars between the European scholars (with the fully support by the European 
Union (UN)) and the North Korean officials. These dialogue programs involve policy 
makers, party officials, civil servants, researchers and the private sector from the 
North Korea and Europe in intense discussion and intellectual exchange on sharing 
the experience of the economic transformation issues of the past Eastern Europe 
countries and the practical solution to the current North Korea economic reform 
strategy 
According to Peter Haas, he mentioned that expert group is a non-state actor 
(NSA) which is free of government political or economic influence. In regards to the 
list of the scholars whom the FNF invited, all the intellectuals are affiliated with 
Universities, which free of government influence. Secondly, Haas mentioned that 
expert group is a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence 
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
that domain or issue area. In looking at the background of the scholars, all of them not 
only formed with a connected-network, but also expertise in economics (especially 
transformation economics) and affiliated with well-known Universities in respective 
countries. 
However, as Haas stated clearly that there are four different criterions which 
separate the epistemic community with the others groups. So, in the following part, 
we can try to apply the criterions which Haas analyzed and elaborate how the 
scholars' community invited by the FNF is an expert group. 
1.1. Shared Normative and Principled Belief 
In what Haas described, a shared normative and principled belief is which 
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provide a value-based rationale for the social action of community members. In this 
sense, Judith Goldstein and Robert Keohane provided the meaning of a principled 
belief is consists of normative ideas that specify criteria for distinguishing right from 
wrong and just from u n j u s t . I n this category, beliefs in collective sense are 
expected to be morally driven and aim to protect world interests. 
By looking closely at the founding principles of the FNF, the programs, no matter 
at home and abroad, are aimed at promoting the principle of freedom of the individual 
in human dignity. Inside the principles, it can be divided into four parts and the 
under-lying values of the principles are laid on normative-driven mentality. 
First, is the idea of liberal policies and the individual. Liberal policies，in theirs' 
definition, are to promote respect for the rights of the individual, for civil rights. The 
individual needs these rights so as to freely shape his/her own life. Therefore, freedom 
of opinion is not only a compelling moral command of tolerance and of the rule of law, 
it is also the path toward progress of the human spirit, a path which can be found only 
through the competition of free ideas and knowledge. 
The definition also included the right to private property. Without respect for 
private property, many other rights cannot be realized. Liberal policies are in favor of 
equal opportunities from the start, in favor of competition and pluralism. They strive, 
therefore, for the free access of all to all markets, education, information, labor, goods, 
and capital markets. Liberal policies seek to free the individual from coercion by the 
state and by anonymous institutions so that he can fulfill his responsibility in freedom. 
151 Goldstein, Judith and Robert Keohane. 1993. Ideas and Foreign Policy: Beliefs, Institutions and 
Political Change. Ithaca: Cornell University Press, p.9 
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Freedom requires responsibility for the c o m m u n i t y ] 52 
Second, is the idea of liberal policies and civic society. Liberal policies strive to 
enlarge the freedom of citizens in all spheres of life and to restrict the role of the state 
to the essentials. This includes recognizing the capacity of citizens to organize 
themselves. Citizens can undertake many tasks in municipalities, wards, associations, 
lobbies, other private institutions and initiatives and wish to do so. 
Third, the basic principle of this community views state as the protection of 
individual freedom and the protection of citizens against violence from within and 
abroad, as well as safeguarding of the constitution. Liberal policies want to ensure 
that rules apply to all, while leaving space for the free decision of the individual. 
Liberal policies do not want to predetermine a certain outcome; they want just rules 
instead of just results, because such results do not exist. 
Therefore, in this sense, the spirit of the founding principles of FNF reveals the 
normative value of this community, as it promote and consolidate the civil rights of 
the peoples. 
Moreover, according to the report of the Workshop, Mr. Ulrich Niemann, the ex 
resident representative of FNF stated that "it is truth of life that people can only 
become real friends when they start to know and to understand each other....openness, 
trust and mutual information as well as sometimes also compromises are central 
preconditions for mutual good understanding and relations."^^^It highlighted the basic 
152 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). 2008. Principles. Access at 16^ of June, 2008. Available at: 
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attitude of the FNF on this historical meeting with the North Korean counterparts is 
that they wish sincerely to provide an alternative and practical solution in order to 
revise and provide another ways of economic transformation. 
In addition, about the human resource arrangement, most of the scholars invited 
by the FNF are primarily either from some former socialist countries in the Eastern 
Europe or expertise academically in this field of subject，e.g. Dr. Dusan Triska, who is 
the Chairman of FSP/CD-F (Contractual Digital Floor) and former Deputy Minister of 
Finance in Czech Republic. He published various articles related to economic 
transformation, especially on the Eastern European countries. For example, he 
published a book on behalf of World Bank in 1995 titled on 'The Role of Investment 
Funds in Privatization' which analyzed how to improve the investment environment 
during the privatization period. Other than that, he was the principal architect of the 
Czech voucher approach to privatization, which indeed supported the gradual 
transformation from the planned economy to the market economy. So, from his 
background, he devoted and spent his whole life in providing academic knowledge to 
the government on the process of privatization. 
1.2. Shared Causal Belief 
Another set of criteria which Haas described about the expert group is that it must 
have a shared causal belief. In their definition of expert group, cognitive regime 
theorists speak of 'casual belief and knowledge about 'cause-and-effect relationships' 
which are offered to policy makers in situations of uncertainty. A cause is that which 
brings about an effect, and action, phenomenon, or condition. In this sense cause and 
the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK', p.10 
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effect are correlative terms. 
A shared causal belief is which are derived from their analysis of practices 
leading or contributing to a central set of problems in their domain and which then 
serve as the basic for elucidating the multiple linkages between possible policy 
actions and desired outcomes. In a much more concrete sense, causal beliefs, is beliefs 
about cause-effect relationships which derive authority from the shared consensus of 
recognized elites, whether they are village elders or scientists at elite 
institutions. ^ ^^This kind of causal belief provided a guide for individual on how to 
achieve their objectives. Concurrently, they also inherited some scientific causal 
relationships which provided a knowledge authority on peoples' beliefs. For example, 
the reason why there was a great change in state's policy on production of CFCs 
which primarily due to the new scientific evidence about the hole in atmospheric 
ozone layer as it would contribute to cancer and climate change. Thus, this scientific 
finding portrait as an authoritarian idea which showed a causal relationship between 
human behavior and climate change so that it demanded a change of state's policy. 
In this sense, the scholars' community from the FNF was providing a causal 
belief on how to reform the North Korean economy in a transitional economic 
perspective. As there are numerous possible pathways for a single country to 
transform its economy from a centrally-planned one into a market-driven economy, no 
matters on the pace, steps or priority, country like North Korea hesitated which paths 
would be the best option for the economic development in North Korea. In the 
154 Teichler, Thomas A. 2007. Think Tanks as an Expert group: The Case of European Armaments 
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theoretical study of transition policy, some countries like the Soviet Union and the 
Eastern European countries preferred the policy called ‘shock therapy' approach as 
the ruling government decided a revolutionary and rapid change of domestic economy 
by removing all the government control and subsidy on economy and followed by 
political reform also. Another set of countries, such as China and Vietnam, preferred a 
rationale called ‘gradualism，which means the change of the economic structure in 
gradual steps and no political reform will be resulted. As a result, under this policy 
uncertainty and without any objective and authoritative advice, the group of economic 
scholars from the FNF, provided a set of potential economic transformation strategy 
and pathway toward the North Korean officials and also helped to predict the possible 
outcomes in respective reform, e.g. Dr. Dusan Triska digested the different forms of 
restructuring the economy in various transitional economies and suggested that the 
'Czech Way’ would be one of the possible applicable model for North Korea's 
economic reform. 
Another causal argument that the expert group holds in this workshops is that 
their view on openness and economic development. In these workshops, scholars 
from different background and countries shared the same view on the more open the 
economy the better economic performance during transition. As a group, scholars who 
experienced or researched on this field made a conclusion and tried to persuade the 
North Korean officials that foreign capitals, experiences and investments can 
stimulate the stagnant domestic economy. For example, Professor Ari Kokko said an 
outward -looking economy attract more foreign capital and higher technical 
development and transportation system will be resulted. Concurrently, Professor 
Rudiger Frank praised the importance of FDI as it can assist the developing countries 
with creating of new jobs and help to develop and restructure of enterprises. Therefore, 
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scholars in this community shared the same causal belief that openness is the 
cornerstone for economic development in North Korea. 
1.3. Shared Notions of Validity 
In addition，a shared notion of validity is also one of the essential criteria of 
forming an expert group. Haas stated that a shared notion of validity is intersubjective 
and internally defined criteria for weighing and validating knowledge in the domain 
of their expertise. Generally speaking, it is meant to be referring to those intellectuals' 
consensus that the adopted solution is a valid solution for the problem at hand. 
First, all community members have an academic training and most of the received 
their doctoral degree on economics or Korean studies. For example, Professor 
Ruediger Frank holds a Master's degree in Korean Studies, Economics and 
International Relations and a PhD in economic and also has spent one semester as a 
language student at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 1991-1992 with support 
from the German Academic Exchange Service. Concurrently, Professor Bruno 
D all ago obtained his PhD in Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences and 
currently working on some research projects on local development for the Balkans 
states. Therefore, judging by the content as well as the level of background education 
of the community members, it can be assumed that they share the criteria for valid 
knowledge that are accepted in the economic studies. 
Another indicator that might strengthen the case for shared validity criteria is that 
all the community members shared the same validity belief that through engaging the 
North Korea, the North Korea will be more willing to extend their cooperation and 
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further accept the ideas which they delivered. During the conferences, one of the most 
important consensuses among those intellectuals is that there is a need for North 
Korea to adopt a new set of coherent development strategy and they truly believed 
that the experience and knowledge from their history would be fruitful and should be 
able to provide an alternative solution towards the current stagnant economy in the 
North. This view was further justified while in the opening speech by Mr. Ulrich 
Niemann, the resident representative of FNF, said in the first EU-DPRK Workshop, he 
mentioned that all the participants in this workshop shared the same goal that the 
ideas they brought will be highly relevant for the economic reform in North Korea 
and they shared a great interest on organizing more training seminars, workshops and 
dialogue in the future. ^ ^^  Not long after, the North Korean officials decided to extend 
the diplomatic cooperation with the North Korea by actively requested for the FNF to 
hold more specific workshops and seminars on banking, finance and accounting either 
abroad or in Pyongyang. Therefore, inside the community, all participants shared the 
same validity belief that the EU-DPRK relations should be built gradually and 
steps-by-steps, and the policy uncertainty situation in North Korea in recent years can 
only be solved with the assistance from the other forces, such as the relevant 
knowledge and model copying from the former socialist countries in the Eastern 
Europe. 
1.4. A Common Policy Enterprise 
Finally, Haas presented an expert group should exist a common policy enterprise, 
that is, a set of common practices associated with a set of problems to which their 
156 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). 2006. Report on the Workshop on 'Economic Reform and 
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professional competence is directed, presumably out of the conviction that human 
welfare will be enhanced as a competence. 
One of the common goals which the expert group of the FNF is that through 
working closely between the EU and the DPRK, these cooperation activities with the 
DPRK would finally transform the economy in the North into a more market-driven 
economy so that more benefit will be brought to the common people in the North so 
as to increase the living quality of North Korean. 
The scholars of this expert group here share another common political objective 
which based upon the fundamental value of FNF: They support and contribute to 
stability and peace on the Korean peninsula and diplomatic is the only mean to 
resolve the crises happened in North Korea. For this purpose, they actively support 
the FNF to organize international seminars, workshops and conferences for North 
Korea. Also, the DPRK's gradual opening to the international community, which has 
diplomatic relations with Germany since 2002, and the North Korean government's 
July 2002 economic adjustments have created a new environment in which the FNF 
was able to co-organize its first training seminar on market economy in Pyongyang in 
2004. With regard to the overwhelming success of its first activity in the DPRK the 
scholars from the FNF was continuing to provide and co-organize training measures 
also in 2005 and resulted in holding the Second Workshop on Economic Reform and 
the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK in October 
2005. So, in this aspect, all the scholars supported a peaceful development in the 
Korean peninsula should be the most important pre-condition for the economic reform 
in North Korea. 
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In addition, as refer to the hidden political objective of FNF, the FNF also would 
like to promote the East-West Germany experience to North-South Korea in order to 
assist them to finally achieve a similar political outcome. As a German-based NGO, 
the FNF supports research, the exchange and training of academics, civil servants and 
politicians particularly between South Korea and Germany as well as knowledge 
transfer and exchange through expert study tours and international conferences and 
seminars. Moreover, the political dialogue program involves policy makers, party 
officials, civil servants, researchers and the private sector in intense discussion and 
intellectual exchange on various issues of high political relevance between South 
Korea and Germany. Beneath those interaction and dynamics between two countries, 
the Foundation aims politically at dialogue and cooperation between the two Koreas 
by bringing in the very unique German experience of national reunification and 
European integration. Also, in regards to the topic of the workshop, cases of 
East-West Germany were deliberately designed and mentioned for North Korea, such 
as the topic of ‘Experiences with the Treuhand agency in Germany, by Dr. Brigitta 
Kauers, he discussed the essential role played by the Treuhand agency in shaping the 
privatization policy of the former East German companies after the re-unification. It 
helped to endorse the labor promotion law to protect the employment opportunity of 
the East German and massively raised the competitiveness of the previous 
state-owned enterprises in the East Germany so as to narrow the structural different 
between the East and West Germany. Therefore, in order to promote the positive 
lessons drew from the re-unification of East-West Germany, the FNF controlled the 
political and discussion agenda so as to assist and contribute to a peaceful 
re-unification in Korean peninsula. 
2. Experts groups in FNF matters: How did the ideas developed, 
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transferred and influenced the policymakers in North Korea 
Through the analysis of the previous part, the experts groups from the FNF can 
generally be considered as a scholar network which provides economic knowledge 
towards the officials in Pyongyang when they conducting their national economic 
restructuring policy. 
Therefore, after confirmation of the status of the expert group, then, questions 
would be raised on how did the ideas from this community being developed and 
transferred to the policy-makers in Pyongyang. In addition, throughout the various 
channels, how the ideas rooted from this community eventually did influence the 
policymakers and to what extend or how successful of the ideas affected the policy 
outcomes in North Korea. 
So, followed by the diagram below, we can step-by-step to tackle the various 
questions. First, in terms of the expert group, there are various aspects to be discussed 
and analyzed，such as the academic and professional background of the participants, 
the consensus of ideas and beliefs inside the community, the consolidation and density 
of the community and what kind of resource and social capital do they keep and hold 
in order to sustain the momentum of the community. 
Second, from the target's perspective, it's important to discuss the reason why the 
target requests such kind of transnational knowledge transfer. According to Peter Haas, 
policy uncertainty plays a significant and decisive role for officials to make a request 
for scientists to provide an objective and authoritative advice on the current situation, 
so as to shape the policy outcome. So, in this case, the officials from North Korea 
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faced a challenging economic situation and at the same time they failed to provide a 
not only immediate but also possible policy advice in this circumstance. Therefore, 
the Pyongyang authority at last makes a policy request to the European counterparts 
through EU>DPRK diplomatic network. Eventually, one of the European NGOs called 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) invited several economic scholars from the 
former socialist countries in the Eastern Europe and organized two EU-DPRK 
workshops so as to provide economic advice on the North Korea current situation. 
Third, in terms of the workshops itself，the expert group presented various ideas 
and policy suggestions in front of the North Korean officials, including the 
importance of foreign capitals and investment for transition and minimizing the role 
of state in the economic sphere during the privatization process. Furthermore, those 
ideas presented during the workshops were transferred and communicated through 
various institutionalized strategies, such as networking building, previous training 
tours and different communication channels during the workshops (conference, 
discussion groups and field visit). 
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Table 4.1: Research Framework 
T . , Target characteristic: Transnational actor 
characteristics: 1. Uncertainty 
1. Consensus 
2. Density ，r 3. Resources 
Policy recommendation/ 
ideas shared/ bilateral 
cooperation 
Expert group by FNF ^ 1. 04 EU-DPRK Workshop 
2. 05 EU-DPRK Workshop 
Communication processes: 
，r 
1. Institutionalized advice/ 
channel North Korea 
2. Communication adopted and 
strategies formulated their 
reform based on 
the ideas 
2.1. Transnational actor characteristics 
2.1.1. Participants of the expert group 
Inside the expert group, the background, portfolio, academic affiliation of the 
community members plays an important role in shaping what kind of knowledge and 
ideas they presented and delivered in the workshops. Moreover, it also demonstrates 
the authoritative and persuasive power of their academic contribution so that officials 
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are more willing to select their ideas to formulate the policy outcome. 
Within the community members in these workshops, various members from 
different background, academic positioning and area of publications were invited to 
form this expert group. In this perspective, the Foundation not only invited academic 
scholars, but also diplomats and transnational corporations' managers. Therefore, the 
dynamics and the scope of practical knowledge was further diversified and broadened 
in this community and hopefully it increased the possibility to influence the final 
policy output. 
2.1.1.1. Workshop in 2004 
Within this expert group, the FNF invited totally five academic professors, one 
professional lawyer, one United Nations officials, two NGOs representatives and two 
officials from the European Union to come and provide their academic knowledge 
and professional experience on how to transform a economy from 
government-planned to market-oriented. 
According to their resumes listed in the appendix one, inside this group of 
experts, in terms of nationality, they all commonly come from various European 
countries, such as Czech Republic, Denmark, Sweden, Italy and the United Kingdom. 
Moreover, in their research or professional experience, they are all majorly shared on 
the field of economic development and transformation, for example, Professor 
Ruediger Frank researched tremendously on the transformation of socialist systems in 
Europe and East Asia, and Professor Ari Kokko written numerous books about how 
foreign direct investment positively affected the recipient countries on their economic 
132 
transformation and development. 
However, in terms of professional background, they can be categorized into three 
different perspectives. Firstly, five of them belong to academic, such as the Stockholm 
School of Economics, Nordic Institute for Asian Studies and University of Economics 
in Prague etc. Secondly, two of them are serving two different NGOs in the last few 
years, such as the Friedrich Naumann Foundation and Europe-Korea Foundation. 
Thirdly, the FNF also invited three officials from the United Nations Development 
Programmes, Dutch EU Presidency and European Commission. Thus, from the 
perspective of their backgrounds, it reveals that there is a wide range of different 
kinds of people who involved in this expert group. 
2.1.1.2. Workshop in 2005 
As the first EU-DPRK Workshop organized by the FNF in 2004 successfully 
built and provided a positive image and experience for the EU-DPRK bilateral 
relations, therefore, the FNF decided to set up another EU-DPRK Workshop in 2005 
so as to extend the room of cooperation and further institutionalized this kind of 
bilateral network. In the workshop in 2005, the FNF continued to invite six academic 
scholars, one NGOs member and one government official in Germany to come to 
Pyongyang and shared their knowledge and experience with the North Korean 
officials. 
According to their resume listed in the appendix one, inside this group of experts, 
in terms of nationality, they all also commonly come from various European countries, 
such as Czech Republic, Hungary, Sweden, Italy and Ireland. One of the most 
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important findings in their resumes is that two of them are re-called and re-invited by 
the FNF in this year's workshop that are Professor Ari Kokko and Dusan Triska. 
Moreover, in their research or professional experience, they are all specially shared on 
the field of economic development and transformation, for example, Professor Andrea 
Szalavetz have done several research projects on economic reform, restructuring and 
privitizations and Professor Bruno Dallago written numerous books about economic 
liberalization in the Eastern Europe. 
Like the previous expert group, the group of experts in 2005 also came from 
different personal background, such as various institutes (National University of 
Ireland and Warsaw School of Economics), NGO (ECORYS group) and government 
branch (Federal Ministry of Finance in Germany). 
2.1.2. Consensus among community members 
In fact, the actor-related factor that has worked in favor of the expert group is the 
existence of consensus. Inside the community, members were having consensus in 
believing the importance of diplomatic engagement will help the North Korean 
counterparts in blending and participating into the international community. Therefore, 
experts who are invited to participate in this community are all agreed on actively 
encouraging the peaceful means in assisting the reform programs in North Korea and 
placed this value as the core common denominator for their particular interest. For 
example, the opening speech in the EU-DPRK conference in 2004 by Mr. Ulrich 
Niemann, the Programme Director for Korea of the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, 
he emphasized that all participants agreed that continue the dialogue and engagement 
(organize more training seminars, workshops and dialogue forum) would be essential 
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in assisting the North Korean officials in returning to the international community. ^ ^^  
In addition, among those European economists who have worked in transition 
economies and invited by the FNF, they also achieved in a consensus that through 
transferring and sharing the knowledge, ideas and experiences of the transformation 
processes in Eastern and Central Europe before, can help and assist the North Korean 
officials in conducting, directing and providing another alternative for their economic 
reform policy. Thus, the expert group constructed a shared ethical obligation by 
sharing their technical and academic knowledge on transition economies and theirs' 
personal experiences on assisting the economic reform programs in respective 
countries during the last ten years after the collapse of the Soviet Union to those 
North Korean officials who were facing a similar deadlock and obstacles in 
transforming their national economy from a centrally-planned economy into a less 
government-driven economy. 
Moreover, another common view within the community was their unanimous 
view of creating momentum for future bilateral cooperation between the European 
Union and North Korean government. In the community, all the members are come 
from Europe and some of them countries' foreign affairs representatives or are 
sponsored by the European Commission. Therefore, one of the core common value 
among them are try to build trust and mutual understanding with each others. For 
example, during the opening session in the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, Mr. Ulrich 
Niemann mentioned that “it is a truth of life that people can only become real friends 
when they start to know and to understand each other...and all of our members are 
157 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). 2005. Report on the Workshop on 'Economic Reform and 
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expected that this workshop should be seen as an valuable occasion in building trust, 
mutual information and an exchange of ideas and sharing of 
• ” 158 
experiences." Therefore, members in this expert group would mobilize their 
diplomatic and technical capability in order to help to build a better relation between 
EU and DPRK in the near future. 
2.1.3. Density among members 
The other actor related factor is density, which means the frequency and period 
of meeting and discussion between different members in this community. However, it 
appears to have little explanatory power. The density of the interactions between the 
members of the network is relatively low, which is not unusual for transnational 
network. 
We find two types of interactions in this network. First, the most comprehensive, 
centralize and influential interactions are to be found on the two big EU-DPRK 
Workshops, which in each of the workshops there were more than 20-30 European 
participants are invited and around 6 to 7 of them are European economic experts and 
therefore formed their expert group. These members, although only 3-4 of them are 
invited in both workshops, would meet in the conference and discussed and 
exchanged their ideas, perspectives and information on the transitional strategies with 
the North Korean officials. During the two-day workshop, their interactions are 
basically through several formal and informal means of communication. Formally, 
such as presentation, follow-up discussion session and working group, and informally, 
158 Ibid, p. 10 
159 Karlsson, Michael. 2004. Expert groups and Cooperative Security: The Case of Communicable 
Disease Control in the Baltic Sea Region. Journal of International and Area Studies 11,1: 92. 
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such as tea break talking and field study. 
Second, the smaller network is upheld separately by irregular interactions on a 
less frequent basis and consists of different combination of members. For example, in 
the first EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004，Dr. Geir Helgesen, Ari Kokko and Frank 
Rudiger were served as the senior researchers in the Nordic Institute of Asian Studies 
(NIAS) in 2001 and 2005 respectively. Actually, NIAS is one of the leading institutes 
in the Nordic countries and it's well-known of organizing numerous Nordic-North 
Korea research projects and academic workshops, such as the International Workshop 
on Social Welfare and Economic Development: North Korean-Nordic Dialogue held 
in 1-3 November 2005, at the Nordic Centre, Fudan University, and in Shanghai. 
During these years, they both conducted and published several research articles which 
are related to the field of economic transition, such as the 'North Korea 's Economic, 
Political and Social Situation ‘ authored by Dr. Geir Helgesen. 
Moreover, in the workshop in 2005, Dr. Andrea Szalavetz and Bruno Dallago 
were also co-working in the same research institute, Transformation, Integration and 
Globalization Economic Research (TIGER). TIGER is the leading independent 
economic think-tank in East Central Europe. It is affiliated with the Leon Kozminski 
Academy of Entrepreneurship and Management (WSPiZ), a well-known business 
school in East Central Europe, located in Warsaw, Poland. They worked and 
co-authored a book called "Small Economies ‘ Adjustment to Global Tendencies ”， 
which is about different countries' experiences on transforming theirs' economies. 
2.1.4. Resources of FNF 
Bara, Z. and Csaba L. 2000. Small Economies 'Adjustment to Global Tendencies. Aula: Budapest. 
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As regards resources, the expert group in these workshops is mainly relied on the 
Friedrich Naumann Stiftung Foundation (FNF), a German based and governmental 
financially supported political foundation. In terms of sources of flinding, the FNF is 
undoubtedly a government financed foundation, which they received $46.1 Million 
from the Development Ministry and $4.9 Million from the Foreign Ministry in 1989. 
However, it can be regarded as a non-governmental foundation due to the fact that 
they can plan and implement their projects in a de facto autonomous way^^^; 
especially most of their budget goes into programme abroad without any political 
censorship. 
Table 4.2 Foreign expenditures of the German party foundations (million DM) 
Source of funds 
Development Foreign 
ministry ministry 
(1989) (1989) Total 
Konrad Adenauer Foundation 
93.1 9.9 103.0 
(Christian Democrat) 
Friedrich Ebert Foundation 
94.3 9.9 104.2 (Social Democrat) 
Friedrich Naumann Foundation 
46.1 4.9 51.0 
(Free Democrat) 
Harms Scidel Foundation 
47.9 4.9 52.8 
(Christian Social Union) 
161 Bnicker, Matthias. 2007. Transnational Actors in Democratizing States: The Case of Germany 
Political Foundations in Ukraine. Journal of Communist Studies and Transition Politics 23, 2: 303. 
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TOTAL 281.4 29.6 311.0 
Excludes funds from private contributions and grants from state governments. Development ministry 
grants include 0.67 million DM to the Rainbow Foundation. Foreign ministry grants include 
scholarships for overseas students selected by the foundations, totaling 17.0 million DM and 12.7 
million Dm for 'international activities'. Excludes grants for foundation activities relating to political 
education and research within Germany. 
(Source: Pinto-Duschinsky 1991: 
Since 1987 the Friedrich Naumann Foundation, in cooperation with the Center 
for Local Autonomy at the Hanyang University in Seoul, has been supporting political 
decentralization, empowerment of local governments and promotion of citizens' 
participation in the local politics of the Republic of Korea. In supporting the operation 
of this transnational expert group, the Foundation received funds from European 
Union (EU) in supporting their activities in North Korea, including the training 
seminars and the two tailor-made big workshops for experts on the economy and 
finance in the North Korea. 
In terms of communication and organization resources, the working office in 
Seoul with quite a number of staffs who are working on this community, especially 
Mr. Ulrich Niemann (the Resident Representative) and Ms. Sabine Burghart (Project 
Officer). On one hand, they coordinated the members in the community and provided 
a medium of network for them to communicate with each other. Simultaneously, they 
kept and engaged a close and cooperative relationship with the North Korean 
government and guaranteed the momentum of the scholars-officials cooperation in 
162 Duschinsky, Pinto. 1991. Foreign Political Aid: The German Political Foundations and Their US 
Counterparts. International Affairs 67, 1: 36 
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every year. 
Therefore, in this part, it can be concluded that the FNF as a liberal-based NGOs 
invited various scholars from Europe who are having similar academic and 
professional background in providing topics which are related to economic reforms 
and transitions from their countries' experiences. Inside this expert group, members 
are having a high degree of moral consensus on helping the North Korean officials, as 
they're facing a serious policy uncertainty on whether how to revive its national 
economy under a decade of economic recession. However，the density of the 
interactions between the members of the network is relatively low as they only met 
once or twice within a year，which is unusual for transnational policy network. But, 
the problem of the lack of density can be supplemented by a large sum of budget of 
FNF as they were actively engaged in various aspects of academic activities in North 
Korea, which still can sustain the network with North Korea in this sense. 
2.2. The specific need of policy suggestion from North Korea 
Uncertainty plays an essential role in assessing the effectiveness and 
power-to-influence from the expert group to the policy-makers in the government. In 
this perspective, Pyongyang officials faced a high degree on policy uncertainty of 
whether taking which path to reform its economy and how far should they open their 
economy to the outside. Therefore, under these policy constraints and without any 
possible policy advices, request is made and the FNF invited several economists who 
are expertise in this field academically or worked in the government during the 
transition period respectively. 
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2.2.1. The existence of uncertainty 
It is believed that expert groups can exert considerable influence if there is a high 
degree of uncertainty among policy-makers. ^ ^^Uncertainty, in this sense, means to 
provide a window of opportunity for knowledge-based expert groups to exert 
influence. 164 Because of this, the function of experts is sometimes described as that of 
uncertainty reducers. The feeling of uncertainty appears to be particular marked 
within issue areas that are characterized by much complexity. ^ ^^  However, because 
of institutional inertia, policy-makers may not at once be susceptible to the technical 
advice. On the contrary, it has been noted that this resistance is easily overcome in 
times of crisis when great values are at stake. ^ ^^  
Moving on to the target, in this case the Foundations and those European 
economic experts, they assumed that uncertainty among the policy-makers in the 
Pyongyang government could open a window for transnational influence. This seems 
to apply to the case of communicable economic transitional knowledge and 
experience. 
In the previous chapter, we discussed about the general trend of economic 
development in North Korea. As we knew, there was a great famine took place in 
North Korea because of the bad harvest and consistent drought, and contributed to the 
widespread of economic hardship and economic collapse in the mid 1990s. Since then, 
163 Haas, Peter. 1992. Introduction: Expert groups and International Policy Coordination. International 
Organization 46: 3-4 
164 Risse, Thomas. 2002. Transnational Actors and World Politics. In W. Carlsnaes, T. Risse and B.A. 
Simmons, eds.，Handbook of International Relations. London: Sage, p. 268. 
165 Haas, Peter. 1992. Introduction: Expert groups and International Policy Coordination. International 
Organization 46: 3-4 
1 6 6 Ibid 
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the Pyongyang government was decided to foster its economic recovery and 
development by designing a careful and gradual opening of the national economy 
through economic cooperation with the outside world. 
With the introduction of the 2002 economic measures, the move of the North 
Korean government from a state-led distribution system to a more market oriented 
approach became evident. However, a reform within the system leading above all to 
short-term effects will not be sufficient to improve the economy. Therefore, a reform 
of the economic system seems necessary. And here, Pyongyang is facing a dual 
dilemma: fundamental economic reforms are needed for the development of the 
•t ^ ^ 
economy, but they may threaten the political status quo. Moreover, the North 
Korean government has carefully studied and applied the process of transformation in 
China, but the instant and immediate feedback was not that optimistic, especially as 
the introduction of a new dual pricing system led to a hyperinflation in 2005. 
Therefore, facing a policy uncertainty, the officials in North Korea were indecisive 
where will be the optimum exit for their policy direction. 
Under this circumstance, the North Korea government considered there is a need 
to broaden and widen the scope of economic transformation experience and 
knowledge, not only from China and Vietnam, but also to the former communist East 
European countries as well. In March to 2002, a North Korean delegation 
headed by Foreign Trade Minister Ri Gwan Gun visited Brussels, Rome, Stockholm 
and London and declared that the goal of the North Korean government was to get 
acquainted with EU economic policy models.^^^ It is attributable to this and similar 
167 Niemann, Ulrich. 2005. Sunshine in the Darkness? Where will North Korea's economic reforms 
lead? Asia Europe Journal 3, 3: 310 
168 Frank, Rudiger. 2002. EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason. International 
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diplomatic missions, North Korea government officials consistently define its needs 
and preferred the European counterparts to provide several training seminars, 
workshops and study tours in order to assist the economic knowledge building and 
model copying for the officials. 
Moreover, from the table 4.3, it is noted that the Pyongyang authorities made 
several policy requests for EU and ask for EU to provide and organize various 
training camps or workshops for North Korean officials respectively. Government 
bodies such as the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Finance and Foreign Trade made a 
request for more training workshops on subjects like ‘FDI promotion' and 
'intellectual property protection' as they understand that the EU, especially those 
ex-socialist countries during the transition period, gradually building a well-protected 
and generally respected legal system and FDI also highly invited in order to solve the 
lack of domestic investment problem in their countries. Therefore, the DPRK officials 
in return asked consistently for the EU officials to organize more training workshops 
in respective fields of studies. 
Therefore, the Friderich Naumann Foundation and several European economic 
scholars who worked for the field of the economic transition policy and shared 
experiences of the former communist East European countries initiated and responded 
to the needs of the North Korean officials and organized the two big EU-DPRK 
Workshops in 2004 and 2005. Thus, in this case, uncertainty among policy-makers 
very much functions as a window of opportunity for experts to influence and for 
economic knowledge to flow. 
Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, 2: 99. 
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Table 4.3: Training Needs as Expressed by DPRK Authorities (selection) 
Suggesting Institutions Summary of Suggested Training Subjects 
• Ministry of Foreign • principles of international • international law 
Affairs trade • EU institutions 
• Ministry of Finance • settlement of trade disputes • FDI promotion 
• Ministry of Foreign • multi- and bilateral treaties • marketing 
Trade • economic and social structures • commercial contacts 
• Foreign Trade Bank of EU economies • intellectual property 
• University of • international financial • standards 
National Economy institutions • finance 
• Kim II Sung • international accounting • export credit 
University, Faculty of standards insurance 
Political Economy • corporate management • letters of credit 
training • fx dealing 
• trade information research • e-commerce 
• loans, credits and clearing • principles of taxation 
systems • corporate governance 
• sovereign credit rating • stock market 
• sovereign risk management operations 
• insurance and re-insurance • double entry 
• relationship between bookkeeping 
government and private sector 
(Source: Frank Rudiger 2002: 
169 Frank, Rudiger. 2002. EU-North Korean Relations: No Effort Without Reason. International 
Journal of Korean Unification Studies 11, 2: 99. 
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2.3. Communication Process 
In the previous part, we have discussed and analyzed about the background of 
the members of the community, components, density, consensus of ideas and 
resources of the community. It's believes that in terms of the capability, the expert 
group itself possessed a well-structured organization and a high degree of potential on 
influencing the North Korean officials in the economic reform spectrum. Then, in the 
following part, we're going to review on how they built the communication channels 
in the last few years and by what means they can communicate with the North Korean 
officials during the workshops. In the last part, assessment will be made upon how did 
it institutionalized and evaluate the effectiveness of the strategies. 
2.3.1. Networking Building 
2.3.1.1. Seminar 
Table 4.4: Seminars organized by the FNF in recent years 
Date Topic 
April 6, 2007 Roundtable on Renewable Energies in 
Germany 
April 1-4, 2007 Seminar on the Economics of 
International Trade and Investment 
April 4, 2007 Improving the Monetary and Banking 
System in the DPR Korea 
May 23-26, 2005 Seminar on Public Finance 
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May 4-5, 2005 International Forum on Foreign Trade 
October 25-28, 2004 Seminar on International Finance 
March 29-1 April, 2004 Role of the System of National Accounts 
and Commercial Account in a Market 
Economy 
Since spring 2004，the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) organized series of 
training seminars for the North Korea's official, specifically for those who are 
working in the trade, business and financing departments. All of the seminars are 
co-organized by the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the DPRK. Here is the table of the 
previous seminars which organized by the FNF since 2004: (See Table 4.4) 
In the most recent one in 2007, the FNF had invited two economic experts from 
Germany, Mr. Georg Koopmann from the University of Hamburg and Dr. Lutz 
Werner who currently serves as Head of Division at the Department for External 
Economic Policies of the Federal Ministry of Economics and Technology to 
Pyongyang. The seminar was focused primarily on building trust between foundation 
and the North Korean counterparts and also to provide new knowledge on trade and 
investment to North Korea in order to help them to further opening up its economy to 
the outside world. In the congratulatory address, the German Ambassador, H.E. 
Friedrich Loehr, cited the New Year Editorial of the Rodong Shinmun, the Workers 
Party's newspaper, where the authors emphasize that 'the economy is our fate'. 
Ambassador Loehr expressed his support for the Foundation's training seminars and 
pointed out that these are not only capacity building but also trust building measures. 
He expressed his hope that the DPR Korea would become an important stakeholder in 
the international community and economy. 
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During the past few seminars, the foundation was primarily dealt with issues 
which are related to different steps and components of economic liberalization, such 
as the introduction of a reliable currency and banking system, the importance of 
international trade for economic development in the globalized world and how to 
attract foreign investment. 
2.3.1.2. Study Tour/ Training seminar 
Table 4.5: Study Tour organized by the FNF in recent years 
Date Destination No. of experts Places to visit Topic/s 
9/2005 Germany Ten economic and The Bundestag 參 Budgeting，expenditure, 
(12 days) financial experts (German Lower monetary and fiscal 
House), the Ministry of policy 
Foreign Affairs, the 
Federal Ministry of 
Economics and Labour, 
the Federal Ministry of 
Finance, German 
Institute for Economic 
Research (DIW), the 
German Federal 
Central Bank and the 
European Central 
Bank. 
1/2006 Germany Four representatives The German Institute • Economic transformation 
^ I I 
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(8 days) of the Ministry of for Economic Research and education 
Foreign Affairs, the in Berlin, the Hamburg 參 The delegation showed 
Ministry of Institute of particular interest when 
Education and the International visiting a successfully 
Ministry of Finance Economics, the restructured state-ownec 
German-Asia Business enterprise (SOE) of the 
Association and the former GDR, the Berlin 
Institute of Asian Chemie AG. 
Affairs. 
Since autumn 2005, FNF has been organizing study tours on various subjects for 
the North Korean officials who are responsible for the economic reform programmes 
in North Korea. In their very first visit to Germany, ten economic and financial 
experts from Pyongyang were invited and the delegation were expected to consolidate 
their technical knowledge on market economy which they gained while participating 
at the seminars organized by FNF in North Korea before. Apart from theoretical 
knowledge on budgeting, expenditure, monetary and fiscal policy, the North Korean 
economic and financial experts gained also practical insights into the organization of 
the German financial institutions as well as into methods of tax collection. 
The North Korean delegation visited the Bundestag (German Lower House), the 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Federal Ministry of Economics and Labour, the 
Federal Ministry of Finance as well as the German Institute for Economic Research 
(DIW), the German Federal Central Bank and the European Central Bank. The 
programme included also meetings in the Federal Statistical Office, the State Ministry 
of Rhineland-Palatinate, the tax office of Mainz as well as the Institute of Finance at 
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the University of Mainz. In many of these institutions the North Korean delegation 
was the first visiting group from DPRK ever. 
On January 2006，four representatives of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the 
Ministry of Education and the Ministry of Finance from the DPRK were invited by 
the Foundation to meet experts in German ministries and other institutions and to 
leam more about issues of economic transformation and education. Topics of future 
training measures in North Korea were also discussed during the eight-day trip. The 
delegation showed particular interest when visiting a successfully restructured 
state-owned enterprise (SOE) of the former GDR, the Berlin Chemie AG After 
takeover by an Italian pharmaceutical enterprise the former SOE developed into a 
successful international company employing 900 people and producing a sales 
volume of 770 Million Euro. 
2.3.2. Channels 
2.3.2.1. Conference 
In the two big annual conferences organized by the FNF in 2004 and 2005, one 
of the major channels of communication between the European scholars and the North 
Korean officials would be through presenting their respectively ideas during the 
various presentation sessions. 
Academic conferences provide a social space for people to present their work， 
149 
leam about others' work, and interact informally with one a n o t h e r . S o , an academic 
conference provides a time and place for people with common interests gather 
together for the pursuit of professional, personal and social goals, and also provides 
an arena for attendees to leam about others' and their works. As a result, many 
conferences offer a variety of sub-contexts for different kinds of interactions, 
including formal presentations such as keynotes, papers, and panels; informal 
presentations such as may occur around demonstrations or posters, and the more 
casual exchanges that typically take place during breaks and receptions. ^ ^^  
In addition, conference can also serve as a managed occasion for community 
learning, supporting both knowledge sharing and knowledge networking building, and 
this knowledge building can practice through negotiating of interpretations, agendas, 
methodologies, facts and so on. From these ideas, we can conceptualize conferences 
1 n ^ as a managed event for: 
i. The formal presentation of recent developments in the field. 
ii. The community evaluation of those developments 
iii. The informal presentation of other relevant development from the 
community, e.g. from the conference floor. 
iv. Discussion of the interpretations and implications of those developments. 
V. Settling disagreements over these interpretations and implications. 
vi. Inducting inexperienced members into the community of practice by 
making aspects of practice explicit and therefore capable of being 
McCarthy, Joseph F., David W. McDonald, Suzanne Soroczak, David H Nguyen and A1 M Rashid. 
2004. Augmenting the Social Space of an Academic Conference. CSCW6, 3: 39 
171 Ibid p.40 
172 Jacobs，N. and A. McFarlane. 2005. Conferences as Learning Communities: Some Early Lessons in 
Using "Back-Channel" Technology at an Academic Conference - Distributed Intelligence of Divided 
Attention? Journal of Computer Assisted Learning 21: 318. 
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apprehended. 
vii. Ensuring that, as a whole, research and/or professional practice progresses 
both substantively and methodologically. 
2.3.2.2 Presentation 
During the two big conferences, scholars and officials' ideas and experiences 
presentations played an essential role in the knowledge transfer process and context. 
Under this communication channel, presentation is an efficient and direct way to 
present author's ideas and belief, and through verbal and intellectual exchange, ideas 
from one side can formally and informally shared and transfer to the receivers and 
thus contribute to the goal of knowledge transfer. 
In the last two conferences, presentations were divided into different sessions 
with its clear and specific focus of topics. For example, in the EU-DRPK conference 
in 2004，presentation sessions are generally divided into four sessions, with specific 
topics on 'sharing experiences in economic modernization', 'examples of 
international co-operation in the area of economic reform', ‘methods to develop 
economic, trade and investment relations between the EU private sector and the 
DPRK and 'DPRK's economic modernization initiatives: possible co-operation with 
the EU'. In each session, scholars from the European countries prepared a concrete 
and detailed presentation on respective topic and present among those North Korean 
officials. Here are some ideas which they brought in the two conferences: (for details 
please look at the following part) 
i. The declining role of state in transition economies 
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ii. The power of market (d/s) on wages setting, inflation, interest rate and 
balance of payment 
iii. The designation of central bank 
iv. The power of FDI on developing domestic economy and technical 
knowledge transfer 
V. A stable legal protection for investors 
vi. Proliferate knowledge on labor management and IT (Poland) 
vii. The co-existence of SMEs with market economy and centrally-planned 
economy 
viii. Steps on restructuring of enterprises 
ix. Minimizing the role of government in land control 
X. Enhance workers' incentive 
2.3.2.3. General Discussion and working groups 
Inside the detailed rundown of the workshops, the organizer tailor-made 
designed another channel for the communication between the scholars and the 
officials. During the conferences, they planned a general discussion in each session 
followed by the 2-3 presentations and designed to increase the mutual 
communications and interactions. 
In the first discussion session held in the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, one 
North Korean participant asked about the advantages and disadvantages when 
comparing a centrally planned economy to a market economy and how incentives for 
foreign investors could be increased. In response to these, Dr. Triska replied that the 
Czech centrally planned economy was extremely inefficient and totally incapable of 
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attracting foreign investment. In addition, a representative of an economic institution 
in Pyongyang asked "How did the government keep control on the economic 
management.. .and is there any standard of assessing stability?"^^^According to what 
Prof. Kokko replied, the function of the state in a transforming economy is to make 
sure that the market works in a fair manner and to prevent monopolies. He 
emphasized competition was essential and stability and the behavior of the actors in 
the market economy must be guaranteed. But, in order to sustain a stable economic 
development, he suggested that a moderate inflation rate, a growth rate that is not too 
high to prevent an overheating economy and trade balance could provide a good 
indicator on the performance of the national economy. 
Other than discussion session, the organizer also developed relevant working 
groups after the normal period of presentation and discussion sessions in order to 
extend the discussion and allow more in-depth exchange on more technical issues. In 
the second EU-DPRK Workshop in 2005, the European and the Korean experts 
decided to introduce two separate working groups, one on 'Tools for modernizing 
state-owned enterprises: markets, autonomy, ownership, SME', the second on 
'Management structures and incentives for managers and workers to enhance output 
and quality'. In the first working group, Dr. Dallago answered the questions, which 
were raised by the Korean counterparts about how to modernize the state-owned 
enterprises (SOEs), by introducing the idea of allowing the rights to use assets by the 
SOEs. 
Undoubtedly, these types of communication strategies were proved to be quite 
173 Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). 2005. Report on the Workshop on 'Economic Reform and 
the Development of Economic Relations between the EU and the DPRK', p 12. 
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successful in enhancing the discussion atmosphere and the quality of communication. 
According to Mr. Guy Ledoux, one of the participant in the workshop, said what he 
witnessed that ‘They (North Korean official) would not only listen to presentations, 
but also ask questions,' and ‘the simple fact that such a large number of North Korean 
officials attended the workshop shows that they are eager to listen and leam from 
others' experience.' 
2.3.2.4. Field Visit 
Other than normal communication channel, the Foundation also organized 
several opportunities for the European experts to visit factories and industrial plant in 
North Korea, including the Textile Plant in Central Pyongyang which produced suits 
for men in relatively small numbers for the Chinese and South Korean market as well 
as greenhouses near the city where mainly water melons and cucumber are grown 
(imported from Netherlands); The Taedonggang Brewery which is a popular and 
widely distributed beet in the Pyongyang area; The PyongSu Pharmaceuticals, a joint 
venture pharmaceutical factory; Tongil Market, with consumer goods such as 
vegetables, fruit, bread, meat and fish; Kaesong Special Economic Zone (SEZ); 
“March 16" Wire Factory in Pyongyang which is a joint venture production line for 
computer cables, a shoe factory and a factory for sealing materials/rings in the 
Kaesong Joint Industrial Zone. 
Throughout the visits, the European economic experts could receive and witness 
a more direct and first-hand experience about the real face of the economic situation 
and development in North Korea, and be able to provide a more suitable and realistic 
economic advice to those Korean counterparts. Moreover, the field visits could also 
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be served as a valuable and friendly arena to further their academic discussion into a 
practical policy advice. 
2.3.2.5. Lunch/Coffee Break and Dinner 
The designation of the lunch, dinner and coffee break would also serve the 
purpose of widening and extending the mutual discussion among the European 
experts and the North Korean officials. In communication and sociological 
perspectives, the behavior of drinking has social meanings and functions. By drinking 
with other people, people can lower their barriers, relax themselves, feel that they are 
sharing their time, and thus enhance the communication and social interaction.!74 The 
words 'tea time' or 'coffee break' show how drinking is related with open social 
activities. People serve tea, coffee, wine, or other beverages with snacks to guests 
during parties, meetings, or many other kinds of gatherings to lower the barriers 
between people. Also, people often have something to drink while taking a rest or 
making a conversation with other people. People feel more comfortable and intimate 
with people with whom they are eating and drinking together. While drinking, people 
become more relaxed and comfortable with other people, and it makes them more 
easily communicate with each other and build up social relationships. Therefore, it's 
essential to include such kind of activities during the academic conferences in order to 
provide another arena and space of communication and network building. 
2.4. Institutionalization of advice 
174 Hyemin Chung, Chia-Hsun Jackie, Lee and Ted Selker. 2006. Lover's Cup: Drinking Interfaces as 
New Communication Channels. Available at: 
<http ://web. media, mit. edu/~j ackylee/publication/ac3 04-chung.pdf>. 
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The influence of expert groups increases if they have access to policy-makers, or 
even become part of the bureaucratic structure itself.^^^ In relation to this, we should 
note that it is important to revisit the literature on how interest groups influence the 
policy-making between taking as an insider or outsider status, while the insider would 
enjoy some privileged access to policy-making. ^ ^^ In the case as an insider, difference 
can also be made between core status (always centrally involved), specialist status 
(always centrally involved on technical issues), and peripheral status (only sometimes 
involved). With reference to the literature, it is suggested that insiders, particularly 
those who enjoy core or specialist status, are provided with the most opportunity to 
influence policy-making. 
As regards institutionalization of advice, we find that the communication 
between the expert group from FNF and the policy-makers from Pyongyang took 
place within a semi-institutionalized context of formal bodies and processes. In terms 
of structure of the community, two factors were affecting its organizational 
competence. Firstly, other than usual academic scholars who involved in the 
communication process, some EU government officials and Ambassadors and 
officials from the United Nations Development Programme would also play a 
complementary role in assisting the operation of the community. In addition, some 
other NGOs, such as KETES (Korea-Europe Technology and Economy Services) also 
involved actively in bridging the network of the EU-DPRK Workshops. Therefore, 
governmental, intergovernmental and non-governmental actors were centrally 
participated during the workshops. Secondly, the community members of the FNF 
175 Haas, Peter. 1992. Introduction: Expert groups and International Policy Coordination. International 
Organization 46: 3-4 
176 Maloney, William A., A.Grant Jordan and Andrew M. McLaughlin. 1995. Interest Groups and 
Public Policy: The Insider/Outsider Model Revisited. Journal of Public Policy 14: 18 
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were meeting annually with the North Korean officials in the last 2 years and engaged 
a very direct communication and ideas transfer process. Thus, these two factors 
showed there is a semi-institutionalized network being built in this context. 
Moreover, the FNF also formed a specialist status and image of the expert group. 
Firstly, in the past two workshops, the members of the community are all independent 
experts from the European countries. These experts were regarded as the expert group 
as they're typically communicated through the written reports and oral presentations 
at the seminars and conferences. Secondly, inside the community, some of the 
members are mentioned as core members as they're being invited in two consecutive 
years, such as Dr. Ari Kokko, Dr. Dusan Triska and Dr. Rudiger Frank. Also, in terms 
of governmental officials, the Ambassadors from the United Kingdom (UK), The 
Netherlands, Germany, Poland and the Representative of the European Commission 
were also being invited twice which showed they are regularly participated and played 
a core role in these Workshops. 
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Table 4.6: The flow of ideas from FNF to the North Korean officials 
Ambassadors I H Representatives 
Expert ^ Others NGOs 
Policy-makers and 
Representatives 
2.5. Communication strategies 
It is important for studies of transnational actors to pay attention to strategy. 
Strategy, here, is defined as “an actor's extensive and comprehensive planning of the 
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use of available means with the object of attaining certain goals attempted in 
competition with others". ^ ^"^Undeniably, it maybe assumed that knowledged-based 
networks do not act in a state of vacuum in which they can easily meet their target 
without taking other actors into consideration. Thus, it means that they are inevitably 
have to compete with the other actors, such as governments, companies, NGOS, and 
perhaps even with other expert groups. In order to promote successfully of their ideas 
to the policy-makers, there are four transnational strategies which can exert their 
influence. For example, the power approach, the technocratic approach, coalition 
building and grass-root mobilization] 78 
In power approach, linkage actors attempt to target top decision makers in either 
domestic political systems or the international system through direct intermediation. 
The technocratic approach means various actors including IGOs, NGOs, expert 
groups, and international courts, acting individually or collectively, uses knowledge of 
procedural mechanisms as well as the legal system, on order to warn the policy trends, 
to intervene administratively, or to institute litigation. The third strategy, the coalition 
building approach, means the transnational actors utilize domestic actors to build 
coalitions, forging domestic policy consensus as a basic for generating transnational 
coalition. The grass-root mobilization approach focuses on try to build widespread 
public involvement in several countries. The strategies are more or less directly linked 
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Referring back to the case, it's apparently that the expert group in FNF more or 
177 Sjoblom, Gunnar. 1968. Party Strategies in a Multiparty System. Lund: Studentlitteratur. p.30. 
178 Ming St, Karen. 1995. Uncovering the Missing Links: Linkage Actors and Their Strategies In 
Foreign Policy Analysis. In L.Neack, J.A. Hey and P.J. Haney, eds., Foreign Policy Analysis: 
Continuity and Change In Its Second Generation. Englewood Cliffs, New Jersey: Prentice Hall. p.238. 
179 Ibid, p.239. 
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less fitted in the second approach. During the workshops, one of the major objectives 
of the expert group is to exert their technical knowledge advantages so as to influence 
the policy-makers in Pyongyang while making their policy change. So, as we can see, 
during the workshops, the expert group shares no pains and consistently presented 
various policy ideas on how to transit gradually from a centrally-planned economy 
into a market-oriented economy. In addition, those European scholars, by using a 
technocratic style, provided a deeply and specific policy advice to those 
policy-makers in North Korea. When meeting with those North Korean officials, the 
members of the community packaged their image carefully as the mixture of 
technocrats and academic scholars, but not purely a government officials or academic 
professor, in order to show their balance their professional status which can enrich 
their persuasive power. For example, one of the North Korean officials appeared to be 
most interested in a presentation given by the Czech Republic's former Vice Minister 
of Finance Dusan Triska, who was personally in charge of his country's economic 
transition from a centrally planned economy to a market-oriented one, demonstrated 
that their successful strategy on using a technocratic approach. 
2.6. Policies recommendation and ideas shared during the two conferences 
After analyzing the structure and communication channels of the expert group, in the 
following part, focus will be shifted on what kind of ideas they presented and 
delivered during the two workshops and eventually affected the policy outcome. 
2.6.1. Workshop on Economic Reforms and the Development of Economic Relations 
between the EU and the DPRK (31 August to 4 September 2004) 
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In this workshop, it was divided into several sessions. In each session, there was 
a specific topic to discuss, such as 'sharing experiences in economic modernization' 
and 'examples of international co-operation in the area of economic reform'. Within 
the session, scholars were invited to present his/her papers in front of the North 
Korean officials and followed by a short and interactive discussion. 
So, in the following part, we will go through each parts of the workshops and 
what kinds of ideas that the scholars presented within that specific session 
Session One “Sharing experiences in economic modernization" 
Dr. Dusan Triska 
“Economic reform process in the new and aspiring members of the EU，， 
In his presentation, Dr. Triska pointed out Czech model of transformation has 
often been criticized by renowned institutions and economists, it finally became a 
success story for a country in transformation. The ‘Czech Way" of transformation was 
mainly based on macroeconomic stability, price liberalization and the social safety net. 
At the core of the transition process was the privatization of 4000 state-owned 
enterprises through a voucher system. In a second step, a legal framework had been 
established. The Czech "privatization first" strategy was often criticized. But "western 
style privatization" that often relied on institutions such as stock-exchanges etc. could 
not applied to the Czech case. Even though of those criticism, the Czech 
transformation process (including the voucher privatization) was "strongly 
re-endorsed" in the Czech Republic, Dr. Triska concluded, with the election of Vaclav 
Klaus as president. 
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Prof. Dr. Ari Kokko 
‘‘Economic reform process in Asian countries” 
Professor Dr. Ari Kokko from the Stockholm School of Economics, gave an 
overview on economic reforms in Asia that had taken place over the past decades. He 
said that although most of these reform processes had involved the move from 
inward-looking to outward-looking economies, they had differed fundamentally 
between countries. Nonetheless, some common elements could be identified. Firstly, 
globalization and increasing market-orientation forced these countries to open up their 
economies to international trade. Secondly, the reform measures proved to be very 
successful: growth rates up to more than 10% were not exceptions and became known 
as the “Asian miracle". Thirdly, the change of the international arena, in particular, the 
reduction of artificial trade barriers, the increasing mobility of international capital as 
well as easier access to technology, technical development of telecommunications and 
transportation made the transition process to an outward focused economy less costly. 
Professor Kokko stressed that there was "no single right way to achieve 
transformation" but that successful reforms were always linked to key words "market 
orientation" and "globalization". 
Session Two “Examples of international co-operation in the area of economic reform，， 
H.E. Ambassador Radinck van Vollenhoven 
“Examples of how the European Commission and Member States have assisted 
economic modernization initiatives in Europe and Asia” 
Speaking of assistance, Ambassador Van Vollenhoven stressed the importance of 
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ownership being in the hands of the partner and not of the donor country. He 
emphasized the vital role of good governance in the broad sense of the word that 
enables foreign assistance to bear fruit. European Community Assistance programmes 
provide a strategic framework for EC cooperation activities in a given country, 
according to Mrs. Castillo Fernandez: a sort of a policy mix which includes support to 
the implementation of association or partnership agreements as well as integration 
with all other community policies towards a partner country. Although the European 
Commission itself cannot provide investment funds, it can assist in the provision of 
know-how, exchanges, training which can be combined with investment funds from 
other sources. It is important to have a coherent approach from a macro-perspective, 
and not to deal with single issues only. Mrs. Castillo Fernandez also reiterated that 
beneficiaries should feel ownership of the programme. 
Mr. Abu Selim 
“Role of international organizations in assisting economic growth strategies in 
transition economies，， 
Mr. Abu Selim spoke on the “Role of International Organizations in Assisting 
Economic Growth Strategies in Transition Economies". Mr. Selim outlined the main 
ingredients of the transition from a planned to a market economy: 
1. economic liberalization 
2. macroeconomic stabilization 
3. restructuring and privatization 
4. legal and institutional reforms. 
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To absorb deterioration in the living standards and quality of life, economic 
growth strategies need to be implemented. International organizations do assist in 
economic growth strategies within a set of basic principles and parameters of 
development cooperation. Since development is the responsibility of the government, 
the recipient country must be active in driving the right direction and the donors have 
to respect its decisions. Another crucial issue is mutual trust between the country and 
its partner. Mutual trust can be built up by a continuous policy dialogue as well as 
closer and more frequent personal contacts. External assistance in the form of policy 
intervention programmes and projects should be integrated with the internal policy 
development process to be effective. Therefore, it is important that external partners 
have access to true statistical data. External expert advice should focus on how to 
reach an appropriate national policy decision. Finally, national capacity building 
through international and human resource development should be at the core of 
cooperation programmes. 
Session Three “Methods to develop economic, trade and investment relations between 
the EU private sector and the DPRK 
Prof. Dr. Rudiger Frank 
‘‘Successful strategies to attract and retain foreign direct investment" 
Professor Dr. Ruediger Frank, University of Vienna, gave an introduction on 
successful strategies to attract and retain foreign direct investment (FDI), an issue of 
great interest to the North Korean side. First, he referred to a number of strengths that 
would attract private investors: 
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1. favorable geographic location at the core of North East Asia 
2. large reserves of various high quality raw materials 
3. a disciplined and well-educated workforce 
4. low wages. 
Although these preconditions are very favorable, investors also demand security 
and transparency. Apart from transparency, the host country has to meet a number of 
preconditions to investment such as nondiscrimination, free transfers, unlimited trade, 
reasonable taxes and balanced subsidies. Investors want to compete with domestic 
companies on an equal footing and in accordance with international law. Transfers 
related to an investment have to be free and the host country has to provide protection 
against arbitrary expropriation. Investors want to be able to sell their products on the 
domestic and international market. 
Excessive taxation and excessive subsidization of domestic competitors by the 
state will discourage investors from investing. Another important factor is accessible 
resources, including good infrastructure and human capital. According to Professor 
Frank, a number of regulatory, financial and fiscal incentives are indispensable to 
attract investors. Professor Frank also pointed to the benefits of FDI for the host 
country, namely, the transfer of technology and know-how, creation of jobs, the 
formation of human capital, provision of future tax revenues and competition among 
business sectors. FDI also contributes to the development and restructuring of the 
enterprise, as well as to fuller international (trade) integration. In his concluding 
remarks, Professor Frank stressed that access to macroeconomic data like GNP, trade 
statistics, inflation rates, etc., is essential for transparency and trust. 
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Mr. Luca Birindelli 
“The Role of foreign legal experts in fostering FDI，， 
Mr. Luca Birindelli, presented the role of foreign legal experts in fostering FDI. 
The opening of the service sector, in particular the legal services sector, has proved to 
be a "successful tool" to increase the quality of an investor-friendly environment. 
Through legal services, communication between foreign investors and the local 
authorities becomes easier since it promotes the exchange of knowledge and expertise 
and finally, creates confidence. Advising and consulting clients with regard to the 
legal, economic and operational framework of the foreign country as well as sharing 
experiences with the local authorities, for example, drafting new laws and regulations, 
are the main activities of legal experts. To prevent foreign lawyers dominating the 
legal sector, the opening up of the local services market in a transition economy needs 
to be managed very carefully, Mr. Birindelli stressed. 
Dr. Tony Michell 
“Doing Business in DPR Korea” 
"Doing Business in the DPRK" was the title of the presentation of Dr. Tony 
Michell focusing on problems caused by the strict character of the regulations and 
logistical shortcomings. According to Dr. Michell, most of the problems are not of a 
legal nature but concern transaction costs. He also pointed out that US laws would 
impede the activities of European investors in DPRK since there is a risk that by 
selling sensitive or so-called strategic products to the DPRK, EU investors could 
violate US laws and might face legal consequences in the US. Moreover, logistical 
shortcomings such as the transportation system, the ban on mobile phones etc. make 
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business difficult. Dr. Michell addressed five major problems and gave some 
recommendations to facilitate the logistical conditions for investors. 
1. the DPRK authorities should issue multi-entry visas to investors and their staff 
2. provide a rapid service for suppliers 
3. the validity period of investment licenses needs to be increased to give investors 
greater confidence. 
4. a part of the port of Nampo that handles imports should be sold or leased to a 
foreign management company to prevent delay in transporting goods into the 
country. 
5. the international security situation caused by the nuclear issue must be resolved. 
In discussions after the session, European participants pointed out that in their 
opinion, unless a solution is found to pending security issues, the restrictions imposed 
by certain countries including South Korea and the EU on the export to North Korea 
of dual-use technology are unlikely to be removed. 
Prof. Dr. Geir Helgesen 
"Different business culture: Facilitating business between Europe and Asia" 
Professor Dr. Geir Helgesen spoke about “Different Business Cultures: 
Facilitating Business between Europe and Asia”. His presentation reflected the 
meaning and function of this workshop, namely how to create trust and confidence 
among partners with different cultural backgrounds. East and West need a "substantial 
dose of knowledge" about the culture of the other to be able to develop closer 
relations. A mutual cultural awareness includes the knowledge about history, culture 
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and social customs and is even more important than the ability to speak the foreign 
language. Professor Helgesen quoted the Danish Ambassador to Singapore, Orstrom 
Moller: "We must know what we think and why we think in the way we do - what is 
our mindset and why do we have it and why do we think it is the right one for us? 
Thinking in this way opens the door for realizing that what is best for us may not 
necessarily be best for others. And that gives the way to the crucial observation that 
the heart of tolerance is that we care for other people's destiny even if we do not agree 
with them. Understanding is the key to tolerance. And communication is the key to 
understanding how other people think and why it may be different from what we think. 
Unless we communicate and try to understand each other, there is no hope of 
comparing different ways of thinking with the ultimate objective of shaping a set of 
values to serve as the mutually agreed framework." It is important for the success of 
economic cooperation to develop - apart from trust and transparency - the "necessary 
cross-cultural awareness". 
Session Four “The DPRK's economic modernization initiatives: possible co-operation 
with the EU” 
Prof. Dr. Ari Kokko, Mrs. Castillo Fernandez and Mr. Ulrich Niemann 
“Role of study visits and training projects，. 
Professor Kokko, Mrs. Castillo Fernandez and Mr. Niemann outlined the role of 
study visits and training projects by referring to the private sector, government 
sponsored programmes and the recent training seminars provided by the Friedrich 
Naumann Foundation in the DPRK, respectively. 
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Professor Kokko stressed the importance of the training of translators, especially 
in business English and Korean. To avoid misunderstandings, both sides should agree 
on economic terms with common content. Training in economic management is 
another important field. "We know too little on what is going on here [in North 
Korea]，，，Professor Kokko said. Therefore, it would not be that easy to design suitable 
training measures for North Korean participants. 
Mrs. Castillo Fernandez presented some examples of economic modernization 
initiatives which could be of interest for the DPRK. In China, cooperation is focused 
on the support of institutional reforms, changes in legal framework, development of 
human resources and market opening. Moreover, the (European) Erasmus Mundus 
Programme provides scholarships to Chinese post graduate students. Other 
programmes support cooperation in the area of intellectual property rights and 
technological development. In Russia, economic training programmes were provided 
for managers (middle management). Unemployed scientists from the former chemical 
and biological weapons-sector were given the opportunity to work in research 
institutes in Moscow and Kiev, co-financed by the EU. By providing support for 
administrative reform and the private sector, the EU also assists Vietnam in its 
transition to a market oriented economy. Apart from financial aid for nuclear safety, 
the EU also promotes people to people programmes in the Ukraine. 
Mr. Niemann gave a short overview over past and future activities organized by 
FNF in the DPRK. He described how cooperation activities with the DPRK had 
involved training in the system of national accounts and commercial accounting at the 
end of March 2004. This had gone very smoothly and a good working relation had 
been established. The format has proved to be the right one for such a purpose and 
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was mutually satisfactory. Looking to the future, Mr. Niemann said that providing a 
four-day training seminar on a very specific, technical and complex topic could only 
be a first step. Further complementing training activities designed to deliver more 
in-depth information and practical training were crucial and needed here. To have a 
multiplier effect, special academic and vocational institutions, such as universities, 
management schools, international organizations and companies should join these 
efforts and offer follow-up activities in the DPRK and abroad. Taking into account 
that these efforts are extremely useful and would hopefully increase in numbers in the 
future, Mr. Niemann emphasized that the need for monitoring, information and 
coordination of these activities would become even more important. He concluded 
with the wish for more transparency, advance information and coordination, more 
efficiency and coherence which would benefit all parties involved in the joint efforts 
and objectives. 
Ms. Nicole Risse 
‘‘Establishing information networks between potential trade partners and training 
projects，， 
Ms. Nicole Risse gave a short presentation on "Establishing Information 
Networks between Potential Trade Partners and Training Projects，，. She concentrated 
on the three main activities of Korea-Europe Technology and Economy Services 
(KETES): 
1. information gathering 
2. network building 
3. capacity building 
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According to Ms. Risse, it is of the utmost importance to have information on 
business actors on both sides and in a second step, to organize information networks 
between potential trade partners. The KETES homepage and library provide useful 
information on business, law, IT, agriculture, energy and environment for North 
Korean and foreign actors. Network building happens through trade fairs and 
exhibitions in Europe and the DPRK. KETES promotes DPRK companies to potential 
multipliers in Europe. In cooperation with the Europe-Korea Foundation, KETES 
organizes training seminars and workshops in the fields of business and economics for 
students and experts in the DPRK and abroad. KETES also supports DPRK students 
studying economics, IT and medicine at European universities. 
2.6.2. Second Workshop on Economic Reform and the Development of Economic 
Relations between the EU and the DPRK (12-14 October 2005) 
Session one “The Role of the State in the Economic Management” 
Prof. Dr. Ari Kokko 
"Economic System and the Role of the State” 
After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the economic transition processes that 
have taken place in most of the former centrally planned economies, there are few 
countries that rely solely on the state as the provider of goods, services, and economic 
growth. It has been widely accepted that markets and prices are essential in driving 
the economies in growth and the chief momentum in distributing the responsibilities 
of all the resources in the market. However, different countries followed different 
paths of reform and development with regards to their distinctive values, experiences 
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and level of development. By the way, it is inarguably that the centrally planned 
economy and the laissez-faire economy are at the two extreme models of 
development. 
However, once a country that are trying to reform and restructure its economy 
from a pure planned economy into a market economy, we can qualify it as a 
'transition economy”，for example China, Vietnam and Russia. These economies 
abandoned central planning and are in transition towards a more market oriented 
system, but the process of transformation has not yet been completed. Therefore, state, 
are still controlling a large proportion of power, including ownership of assets, 
creating institution infrastructure, establishing property right and legal system. 
State-owned enterprises (SOEs) were illustrated as the best example on how 
economic transformation took place in a transitional economy. In order to stabilize the 
transition economy, SOEs were responsible to maintain the high level of employment 
(especially for the industrial sector) and welfare system for a certain period of time. 
Other than transition economies, there are some other economic models which 
categorize different kinds of economies. Liberal market economy lies the closest to 
the theoretical laissez-faire economy and represented by the US and some other 
advanced Western economies. Although the state holds an important position as a 
provider of public goods and a guardian of the rules and rights of individuals and 
firms, it has a much less active role than in transition economies. 
"Welfare state" and "developmental state" are known as the two intermediate 
example of this economic categorization spectrum. The common characteristics for 
these two models is that the role of the state is significantly more prominent than in 
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the liberal market economy, but the focus of state intervention is found in different 
areas. 
In evaluating the four systems listed above, the author provided several reasons 
to support when regards to different circumstances, different economic systems would 
be chosen. Firstly, in regards to the short terms and long terms return, the highest 
short term growth rates can probably be achieved in the transition economies, where 
many commercial opportunities are unexploited, and where the initial productivity 
levels are low enough to leave much potential for convergence and catching up. 
Secondly, in terms of social stability, welfare state systems can be anticipated to 
generate the most equitable and stable development. Comparing with transition and 
developmental economies, several population groups are under-privileged and in a 
vulnerable position while facing tremendous transformation pressure. Concurrently, 
liberal market economy also rewards entrepreneurship and hard work, and resulted in 
a polarized social structure. 
To conclude, these economic considerations can be portrait as a debate between 
growth and equity. Countries with historical consideration on equity than growth, like 
Nordic countries, weighted a relatively higher in egalitarian economic and political 
structure than others. In contrast, the Asian developmental state model in the 1980s 
attracted the attention on growth rather than equity. Since then, neo-liberal economies 
have attempted to build as the most dominant approach in every parts of the world. 
But, the debate between equity and growth is still struggling and looking for a balance 
development strategy. 
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Dr. Dusan Triska 
“Redefining the role of the state: public planning and management tools，， 
Dr. Dusan Triska, former deputy Minister of Finance during the transition of 
Czechoslovakia, focused on the topic Redefining the role of the state from central 
planning to development planning with market incentives. He pointed to the paradox 
of reform in which government officials have to begin implementing significant 
changes while operating under a pre-reform framework - at a time when the 
government needs to be strong enough to implement changes it weakens itself by 
transforming its personnel, objectives and methods. Dr. Triska referred to the differing 
degrees of intensity in sectors undergoing transition. The level of intensity would 
depend on the specific circumstances of the country and the stage of the overall 
transition process. He then described the "mass privatization programme" that had 
taken place in Czechoslovakia. This was based on a system of voucher distribution 
and within less than ten years half of the medium and large enterprise assets had been 
privatized through voucher privatization. 
Mr. Max van der Sleen 
‘‘Macro-economic tools of the State to manage the economy: Theory and 
experiences from market economies，transition countries in Europe and developing 
countries" 
Macro-economy is widely been accepted as the driving and decisive indicator for 
a state for managing to develop a market economy. Policy, including fiscal and 
monetary, are specifically important for this transition. 
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By inviting the experience of the transitional economies in Europe, the author of 
this paper is trying to develop a basic mutual understanding of the role of macro 
economic policy tools in an open market economy, and to stimulate an exchange of 
views between the workshop participants from the DPRK and the EU on the 
relevance of macro-economic insights for the direction of the reforms in the DPRK. 
Starting from the macro economic policy tools in market economies, the author 
mentioned the power of market (demand and supply) in deriving the price of market 
(wages and inflation), money market (interest rate) and foreign exchange market 
(exchange rate) and trade market (balance of payment). Therefore, it would affect the 
whole business environment. 
Then, what role should the government play in this macro market economy? The 
author stated that let markets function on its own but government has also an 
important role to play, including building and safeguarding the institutions, rules and 
regulations and providing sufficient information as a broker of market. 
To be more specific, what we can expect the government should do in this 
circumstance are: reducing tax-created discentives, privatizing public enterprises, 
reducing those regulations and policies that give much discretion to some public 
employees, such as those, for example, that grant import permits, tax incentives, and 
so forth. Therefore, as we can anticipate, government should pay a more neutral role 
in the economy. 
In monetary policy, the author brings the case in Europe in order to demonstrate 
the price (currency) stability function of the European Central Bank. Through various 
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ways, such as control the money supply, influence the interest rate and issuing 
government bond, directly and indirectly affecting the commercial banking system 
and the financial markets. 
In other example, in accordance to the observation on the exchange rate (floating 
or fixed), the government can fully understand the balance of payment (import and 
export) of her country and carefully tailor-made a foreign trade regime which can 
truly reflect the real import and export situation. 
Moreover, in the fiscal policy, however, if a country which facing a situation of 
real expenditure more than income, we can regard it as a deficit budget. In response to 
this, raising tax, inviting foreign investment and borrowing are some possible solution 
to resolve the problem and increase the government revenues. 
In arguing the general principles, there is a need to discuss the vision of the concept of 
shock therapy, which implemented by the former Eastern European countries during 
the transitional period, and the gradual reform process, which developed by the 
Chinese and Vietnamese experience during the late 1980s. 
The analysis of the transition experience in Central and Eastern Europe can be 
illustrated as the fact that economic liberalization and political liberalization were 
implemented as the same time within a very short period of time. In central and 
eastern Europe, the whole transition started with price liberalization and trade 
liberalization for consumer goods. However, it's inevitably that prices will fluctuate 
tremendously after the initial period of transition and inflation will be happened. In 
order to address this problem, government should promote an adjusted monetary 
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policy which geared at low inflation and needs to make sure that the interest rate 
should be kept above zero. Secondly, for the exchange rate, by bringing the 
experience in Poland, a short period of government controlled fixed exchange rate 
should be implemented before the fully opening up of the exchange rate to a floating 
rate. Moreover, as the lack of development expenditure in those central and eastern 
European countries, there was a need from the neighboring countries assistance and 
international borrowing to support and finance the reforms in their economies. 
Session two “Conditions and Strategies to Attract Investment: Experiences of the new 
Member States of the EU” 
Dr. Andrea Szalavetz 
“Mobilizing foreign capital to promote catching-up and modernization: The 
Hungarian experience，， 
The main message of this paper is that mobilizing foreign capital/investment is 
indispensable since it plays an outstanding and indispensable role in driving the 
economy and the modernization-inducing FDI with minimal state interventionism, by 
adopting a liberal policy stance. 
Through referring to the role of foreign investment, it highly praised the state to 
allow the foreign company to hold at least majority shares or even 100% in the 
business. Actually, the reason for this appraisal simply because it can draw foreign 
money to help to develop domestic economy, learning entrepreneur knowledge and 
skills, imported foreign high technology machinery and booth the restructuring 
process of the business in the country. 
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In regards to the Hungarian experience on economic reform during the 
transformation era, the most obvious and catchy lesson that it showed is that 
whenever a foreign company initiated an cooperation with local business corporate, 
it's of utmost importance to catch every cooperation opportunity. In addition, other 
than that, the domestic government should actively provide some sort of investment 
incentive and attraction for foreign investors, such as tax exemptions and free trade 
zones. 
More importantly, as it mentioned, there are basically three main policy which 
are the cornerstone for the successful transformation in Hungary economy. Firstly, the 
creation of industrial customs free zones (ICFZ). Secondly, developed an advanced 
system of industrial parks. Finally, increased MNC's regional embeddedness by which 
strengthening MNC's local ties by promoting backward linkages. 
Dr. Dusan Triska 
“Designing a legal framework for economic activity" 
Dr. Triska stressed the importance of 'designing a legal framework for economic 
activity'. “A stable legal frame and its reliable enforcement are the necessary 
pre-conditions of decent reform”�he said. In the Czech Republic simple laws (Acts) 
on private enterprises and privatization represented a "minimal transformation 
corridor". He stressed that corruption and other economic crimes are major dangers 
for the government in transition and that the "unavoidable lack of law enforcement 
represents the major danger to the promoters of change and thus the chief obstacle to 
the genuine transition". Finally, he reminded participants that it would take years to 
transform the state-planning economy but it might "take decades, even generations to 
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adapt to the outcomes and changes brought by transformation". 
Dr. Jacek Mironski 
“Human Resource Management and Investment in Human Capital (development 
of existing skills and technical expertise) 
Human capital has long to be regarded as the decisive factor on the evaluating of 
a company's competitiveness. During the transformation period, developing skills and 
technical expertise in human resource management plays an important role in 
assisting the whole restructuring progress. 
Poland, was long cited as one of most successful economies who undergone a 
massive human resource training programme in history. In order to better equipped 
the new employee in Poland, the Poland government and some non-governmental 
organizations promoted the development of the companies itself (enrich the 
consultation and training firms) and trained the employees departing from traditional 
values (subordinate, discipline and fulfilling diligence tasks only). 
One example of this human capital project is called EQUAL. EQUAL is part of 
the European Union's strategy for more and better jobs and for ensuring that no-one is 
denied access to them. The aim of this project is by using new ways to tackle 
discrimination and inequality for those people who are working and those looking for 
a job. Among many other objectives, this project is basically focuses on supporting on 
adaptability of firms and employees to structural economic change and the use of 
information technology and other new technologies. 
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Under EQUAL, the project titled "Model System of Companies Staff Adaptation 
to Structural Changes in Economy" intended to create a model system to support 
entrepreneurs and company employees in the creation of a learning process in 
companies undergoing restructuring, e.g. proliferating the knowledge on management, 
providing training to the most threatening sectors of labors (old and marginalize). 
Another project called "Mentoring through IT" is to develop an effective model for 
the mutual transfer of knowledge between groups of older people (over 50) and 
people entering the labor market, with the use of IT tools. This model, by using IT 
knowledge, can significantly help reduce the discrimination these people suffer and 
will have a significant impact on the efficiency of the economy. 
E-Dialogue is another project which is supposed to develop and test for 
supporting the abilities of small-and-medium-sized enterprises and their employees to 
adopt to structural changes in the economy. It has dual nature, combining the 
provision of an innovative information system to companies, which supports human 
resources management, with raising employees' qualifications. 
The "ElaStan Promotion of Flexible Employment Methods" was another project 
which wanted to promote innovate solutions on the labor market and new 
employment opportunities. By targeting both SMEs and Large companies, it wants to 
promote the use of provided by information society in making the forms of 
employment more flexible (e-working) and lowering the unemployment ratio. 
Other types of project like "Opole e-Craftsman" and “EUROSTER Partnership 
for Increasing Adaptability of Workers in the Shipbuilding Industry" are intends to 
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raise the productivity, the smooth of restructuring and the adaptive capabilities of 
craftsman and workers in shipbuilding industry by using information technology 
respectively. 
Session three "Restructuring State-owned Enterprises and Agricultural Sector: 
Methods and Implementation” 
Prof. Dr. Bruno Dallago 
“Creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises (SME) 
Different countries in transformation have been considering the role of small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs) as potentially and actually important for the process 
of economic development. In several findings showed that SMEs can be: 
1. not necessarily coincide with systemic transformation from socialism to 
capitalism 
2. functionally both a planned economy to a market economy 
3. not alternative to, nor compatible with large firms. 
According to the experience in some Central and Eastern European countries, 
SMEs was not functionally and naturally a product from either only of socialism or 
capitalism. In some cases, SMEs lead the economic transformation in some socialist 
countries. However, in some other cases, SMEs can also cooperation with some larger 
State-owned companies in sustaining the economic system of socialism. 
However, there are several limitations hindering for the development of SMEs 
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during the transformation, including the insufficient domestic capital, the lack of 
interest of foreign capital in taking over the firms, the negative effect brought by the 
transformation of macro economy on the SMEs (insufficient focus), unconcern of the 
development of institutions, insufficient knowledge and skills support the 
transformation of SMEs. 
By the way, SMEs are absolutely playing an important role in directing the 
transformation of the economy. On one hand, SMEs, through the vertical integration 
with the large firms, can attract additional financial resources from foreign investors 
and accumulate their professional knowledge and entrepreneur skills. Moreover, on 
the other hand, through the joint cooperation with the foreign investors, the legal 
system will reform and issued a lot of protection rights for foreign investment. 
Therefore, it can delocalized the financial burden outsource some of the financial 
activities with a comparatively lower cost. 
Therefore, as we can see, the only economically sound way to maximize the 
advantages, while minimizing disadvantages and keeping control over foreign 
investment is to make the economy and domestic firms as attractive as possible, so 
that the foreign investor has a strong interest in the country and in keeping the 
investment for a long time. 
In policy suggestions, in order to sustain the development of SMEs, local banks 
are in the best position to finance SMEs because they have superior knowledge of 
local circumstances and the reputation of SMEs and their entrepreneurs. Also, 
microcredit has an important role for the smallest businesses because it is simple and 
the risk modest. It may also promote the cooperation among small firms and the 
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development of networks. In addition, the provision of private consultation services 
during the first stage of firm creation, including training and vocational support will 
be also essential for the survival of the SMEs. 
Dr. Brigitta Kauers 
“Expediences with the Treuhand agency in Germany，， 
Due to the unresolved economic problems continued to be happened in the 
eastern part of Germany during the 1990s，in March 1990, the Treuhand agency was 
entrusted with the responsibility of an economic restructuring process. 
Through assigning the Treuhand agency to take the initiative to lead the reform 
in Germany, it firstly administered and disposed the reform of agriculture and forestry. 
Since then, it handled the issues related to the enterprises and take-over of redundancy 
scheme payment of enterprises unable to pay it. 
In addition, it also carefully planned and monitored the process of the 
privatization of the East German companies. Through the steps by steps criteria, the 
Treuhand agency dealt with the restructuring and modernization of the enterprises and 
reduces the unnecessary numbers of employers and workers so as to raise the 
competitiveness of the enterprises, applied massively of the social flanking measures 
(including the Labor Promotion Law). 
The Treuhand agency also placed great importance from the very beginning on 
attracting foreign investor involvement. They signed more than 40,000 contracts with 
domestic companies and enjoyed several investment rights and guaranteed more than 
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10% of all jobs and investment commitment. 
Even though the Treuhand agency finished its work with a deficit of 104 billion 
EURO, but there are also numerous good news resulted, such as it preserved the 
chemical industry, raised the wage standard, brought foreign investment and 
know-how and planned the modem infrastructure development which can provide an 
ideal condition for innovation. 
Prof. Dr. Michael P. Cuddy 
“Some thoughts on agriculture and rural development in the DPRK，， 
In regards to the agricultural development in North Korea, self-sufficiency， 
including food, production, land, labor, capital, and materials inputs, should be 
sufficient to sustain the total population and there should be a stable mechanism to 
distribute the food to all members of the population. 
However, as the writer stated clearly, there are numerous difficulties that North 
Korean need to face on agricultural development. 
Land is the major constraint in North Korea. Inside North Korea, not only it 
lacks of sufficient arable land, but also the size of it hindered its mechanization. In 
addition, the uncertain quality of seeds, fertilizers and the lack of skills and 
knowledge of production are the basic limitation of the development of agriculture in 
North Korea. 
Moreover, due to the political consideration, North Korean government refused 
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to privatize and marketize the ownership of the land, production of the crops, price of 
the products, and also the way how to distribute the products. However, as the writer 
cited the case in China before, it praised the land reform and privatization of 
agricultural policy in China (farmers are allowed the sell remaining crops to the 
market with an uncontrolled price). 
One of the major suggestion from the writer is that the retreat of the role of the 
government in the agriculture. After minimizing the role of the government, farmers' 
income and profits will be completely determined by the market and will stimulate the 
development of the consumer industry also. 
As the North Korean also wanted to address the economic imbalance situation 
between urban and rural areas, the writer advised that the mechanization of the rural 
economy would be one of the possible solutions to this problem. As according to the 
Chinese experience, the central government can invite local authorities in towns and 
villages to set up some enterprises with independent or joint ventures management 
nature. In order to raise the productivity and standard of living in the rural area, it's 
essential to transform the rural economy from primary production to semi-industrial 
production. 
However, a rapid and uncontrolled market transformation would bring tragedy 
effect on the macro-economy. Therefore, state, instead of fading away in market 
economy, but still keep a pivotal role in providing the institutional environment in 
which a market economy can operate. It also provides the checks and balances, the 
'carrot and the stick' in achieving social objectives in co-operation with private 
business within the market economy. 
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Two Working Groups 
In this workshop, the FNF organized two separated workshop groups in order to 
extend the discussion and further developed the interactions and dynamics after the 
presentation sessions. 
Tools for modernization state-owned enterprises - markets, autonomyy ownershipy 
SME 
In order to allow more in-depth discussion and exchange on more technical 
issues between the European and the Korean experts, the foundation decided to 
introduce two working groups, which designed to further developed their discussion. 
In the first working group, many questions from the Korean side dealt with 
issues of how to modernize state-own enterprises and how to create small and 
medium sized enterprises (SMEs). Ownership of SMEs, property rights and methods 
of auditing state-owned enterprises were among the first points discussed. 
Throughout the discussion, Dr. Dallago said that there isn't any contradiction 
between centrally planned economy with the creation of SMEs. But, during the 
process of privatization, private property right should be developed and this could 
supplement the development of the SMEs. 
In addition, Mr. Van der Sleen raised the importance of auditing and explained 
this is legally necessary which state-owned enterprises should also be included. In the 
conversation, he explained auditing can contribute not only to quality improvement 
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since the auditing report can cover a full year of operation, but also can check and 
raised the working incentive of the workers as they may lose their job if they fail to 
work efficiently. 
Finally, one Korean expert wanted to know how output and quality of the 
product could be increased. Dr. Szalavetz answered that replacing old machinery with 
new models would promptly increase the productivity, but, at the same time, giving 
managers and workers more freedom for decision making in their companies and 
enterprises on the micro economic level would also provide an incentive to boost the 
production. 
Management structures and incentives for managers and workers to enhance 
output and quality 
The second working group on management structures and incentives for 
managers and workers to enhance output and quality started by Dr. Triska who wanted 
to know which institution sets the price and what criteria is applied when determining 
the price. One Korean expert replied that the State Pricing Institute sets the price and 
somehow the mechanism of demand and supply is applied while setting the price for 
strategic goods，such as oil and rice. 
Then, in the following rounds of discussions, the Korean counterparts exchanged 
actively theirs' views on profit sharing mechanism between the state and company, the 
role of state in controlling the prices and wages where to what extend should the state 
allows some room of flexible of price setting for company, the level of wages change 
accordingly with the sales profit，the function of Central Bank in manipulating the 
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economic stress, such as exchange rate and inflation and finally how to attract foreign 
direct investment (FDI) and the institutional changes respectively. 
3. Conclusion 
Throughout this chapter, we made a deep analysis on the interaction between EU 
and DPRK in non-governmental perspective, specifically focused on one of the most 
influential NGOs in this area, the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF). The FNF 
provided various academic and professional services in different countries, and also 
been organizing numerous training workshops and study tours for the inter-cultural 
and economic exchanges between the scholars and officials from the EU and the 
officials in North Korea. The bilateral relation was built upon since 2004 after the 
FNF was invited to have a diplomatic visit to Pyongyang. 
Among all other activities, the two big workshops which organized by FNF 
proved to be one of the most important knowledge shared platform for the North 
Korean officials. It's indeed true that North Korea was facing a tremendous economic 
crisis in recent years as the poor performance of national economy contributed to a 
high pressure on the Pyongyang government to seek for some alternative solution to 
this problem. Thanks to the support of FNF, they organized two training workshops, 
with invited 10-15 economists from different European countries but having a similar 
background of sharing the expert knowledge on transitional economies and having 
some personal experiences on the transformation from socialist economy into 
capitalist economy. These scholars, with the fully supported by the FNF, no matter on 
finance, network and meeting medium, through various institutionalized channels 
provided their expert advices and professional opinions on the North Korea current 
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situation. Therefore, it can be understood that we can see there is an early stage of 
epistemic community is emerging and development through using the transnational 
advocacy network method to begin to build up gradually. With the support of NGO or 
foundation, the epistemic community will gain its momentum and power to 
consolidate the network its built and eventually establish a mature, well-structured 
and densely-networked epistemic community in the coming future. 
Hence, in the following chapter, discuss will be made on how the ideas raised by 
those experts in the groups transform into real political outcome and eventually 
shaped the policy direction in North Korea. 
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Chapter Five 
The Distinctive Path of North Korean Reform and the Policy Impacts 
of the Expert Group 
After reviewing how the expert group has emerged, developed and transfered 
their ideas through close cooperation with the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF), 
it is suitable to reflect upon the policy impacts of the recent economic reform 
programs or incentives implemented by the North Korean government. 
However, before linking the ideas to policy outcome, it's the fact that big and 
substantial changes of reform in the last few years in North Korea was not easily to be 
found. This is due to the fact that the basic economic situation in North Korea was 
overcoming a new set of challenges, including the bad economic figures, a 
hyperinflation occurred in 2005 and the re-introduction of the centralized food 
rationing system in 2005. These setbacks demonstrated that there are fundamental 
problems in North Korea's economy. In addition, since the ruling elites in North 
Korea observed carefully the Chinese reform model and have been considering to 
borrow it. The model, tried by the former socialist countries in Europe, play an 
alternative recommendation for the North Korean official to consider and therefore 
it's predictable that the North Korean officials preferred a mixed economic strategy 
changes of its economy will only be made gradually and pragmatically. 
1. Similarities between North Korea and Central and Eastern 
Europe 
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In contrast to the countries of Central and Eastern Europe, the political regime in 
North Korea survived the epochal collapsed of communism. The shock waves 
unleashed by events like the opening of the Berlin Wall in Germany, the 'Velvet 
Revolution' in former Czechoslovakia and the banning of the once all-powerftil 
Communist Party of the Soviet Union did not reach the northern part of the Korean 
peninsula, where socialism went into history's extra-time. ^ ^^  
The collapse of North Korean economy in the mid-1990s showed a chronic 
problem inside the structure of the national economy. With the loss of investment 
from its socialist partners, the whole set of economic supply collapsed, including 
energy, industrial development and food production. Under these conditions, the 
North Korean leadership is attempting to restructure the economy. In July 2002, the 
government announced some measures in the field of several sectors of economic 
policy: the retreat of state from price setting, allow state farmers to sell some of its 
surplus to the market etc. 
However, measures taken so far suggest that the North Korean leadership has 
decided against Chinese-Style reform and in favor of the sort of reform deployed 
repeatedly from the 1960s by the state and party leaders of the formerly socialist 
countries of Central and Eastern Europe as they attempted to improve the 
performance of their planned economies. Therefore, in the following part, several 
aspects of economic structure will be discussed as proving the Eastern Europe 
economic structure is similar to modem day's North Korea and as a result it's natural 
that the Pyongyang leaders would look at the reform possibility and route by the 
Gey, Peter. 2004. North Korea: Soviet-Style Reform and the Erosion of the State Economy. 
International Politics Society 1: 33. 
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former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. 
Firstly, in the phrase that the government used to describe its economic behavior, 
instead of using the terms reform and opening, North Korea refers to rebuilding 
(Kaegon) and improvement (Kaeson); recently it added the word 'silli' (meaning 
profit or practicality). Yet North Korea denies that it has adopted the market-oriented 
approach chosen by China, instead claiming that the rebuilding and improvement 
efforts are geared toward building up a powerful state and a self-reliant economy.^^^ 
Ironically, the term which the government chooses can reflect what the government 
believes. In the Pyongyang's rationale, the idea of 'practical socialism' is quite similar 
to the economic improvement policy in 1960s, which took place in the former 
socialist countries in Eastern Europe. At that moment, Hungary conducted a set of 
market reforms in gradual steps. Even though the objective of that reform was not a 
market-based economy, Hungary emerged better prepared on the institutional 
economic front than the other countries for the dramatic political liberalizations of 
1989-90. Reforms had already led to price and trade liberalizations and developments 
in the small-scale private ownership sector, and Hungary had also introduced a 
1 oo 
two-tire banking system, a tax reform, and a corporate law. However, these 
re-adjustment steps was retreated and abolished after some years' of experiences. 
These structural re-adjustment steps reflect a similar rationale behind the North 
Korean officials, which the main intension of the government is not focus on market 
reforms, but to temporarily re-adjusted the economic failure 
181 Yong Chul, Chung. 2004. North Korean Reform and Opening: Dual Strategy and ‘Silli，(Practical) 
Socialism. Pacific Affairs 77, 2: 285. 
182 Bruno, Michael. 1992. Stabilization and Reform in Eastern Europe: A Preliminary Evaluation. IMF 
Staff Papers 39，4: 22. 
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Secondly, inside the economic organization and level of development, it seems 
that the there are some similarities between the former East European countries with 
today's North Korea. Unlike the Chinese-Style reform model, North Korea faced a 
similar reform background with the Eastern European countries as agricultural 
production was not the sole or dominant sector of development. In North Korea, 
because the basic for agricultural production has been largely destroyed by soil 
erosion and salinification, and farming traditions have been shattered, as in Russia. 
According to Table 5.1, while in China around 70% of the working population was 
employed in agriculture when the reforms began, the farming sector in North Korea, 
which has about 30% of employees, would be too small to get the whole economy 
back on track. 
Table 5.1 Percentage Distribution of Labour Force at Time of Reform 
Sector 
Country Year Agriculture Industry Service 
Czech Republic 1989 11 39 50 
Slovakia 1989 15 34 51 
Poland 1989 7 37 56 
Hungary 1990 15 36 49 
Soviet Union 1990 19 38 43 
Ukraine 1990 20 40 40 
Belarus 1990 20 42 38 
Romania 1990 28 38 34 
183 Noland, Marcus. 2000. Avoiding the Apocalypse: the Future of the Two Koreas. Washington: 
Institute for international Economics. 
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Bulgaria 1989 19 47 34 
North Korea 1993 33 37 30 
China 1979 71 15 14 
Vietnam 1989 71 12 17 
Therefore, it's rational not to start the reform in agricultural sector, like the 
former socialist countries in Eastern Europe. In Eastern Europe, the main priority of 
their market reform started gradually on price, consumer and industrial sector. So, in 
terms of this sequence of reforms and the lack of the market momentum of the 
agricultural sector, the North Korean government shared the same circumstances with 
the Eastern European countries. 
In addition, in the area of market structure, the situation in nowadays Pyongyang 
shows a similar picture with the Eastern European countries during the Cold War era. 
Heavy industry is regarded as the leading sector of socialist economic of development. 
In the 1960s, most of the formerly socialist countries in East Europe experienced a 
rapid stage of industrialization while some of the industries received a great 
percentage of government support during that period. During that period of time, most 
of the Eastern European countries emphasized mainly reflects two factors: first, the 
obsessive growth orientation of the Stalinist model and, second, trade patterns 
instituted by the Soviet Union, which has induced them to develop large industries to 
process Soviet raw materials and then re-export them to the Soviet Union in 
semi-finished or finished form. This development priority and model coincides with 
the situation in North Korea. North Korea's economic strategy has emphasized heavy 
industry in each of its economic plans. In its economic development history, the 
fundamental strategy was to consider heavy industry the priority, and neglected the 
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focus on light or consumer industry. Therefore, in terms of domestic economic 
structure, both Eastern European countries and North Korea share a quite similar 
background, which shows the North Korean can refer the history, lesson and path of 
the economic transformation in the Eastern Europe. 
2. From ideas to policy: What are policy impacts from the expert 
group to the North Korea economic reform? 
2.1 IT and software development 
Obviously, North Korea is one of the world's least globalized countries, but it has 
long produced ballistic missiles and now even a nuclear arsenal. However, the 
information technology and software development was far left other developing 
countries. Since the North Korea openly declared the essential mission to rejuvenate 
its domestic economy, computerization and software development was not a top 
priority task for the Pyongyang government to address on. But, since in recent years 
with further cooperation with the European countries, North Korea developed its new 
strategy by actively inviting European expertise and software companies to 
Pyongyang and started their bilateral cooperation. 
While in the second workshop on economic reform and the development of 
economic relations between the EU and the DPRK in 2005，Dr Jacek Mironski, the 
head of Business Communication Department at Warsaw School of Economic in 
Poland, presented his idea on how information and communication technology (ICT) 
would enhance the human resource development, labor market optimization and 
productivity. It's indeed that ICT is considered by many developing countries as a 
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leverage for socio-economic development. This view is encouraged for example by 
India's success in the software industry.! 84 At the same time, the Information 
Technology (IT) sector development in North Korea was long to be premature and 
slow in progress. But, since the stimulating ideas which raised and discussed between 
Dr. Mironski and with North Korean officials, North Korea decided to modify its IT 
strategy by further and extend their cooperation with the European countries and tried 
to borrow their lessons and experiences. Therefore, since recent years, there were 
growing numbers of European companies which started to hold joint company or IT 
projects with the North, and this new road was built upon the ideas during the last two 
workshops. 
2.1.1. Case one: Nosotek 
The Nosotek (Number One Software Technology) JV Company founded in 2007 
is the first foreign-invested joint venture company in the IT-industry on software and 
research development in North Korea. It is founded by the General Federation of 
Science and Technology (GFST) of DPRK and experienced European 
IT-entrepreneurs. In addition, it is jointly headed by a German and a French 
185 IT-engineer, and its business volume is already substantial and rapidly increasing. 
In operation, Nosotek is jointly run by European IT engineers together with the 
North Korean counterparts. They have presently 50 engineers and a strong production 
line. For the products which they made, they specialize on offshore IT outsourcing 
services already have produced a large range of software products. Among those 
184 Heejin, Lee and Huang Jaeho. 2004. ICT Development in North Korea: Changes and Challenges. 
Information Technologies and International Development 2，1: 75. 
185 Nosotek. 2008. Available at < http://www.nosotek.com/index.htm>. 
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finished products, most of them are scientific software, video games, web applications, 
embedded software and 3D virtualization tools]86 
In the North, there are several strong potential points which provide a concrete 
platform for the European companies to extend their cooperation with them and 
eventually improve the performance of their economy. First, it is human resources. 
Throughout the interview with Mr. Ju Jong Choi, the vice president of Nosotek, He 
named that there is a huge pool of local talent in North Korea who are expertise in 
software engineering which have an average academic math level superior to their 
1 0^7 ^ ^ 
western or Indian counterparts. This great supply of talented IT software engineers 
was well-matched with the lack of popularity on information technology among the 
youth in Europe in recent years, such as the Netherlands, the enrollment in courses in 
information technology is not attractive anymore among the young people and 
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contributed to a shortage of software engineers. Second, since in recent years, 
North Korea was improving its domestic criterion which tries to attract the European 
counterparts to invest on the IT sector in North Korea. Lowering their local tariffs is 
one of their potential advantages as this gives the European firms considerate cost 
reductions. In addition, according to the feedback given by one of the participants in 
the IT study tour to North Korea in 2007 which organized by the GPI Consultancy, a 
Rotterdam-based consulting company, it's indeed that the commitment of North 
Korean IT-firms on the cooperation projects is so high and outsourcing work to North 
1 8 6 Ibid 





188 Tjia, Paul. 2006. North Korea: an Upcoming Software Destination: Surprising Business 
Opportunities in Pyongyang. GPI Consultancy. Available at :<www.gpic.nl/IT_in_NKorea.pdf>. 
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Korea could also be used to foster innovation and development. ^ ^^  Therefore, over 
the recent years, North Korea was building a new hardware and software capability 
which attract the European companies to further their investment and cooperation in 
the IT sector with the North and even optimize the quality of the labor in North 
Korea. 
2.1.2. Case two: Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition 
(PITIE) 2006 
Other than joint venture cooperation, North Korea was also engaging a proactive 
ICT policy which holding big exhibitions on technology and infrastructure 
development with the European countries in recent years. Among those exhibitions, 
the Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition (PITE) was 
one of the most attractive and comprehensive platform which brought enormous 
business cooperation opportunities between European companies and the North 
Korean enterprises. 
PITE was organized jointly by Messe Miinchen International (MMI) and Korea 
International Exhibition Corporation (KIEC). KIEC has been having a strong 
connection with the DPRK Ministry of Foreign Trade combined with its irrefutable 
local knowledge of the market. As a pioneer organizer of trade fairs in DPRK, the 
KIEC is further in an excellent and most experienced position to ensure the smooth 
handling and operation of all trade fair requirements thereby ensuring a hassle free 
trade fair participation environment for all exhibitors and trade visitors. ^ ^^For MMI, it 
189 Ibid,p.3 
190 Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition (PITE). 2008. About the 
Organizers. (24/6/2008). Available at :<http://www.pyongyang-itiexom/aboutinmi.asp>. 
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was one of the most experienced and renowned company which based in Germany 
and has tremendous experience on organizing trade fair and having an extensive 
global networks. The first PITE started in 2002 but unfortunately it was halted to 
organize from 2003 to 2005 as the United States issued an economic sanction on 
North Korea and no foreign investors was interested in participating in this exhibition. 
But, since 2006, while through the revised North Korean policy with the European 
countries, the European Union Chamber of Commerce in Korea and its European 
liaison office the EU-Korea Industrial Cooperation Agency tried to re-build its 
cooperation with North Korea and re-generate the momentum by organizing the 
second PITE in 2006. 
Throughout the exhibition, North Korea was closely cooperated with the 
European companies and provided an essential platform on displaying the latest 
equipment, technology and machines to be used on building, mining, transport, 
communication and chemical industry. ^^ ^ According to the interview with 
Jean-Jacques Grauhar, chairman of the EUCCK North Korea Committee, in Korean 
Times, he said that the current nuclear crisis is not favorable for this exhibition. The 
U.S. is also exercising pressure on some European companies to limit their contacts 
with North Korea, in line with their strategy to isolate the country. Europe, however, 
will not bend to U.S. pressure, and 23 out of 25 EU member states have full-fledged 
diplomatic relations with North Korea, some of them even have embassies in 
Pyongyang. The EU，s engagement policy of North Korea still prevails, and this 
exhibition can be considered an important part of it.^^^More importantly, he also 
191 Pyongyang International Technology and Infrastructure Exhibition (PITE). 2008. Fair at a Glance. 
(24/6/2008). Available at :< http://www.pyongyang-itie.com/fairsatglance.asp>. 
192 Jettle, Jan. 2006. EU Promotes Pyongyang Trade Fair. (24/6/2008) Available at :< 
http://search.hankooki.com/times/times_view.php?term=north+korea++&path=hankooki3/times/lpage/ 
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added that German companies showed a particular interest in the exhibition because 
experience in dealing with East Germany has shown them that companies can 
successfully do business with one another even if they operate in countries with 
different political systems. ^^^Therefore, it is by no means that the ideas which 
developed during the EU-DPRK Workshops stimulated the North Korean government 
further their economic exchange and technical development with the European 
counterparts, and therefore contributed to the increasing numbers and extension of 
policy cooperation between the North Korean companies with the European groups, 
especially on ICT sector. 
2.2. The strengthening of the small and medium enterprises (SMEs) in mining 
industry 
In North Korea, since the establishment of the socialist regime in the early 1950s， 
the state policy on economic development was primarily followed the textbook of 
communism which collectivization and heavy industry played a significant role in 
driving the momentum of the national economy. During that period of time, the 
national economy of North Korea can be characterized by state-ownership of means 
of production; centralized economic planning, command, and monitoring of political 
attitudes; and an emphasis on military development. ^^ "^ The economic system is 
designed to be self-reliant and closed, with poor performance and inflexible to 




194 Nanto, Dick K. and Emma Chanlett-Avery. 2008. The North Korean Economy: Leverage and 
Policy Analysis. Congressional Research Service (CRS) Report for Congress, p. 4. 
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So far, on one hand, the Pyongyang government strictly controlled over both the 
natural and capital resource which state dominated economy remains unchanged in 
the last few decades. However, on the other hand, the North Korea government also 
disallowed the local people to violate the juche ideology and experience any market 
and capitalist mechanism, such as trade, firm establishment and open transaction. 
Therefore, the banning of private enterprises was the predominant strategy which any 
departure of socialist economy was disallowed. 
Mining, which is a labor and capital intensive industry, needs a huge amount of 
government investment and support. It is by no means that mining in North Korea has 
been playing an important role in leading the domestic economy in the last few 
decades. As the collapsed of Soviet Union and the cut off of the assistance, North 
Korea government has been developing its heavy industry in mining which in order to 
compensate to the lost of energy and electricity supply from the Russian counterparts 
The mining sector was an important sector of North Korean economy. Mining sector 
produced a wide variety of minerals for domestic consumption by the defense 
(military), manufacturing, and utility industries. Production of such minerals as coal, 
copper, iron ore, limestone, lead, magnesite, steel, tungsten, and zinc was essential for 
the country's industrial and military establishments, as well as for export to earn 
foreign currency. On the basis of North Korea's industrial structure in 2004, the 
mining sector accounted for about 8.7% of North Korea's gross domestic product^^^ 
North Korea has significant resources of iron ore, which are located at Chaeyong, 
Hason, Komdok, Musan, Sehaeri, Songhung, Tokhyon, Tokonsong, Toksong, and 
195 Bank of Korea. 2005. Gross Domestic Product of North Korea in 2004: Bank of Korea Press 
Release (31/5/2004). Available 
at :<http://www.bok.or.kr/contents—admin/infor_admin/eng/home/pree/pree/infor/NKGDP20042.doc.> 
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lJnryul.196 Most of the large-scale mining and mineral-processing enterprises in 
North Korea were owned and operated by the central government. In this 
circumstance, private (domestic) or small-medium enterprises was not welcomed to 
invest in this sector. 
But, one of the most important turning points of the mining industry in North 
Korea took place in December 2006 as the DPRK government passed the 
'Small-Medium Coal Mine Development and Management Regulations', which 
allowed any business, organizations, or association, regardless of size or function, to 
go into the mine development business in an attempt to encourage development of 
underground resources, even gold mining-rights were given to some business.^^^In 
particular, the strengthening of self-supporting operations and autonomous 
management, along with other market economy measures, have been deemed new 
steps forward in line with the M y 1 Economic Reform Measures passed in 2002. 
Until this moment，North Korean authorities have controlled the whole responsibility 
for the development of coal mines, and with their focus on large-scale enterprise, 
non-productive organizations and groups were not granted development rights. Small 
and medium-sized coal mines have been run by regional government, or similar 
large-scale enterprises determined by the Central Party, People's Public Peace Office, 
People's Armed Forces Agency，and other similar high-powered, main-stream 
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agencies. But, since the passing of this regulation, from art groups to press 
organizations to small-scale food processing plants, anyone with the wherewithal to 
196 United States Geology Survey (USGS). 2007. 2005 Minerals Yearbook: North Korea. U.S.GS, June 
2007，p.l 
197 The Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES). 2007. DPRK Takes Measure to Reel in Mining Rights. 
NK Brief No. 05-7-4-1. Available 
at :<http://ifes.kyungnam.ac.kr/adminyupload_file/nk—brief/NK—Brief—NK—070411—1 .pdfX 
198 The Institute of Far Eastern Studies (IFES). 2006. Independent Coal Mines Get Legal Backing in 
DPRK. NK Brief No. 0(5-72-7^-7. Available 
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independent undertake the development and operations of coal mining may do so. 
In regards to the above policy change, as we recalled what the ideas brought 
during the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2005, there was a quite hot and interactive 
discussion on the creation and development of small and medium-sized enterprises 
(SME) presented by Dr. Bruno Dallago, and the discussion on how to modernize the 
state-owned enterprises and how to enhance the ownership of SMEs on one of the 
working group discussion. The ideas which presented and discussed provided a 
stimulating factor that drove the North Korean government to focus not only on the 
large-scale enterprises development, but also to the SMEs. In his presentation, he 
presented several arguments which positively support the existence of the SMEs in a 
transition economy, including SMEs can assist the large state-owned companies in 
sustaining the economic system of socialism, SMEs can attract additional foreign 
financial investment and accumulate professional knowledge and entrepreneur skills 
while vertically integrated with large firms, and SME can play a balancing role which 
between the detrimental effect of socialism and the positive side of capitalism. 
Concurrently, during the working group discussion, the North Korean officials raised 
several questions which are related to how to establish SMEs and the importance of 
property right in sustaining the economic growth during the transitional period. In the 
discussion, the officials were further reinforced with the idea that there was no 
contradiction between centrally planed economy with the creation of SMEs and the 
essential role of it during the transformation. Therefore, it's indeed important for the 
ideas which developed by the European economic expert in providing an authoritative 
advice to the North Korean officials and shape the policy change in the SMEs 
development in the late 2006. 
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2.3. Policies to attract FDI 
In regards to economic development, in recent decades, foreign direct investment 
(FDI) plays an important role in the long-term economic development of a country 
not only as a source of capital but also for enhancing competitiveness of the domestic 
economy through transfer of technology, strengthening infrastructure, raising 
productivity and generating new employment opportunities. FDI also has an 
important role in enhancing exports. ^ ^^  Therefore, most of the countries in our world 
started to develop its policy instruments which tried to attract foreign investors by 
offering ever more generous incentive packages. 
North Korea, one of most isolated economy in the world, tried to reform its 
economy in recent years due to the poor performance of the domestic economy. Since 
the mid 1990s, North Korea was facing a consistent drought and bad harvest which 
contributed to a great famine. Since then, the government was forced to open its 
economy by inviting foreign assistance, including aid and food, to approach the North 
Korean official and started to build up the foreign contacts. However, even though the 
North began to diverse its foreign contact by inviting foreign capital investment in 
recent years, still not too many countries would favor to invest their money into the 
North Korean economy because there was a far lack of legal protection for the foreign 
investors. Thus, due to a huge sense of investment insecurity, the total amount of 
foreign investment in North Korea was far left behind than the other transition 
economies. 
199 Javorcik, Beata Smarzynska. 2002. Does Foreign Direct Investment Increase the Productivity of 
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2.4. Legal development 
The insufficient of legal protection on foreign investors was one of the most 
important reasons why the there was a limit number of companies to invest in North 
Korea. Because of this, which coincide with the ideas which provided by the two 
European economic experts in the EU-DPRK Workshop, direct the reform motive and 
momentum to the development of a concrete and friendly legal system which aimed 
to develop North Korea as an investor-friendly country. This policy channel was 
materialized when according to a 49-year-old official said in an interview with the 
Yonhap News Agency after returning from his seven-day trip to North Korea for an 
economic workshop, he said that he heard from North Korean officials that they are 
now working on a legal framework to attract more foreign direct i n v e s t m e n t . ^ 
In the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, Dr Rudiger Frank presented his idea on the topic 
'successful strategies to attract and retain foreign direct investment', which stressed 
that a secure and transparent environment would provide a attract spot for foreign 
investors. According to his comment, a secure environment means that there is a clear 
regulatory guidelines and rule setting which the investors would understand it easily. 
Moreover, any transactions related to trade have to be free and the host country has to 
provide protection against arbitrary expropriation. On the other hand, a transparent 
market area, means the macroeconomic datas like GNP, trade statistics, inflation rates, 
are openly accessible and therefore trust would be built up in consequence. 
Similar idea was raised in the same session by Mr. Luca Birindelli. In the topic 
named as 'The role of foreign legal experts in fostering FDI，，he highlighted the idea 
2�o Duk-kun, Byun. N. Korea Eager to Take Steps to Reform its Economy: EU Official. Vantage Point 
Interview 27, 10 (October 2004). Available at: 
<http://www.koreascope.corn/bbs/board.php?bo—table=E200_001 O&wr—id= 1112>. 
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of opening of service sector, in particular the legal services sector, has proved to be a 
successful tool to increase the quality of an investment friendly environment. Through 
legal activities, communication between foreign investors and the local authorities 
becomes easier since it promotes the exchange of knowledge and expertise and finally 
creates confidence. These ideas were valuable for North Korean officials and directed 
their mindset to formulate similar policy outcome in recent years. 
2.4.1. Case one: Pyongyang Law Office 
On January 2005, the North Korea newspaper announced that the 
government is going to start a law office called ‘The Pyongyang Law Office', which 
is an independent corporate body, has started its operation to provide services for the 
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solution of legal matters arising in various sectors. Through the news interview 
with Mr. Ho Yong Ho, the chief of the office said that his office provides legal 
services upon application and assignment by foreign-invested businesses (equity or 
contractual joint ventures and wholly-foreign owned enterprises) and Koreans in 
overseas as well as by the institutions, establishments, organizations and citizens at 
home.202 
As for the categories of services, it introduces the laws and regulations of the 
on) 
DPRK on foreign-related matters, Kaesong Industrial Zone ，Kumgangsan Tourist 
Zone204 and others. It also holds legal consultations concerning the selection of the 
201 Korean Central News Agency (KCNA). 2007. Pyongyang Law Office Opens. (11/1/2007). 
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tourist project spot. 
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investment project, establishment and operation of foreign businesses, dissolution and 
bankruptcy of businesses, concerning documents of legal nature including feasibility 
study reports and memorandum of association, concerning trade, transport, finance, 
insurance, intellectual property, real property and concerning civil law relations 
between corporate bodies, corporate body and individual and so on. Legal services are 
offered on the principle of fairness, promptness and legality and on the basis of the 
facts, laws and contracts, while the service performer is held accountable before the 
party concerned and the law for the service offered. Foreign investors are well advised 
to consult the office prior to their investment in the DPRK, and enhance their sense of 
security on their investment. ^ ^^  Therefore, by adopting the idea raised by the 
European economic experts, the North Korean government in accordance established 
a legal office which handles legal issues which related to foreign investment and set 
up clear rules and guidelines for the investors which provided higher sense of security 
for investment. 
2.4.2. Case two: Birindelli & Associati 
Other than the Pyongyang law office, the North Korean government also affected 
by the idea raised by Mr. Luca Birindelli and allowed the Birindelli Law Company to 
be established in North Korea in June 2005, which is the first North Korea-Italy joint 
law office. It was the first international law firm to receive the official authorization 
by the Government of the DPRK to establish an office in Pyongyang. It assists foreign 
clients in the DPR of Korea in all relevant areas of commercial and civil practice. 
205 The Center For International Cooperation for North Korean Development (ICNK). 2007. NK Recap: 
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Mr. Luca Birindelli, the President of Birindelli & Associati, participated in the 
EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004. During the conference, he presented his idea on 
advising the North Korean officials which inviting several number of foreign legal 
company to assist the legal transformation in North Korea would play an essential 
role in this aspect. In his major idea, he exchanged his idea with the North Korean 
counterparts in the conference that through some joint legal cooperation, the local 
authorities can understand the legal, economic and operational framework of foreign 
country as well as their valuable experience, which help them to draft new laws and 
regulations. As deeply impressed by the idea, the North Korean officials actively 
invited the Birindelli Law Company to set up its new branch offices in Pyongyang 
which primarily help them to handle possible trade disputes between North Korea and 
foreign companies, as the total volume of trade is increasing in recent years. 
2.4.3. Law on the Assessment of Environmental Effects in North Korea (Mar. 10, 
2006) 
In reference to the idea presented by Dr. Rudigar Frank in the conference, a 
favorable market environment would be one of the most important pre-conditions for 
foreign investment. In order to safeguard this marketable environment, some legal 
measures should be taken so as to protect the environment from any illegal 
destruction. Therefore, after receiving the idea brought by the economic expert, the 
North Korean authorities announced the enactment of the Law on the Assessment of 
Environmental Effects, which would to prevent environmental destruction and its 
subsequent damages, and to protect clean environment. In particular, Article 1 
stipulated that North Korea further develop exchanges and cooperation with other 
<http://www.koreascope.com/bbs/board.php?bo_table=E200_0010&wr_id= 1152&sca=Vantage+Pomt> 
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countries and international organizations in the assessment of national environmental 
effects.207 
In the last few years, the DPRK's environmental problems are getting worse 
simply because of the indifference government policy on environmental protection, 
the imbalance industrial policy which over-emphasis on the heavy industry and the 
developmental-priority mentality. Because of that, North Korea's environmental 
challenges are deteriorating which badly affect in fours aspects: unsustainable food 
production; water pollution and treatment; mining wastes and industrial waste dumps; 
and deforestation and desertification?^^ These environmental hazards not only affect 
the environment itself, but also posed a threat on foreign investment as more and 
more foreign investors are getting more aware of the environmental situation in North 
Korea and this intensified the eagerness of the North Korean government to address it 
promptly. 
From the Law, it has two characteristics, one is Article 4 stipulated the strict 
enforcement of the Law, including the cessation of development and construction 
works on its territory when negative environmental effects ensue, and secondly it put 
emphasis on international cooperation with other countries and international 
organizations. In understanding the reason why the North Korean government issued 
such a law, it is expected that it aimed to improve the North's international image and 
receive funds as well as equipment from international organizations for the resolution 
207 Ministry of Unification. 2006. Major Development: The Enactment of the Law on the Assessment of 
Environmental Effects in North Korea (Mar. 10, 2006). Available at: 
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of environmental problems arising from its reform and opening process in a future?^^ 
So, the enactment of the law can be seen as a great contribution from the community 
member who proclaimed a favorable market environment would attract more foreign 
investment. 
2.5. Trade fairs 
Besides improving legal system, holding trade fairs is another possible way to 
increase and attract foreign investment. Trade fairs represent a significant opportunity 
to enhance brand and product visibility, promote new and existing products, generate 
leads and drive sales. In addition, show participation enables to leam about industry 
trends，gain competitor insights, make key industry contacts, and further solidify 
relationships with current customers. Therefore, holding trade fairs would maximize 
the potential to widen the business opportunity with the foreign companies. 
During the EU-DPRK Workshop in 2004, Ms. Nicole Risse, the director of the 
Europe-Korea Foundation and the Korea-Europe Technology and Economy Services 
(KETES), raised the importance of trade fair in her presentation named as 
'Establishing information networks between potential trade partners and training 
projects'. She suggested that the DPRK should organize trade fairs with the European 
companies and therefore business network will be built. However, sending out the 
idea is not enough for building up business network between Pyongyang and the 
European counterparts. Other than her idea, the European Business Association (EBA) 
also provided substantial efforts on building this business relationship. So, in the idea 
209 Ministry of Unification. 2006. Major Development: The Enactment of the Law on the Assessment of 
Environmental Effects in North Korea (Mar. 10，2006). Available at: 
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that she gave in the conference and incorporate with the business efforts, the North 
Korean counterparts to start to organize more and more trade fairs, either in 
Pyongyang or Europe, in order to build business opportunity. 
2.5.1. The Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair fPAITT) 2006-2008 
Deeply influenced by this idea, the DPRK Chamber of Commerce re-opened the 
'Pyongyang Autumn International Trade Fair', which started on 2002 with the help of 
the European Business Association (EBA) but was stopped to organize due to the 
tense diplomatic atmosphere and nuclear crisis took place in 2002. In 2006, with the 
strong demand of both sides to re-open the event, they began to organize this trade 
fair again since 2006. 
PAITT is a trade fair which advertises foreign products at Pyongyang and helps 
develop trade contacts among companies, regularly in autumn, as requested by 
business people at home and abroad. In the trade fair on last year, 18 European 
companies are participating at the European booth organized by the (EBA) in 
Pyongyang. This has been the largest ever participation of European companies at a 
trade fair in Pyongyang. The 18 EBA-member companies come from 6 European 
countries and are engaged in banking, IT, pharmaceuticals, maritime transportation, 
railways, courier services, industry, mining, solar driven water pumps, energy saving 
technology, commodity inspection, cosmetics and other consumer goods and general 
trading. Some already operate in joint ventures with North Korean partners or found 
other forms of close business cooperation, particularly in the fields of banking, mining, 
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internet services, logistics, software development and pharmaceuticals.^^^ From 2006 
onward, these autumn trade fairs which are held in Pyongyang annually are making a 
positive contribution to strengthening the economic cooperation among nations and 
regions and promoting their development. So, derived from the idea which raised by 
Ms Nicole Risse in the last EU-DPRK Workshop, it's of utmost importance that it 
direct the North Korean officials' attention and policy idea and successfully rebuilt the 
trade fair in 2006. 
3. Conclusion 
In recent years, we witnessed a slow progress of economic reform in North Korea 
after the July 1 economic reform packages. Coincide with the limited reform; the 
general economic performance in North Korea was also stagnated while there was a 
small famine happened in 2006 and the authority re-called the food assistance from 
the United Nations in 2007. These facts showed negatively that North Korea is 
encountering another economic challenge which hampered the confidence on her 
economic reform and therefore decided to take some steps backward from previous 
reform in recent years. 
Ironically, taking economic reform is an inevitable task for the DPRK authority to 
handle as the more it isolated the poor of her national economy. According to Mr. 
Ulrich Niemann, the ex-resident representative of the FNF, commented that the DPRK 
has no official intention to transform their center-planned economy to market 
economy as there has been no comprehensive reform process since then. But, he said 




that North Korea wants to improve its economy, as they're looking for solutions also 
from the systems abroad,” 
However, with carefully studied on transition economies, the North Korean 
official fully understand that it's unwise to simply and directly copy from the reform 
model from the Chinese gradualist approach as the domestic economic structure and 
the international circumstances are different from that period of time. Therefore, they 
decided to widen their scope of knowledge by asking for the help from the European 
counterparts, which is the FNF. The FNF subsequently invited numbers of economic 
experts, who has knowledge or experience in working on East European socialist 
transformation policy, to provide ideational support toward the North Korean officials 
and eventually directed their policy outcomes. 
After digesting the ideas and formulated respective reform plan and policy，what 
we can understand and conclude is that North Korea is neither choosing the reform 
model from China, Europe or even Vietnam completely. Since the North Korean 
government decided to input the market mechanism into its isolated and self-protected 
economy, the general strategy would be pragmatically selected different reform 
programs which aimed at sustain the stability of the regime and power. Therefore, 
from what Mr. Ulrich Niemann said in an interview, when experts from the countries 
like Poland, Czech Republic, and Hungary discussed experiences from their own 
countries in the seminar, one of the things we learned is that every country has 
followed its own path, and this was also the message to the North Korea participants 
that nobody is imposing to them anything. They have to find their own way. 
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Conclusion 
In Chapter 4 and 5, we have discussed how the ideas promoted by the 
economists, who were invited by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) during the 
two EU-DPRK Workshops which held in 2004 and 2005, developed and transferred 
through various institutionalized communication channels and networks and 
eventually shaped the mindset of the North Korean officials. 
In accordance to the findings of this study, we found there is a concrete linking 
between the ideas raised by the European economists with the real policy outcome in 
North Korea. This shows positively of the scholars-to-officials network is functioning 
transnationally from Europe to North Korea and proves this non-governmental 
channel is successfully built and provide a substantial policy impacts on the economic 
reform in North Korea. Eventually, this community also addressed simultaneously on 
the policy uncertainty among the North Korean officials and directed the policy path 
in the future. 
Other than the findings and the analysis, the implications of this research should 
as well be paid attention to. In the main focus of this chapter, there are several aspects 
of theories of literatures will be re-examined. First, the theoretical debate between the 
two different worlds: scholars and policy-makers, will be re-visited as in order to 
provide a conclusion on whether is it possible to bridge the two worlds together? 
Secondly, the theory of epistemic community and transnational advocacy 
network will be re-visited and by referring to the case in this thesis, some details and 
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variables can be illustrated as a supplementation of this theory. 
Thirdly, as economic reform is constructed as one of the variables in this thesis, 
the current situation in North Korea demonstrates an essential case study on bridging 
and mixing the theoretical debate on shock therapy and gradualism. Hence, in this 
part, a close evaluation on this debate will be re-examined. 
Besides, another implication of this research is that it breaks the general belief that 
China is the sole player which is eligible in shaping and influencing the political and 
economic development in North Korea. After the findings in this research, it reveals 
European Union (EU), or several European countries, can also exert their political and 
economic power by using non-governmental channel in order to shape the policy 
direction in North Korea. Hence, this finding provides a great implication. 
1. Research Implications 
1.1. Revisit the debate between scholarship and policy-making in Political Science 
The relationship between the theory and practice of foreign policy is a recurrent 
theme in foreign policy analysis. Importantly, this topic is also discussed in a very rich 
literature focusing on domestic public policy. Unfortunately, there is very little 
interaction between the two bodies of literature. This may be due to the development 
of separate academic communities with their own journals and conferences, but it is 
hardly an excuse. 
Should academics work closely with policy practitioners, or should they resist the 
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'siren song of policy relevant’�！�？ There are three separate perspectives can be 
identified in this debate: a bridge-building perspective; an independence perspective; 
and a critical perspective. They debate on whether for or against the dialogue between 
scholars and policy makers in a normative sense, and whether the gap between the 
worlds of academic and policy making should be bridged, partly bridged or hard to be 
bridged. 
1.1.1. Bridge-Building Perspective 
The bridge-building perspective claims that scholars not only can but have an 
obligation to contribute to practice.^Undoubtedly, this kind of obligation is much 
more than a philosophical one, but also related to some practical reasons as 
governments spend huge amounts of money on social science research, as they do in 
the U.S. 
The normative position from this perspective holds that scholars have an 
obligation to do more than just teaching and writing for their students and academic 
colleagues. They also have to interact directly with policy makers, to take an interest 
in world affairs, and to ensure their research is communicated to those who need it: 
215 the practitioners of foreign policy. 
Moreover, the fact that the foreign policy professionals generally think of their 
actions as independent of the academic world, whilst the inverse is rarely true. 
Eriksson, Johan and Bengt Sunderlius. 2005. Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make 
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Financially and materially, academics are far from being virtually autonomous, and 
are professionally dependent on the practitioners to provide the materials on which 
they can construct their theories as well as their empirical studies. 
In addition, the bridge builders claim that interactions between scholars and 
practitioners may provide valuable input for research.^^^ In Webb's study, British IR 
scholars responded to a question about the value of interaction between scholars and 
practitioners. Forty-seven percent responded that “insight into the policy-making 
process" was more important than influence. Therefore, being a participating 
observer has its obvious advantages. 
In working out the bridge, the 'expertise' must be connected to particular 
problems of the policy itself. In George's study, he identified three types of 
knowledge that can help policymakers find the right strategy for influencing 
1 g 
adversaries. The first is to conceptualize strategies, expose their internal logic, and 
deduce what elements in theory such strategies appear to acquire. The second is 
generic knowledge, derived from systemic comparison of past cases, which offers 
conditional generalizations about the strengths and weaknesses of various chains of 
strategic logic. Third is the knowledge that can help policymakers develop more 
/•J 1 Q nuanced and individual (actor-specific) models of how others will behave. 
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1.1.2. Independence Perspective 
The independence perspective argues that scholars and practitioners are varied not 
only by nature, but also theoretically. In this academic debate, scholars should keep a 
certain distance from the policy makers. 
Scholars, on one hand, are usually described, not always in a complimentary 
fashion, as being too academic and all too obsessed with writing papers and 
monographs that will appeal a few other specialists, and be largely incomprehensible 
99n 
to anyone else. Practitioners and policy makers, in contrast, accused scholars of 
using academic jargon languages and theoretical models to complicate processes that 
are quite straightforward. It seems that they are totally irrelevant and hard to 
understand. 
One of the reasons why to restraint the engagement in policy-relevant affairs is 
1 
that the worlds of scholarship and policy making are perceived as incompatible. 
On the one hand, policy makers seek power rather than knowledge, and their work is 
dictated by short rather than long time frames. However, intellectual studies are often 
focusing on theoretical building and intellectual debate, which takes a long period 
time to conduct. Therefore, in contrast to the bridge function assumption, scholars 
argue that the more we strain for policy relevance, even if only to justify our existence 
in the eyes of society at large, the more difficult it becomes to maintain intellectual 
220 Bercovitch, Jacob, Kevin Clements and Daniel Druckman. 2005. On Bridging the Gap: The 
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integrity.222 
One of most harmful effects of bridging scholars and policy makers together is 
that scholar will lost their theoretical, normative and historical perspectives when they 
are moving too close towards the policy makers. Whenever there is some drastic issue 
happened, media will urge and demand for 'expert' commentary on those current 
affairs. In regards to this, scholars will be crazy to work for doing interviews, writing 
journal articles and books. Undoubtedly, scholars in this sense will become journalists, 
contemporary historians and even pressure groups, while forgetting their academic 
mission to work on an independent long-term perspective. 
There is another problem to do with the professional role and status of the 
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academic scholars. In the concept of agenda setting, if policy makers are involved, 
it is so easy to be diverged, controlled and decided on the themes and questions of the 
research. Then, the research that scholars conducted will no longer be regarded as 
academically independent and relevant. So, in this point of view, it would be a matter 
of sustaining and defending the role of ivory tower academic or surrender it. 
To conclude, the major value of this part is to demonstrate there was an 
unsolvable theoretical debate on whether the cleavages between the role played by 
academic scholars and practical policymakers and the research ideas initiated by the 
scholars in the ivory towers are practically useful for policymakers when they're 
handling diplomatic issues. Indeed, within this theoretical debate, there are two sets of 
scholars who believe oppositely. One side believes that the ideas promoted by the 
222 Eriksson, Johan and Bengt Sunderlius. 2005. Molding Minds That Form Policy: How to Make 
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experts are practically useful for policymakers as academic models and ideology still 
play an important role in affecting world politics. However, in the contrary, some 
scholars think that there is a wide gap between the academic experts and their ideas 
with the policymakers as the interest and aims between them are basically different 
and unbridgeable. 
Ironically, this theoretical controversy shows that it seems to us there is an 
unbridgeable gap between the academic scholars and the policymakers. However, in 
my dissertation, one of the core values is to bridge this two polar together and assess 
the importance of the ideas promoted by the academic circles to the government 
officials. In the above discussion, it mentioned there are several positive signs that the 
distance between academic scholars and policymakers is not that far in theoretical 
sense. In normative position, scholars are normative-driven to provide research-based 
knowledge and digested information toward the officials. In ideation factor, academic 
scholars may assist the policymakers in analyzing the present political or economic 
deadlock by drawing back from history and cases from other countries. Hence, these 
two perspectives are highly relevant on my dissertation. 
In my dissertation, one of the major problems that I'm going to address is how to 
bridge the ideas raised by the economist from the expert groups in Europe with the 
policy outcomes issued by the North Korean officials who are working on the 
economic reform programs. In general understanding, there is an inherited 
disadvantage of the communication with the communist regime with isolated nature. 
In addition, in terms of policymaking in North Korea, it's widely believes that all the 
decision making is centralized by Kim Jong-il and it's nearly impossible for the 
outside forces to pose any influence on the regime. However, in the major arguments 
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in this dissertation, it designed to break the myth that the academic scholars can be 
influential in shaping the policymakers' mindset and policy outcomes. Therefore, in 
the following parts of this dissertation, a deeper analyze will be presented and 
justification will be provided on how the ideas brought by the economists eventually 
affected the policy outcomes in North Korea. 
1.2. Revisit of the theory of epistemic community and transnational advocacy 
network 
In our study, we define the concept of epistemic community based on Haas's 
observation and description. As mentioned by Haas, he described an epistemic 
community as a network of professionals with recognized expertise and competence 
in a particular domain and an authoritative claim to policy-relevant knowledge within 
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that domain or issue-area. Four important characteristics distinguish an epistemic 
community: shared normative and principled beliefs; shared causal beliefs; shared 
notions of validity; and a set of shared common practices associated with the problem 
within the particular issue area. Epistemic communities provide crucial information 
by interpreting problems and offering solutions to those problems. These communities 
and their regimes are co-constituted, meaning that the identity commitments and 
history of the regime necessarily impact the expert group and vice versa. The 
knowledge and suggestions offered by the community reflect their co-constituted 
nature, as its information and suggestions are informed by its own broader 
99 S worldview. 
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In addition, he described that the there are several preconditions for the existence 
and emergence of the expert group. First, uncertainty provides the foundation force 
for the community to establish as the government officials are lacking of objective 
and authoritative knowledge and information about the existing crisis. In addition, for 
the experts and professionals side, as they carry the normative and principled belief 
that motivate themselves to organize the epistemic network and formulate the 
connected channel in order to provide information for the government officials. Hence, 
from these perspectives, it's assumed that the professionals will be self-motivated and 
driven by normative consensus to establish the community. 
However, from the case that we studied, it demonstrates that the members of the 
expert group are mobilized by the NGOs, which initiated the political and economic 
dialogue and controlled the discussion agenda. In Chapter 4, we found out that all of 
the academic scholars and diplomatic representatives from the European countries are 
invited by the Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF), That means even though the 
scholars are driven by normative sense that they should formulate an expert group so 
as to provide ideation support and technical assistance toward the North Korean 
officials, and simultaneously they gathered a group of scholars from the academic 
field, it's insufficient to further this cooperation and consensus into a practical and 
tangible community. In this case, it serves a representative case that a likely or 
preliminary stage of epistemic community can make use of the tactic by transnational 
advocacy network which NGO can play an important role in organizing and 
mobilizing the scholars together and provide their authoritative knowledge advice 
towards the government officials transnationally. Therefore, by referring to this 
specific case, it shows that there is a room of collaboration of theory of epistemic 
community and transnational advocacy network in understand the transnational 
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political advocacy network building. 
1.3. Re-examine the debate between shock therapy and gradualism 
In the analytical part of this thesis, the economic reform of North Korea was 
borrowed to perform as a case study to illustrate the different paths of the transition 
economies. In Chapter 1, we acknowledge that there is an academic debate the two 
divergent paths of economic liberalization: shock therapy and gradualism. The 
essence of the shock therapy approach means the government pursues a radical 
economic transformation from a centrally-planned economy into a market economy 
within a short period of time, without any institution preparation and always coincides 
with the political reform and regime change. On the contrary, gradualism takes an 
opposite approach to transform the economy by using the 'soft-landing' approach, as 
the transition of economy follows a gradual step from a government-controlled one 
into a market economy. However, under this approach, a more carefully program 
design will be offered and without any significant political reform will be resulted. 
This long and heat theoretical debate lasted for more than a decade since the 
collapse of Soviet Union in the early 1990s. However, in referring to the economic 
reform in North Korea, it demonstrates that the North Korea neither follow the 
pathology suggested by the scholars from the shock therapy discipline nor support 
whole-heartedly to the gradual step as a building a market economy. What we can 
describe from the North Korea economic reform is the idea of the third road. 
After the introduction of the economic reform in 2002 in North Korea, practically 
became the core value of the economic reform. According to the North Korean 
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position, what are they following is the idea described as 'practical socialism' or 
selective and pragmatic opening strategy. In the idea of practical socialism, it implies 
building up the economy in a way that provided people with actual benefits while 
maintaining socialist principles, and embraces contemporary technology.^^^ In this 
framework, North Korea argues that it is a goal pursued according to collect!vist 
rather than individualistic principles. In addition, North Korea also claims that the 
reform is not an acceptance of a free economy, but a means of 'strengthening the 
creativity guaranteed by the planned leadership of the state'. Therefore, this position 
explains the role of the economic reform in a socialist framework, and seems to 
emphasize the legitimacy of Kim Jong Il's regime. As a result, under the clarification 
of the North Korea authorities, they argue that every reform steps taken by the North 
Korean officials is not aim at dismantling the current system, but simply a 
modification. So, in practical socialism, the focus is on a practical application of the 
socialist framework. 
Moreover, the reform executed in North Korea was not only served as a means to 
sustain the credibility and legitimacy of the ruling power of the Kim Jong-Il's regime, 
but also reveal a mixture of the spirit of shock therapy and gradualism. As discussed 
in Chapter 2, we reviewed that reform strategies started from 2002 to recent years. To 
sum up all the reform programs in North Korea, it conglomerates the ideas of radical 
and mild reform. First, in the July 1 Reform in 2002, North Korea pursued a radical, 
revolutionary and rapid reform strategy. Inside the reform programs, it covered 
several important aspects of the economy, such as price, law, and agriculture. More 
than that, it directed all the policy changes simultaneously and rapidly. These 
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strategies showed the government officials was deeply affected by the idea of shock 
therapy and decided to grasp the spirit and perform according to it. 
Secondly, since the reform programs promoted and executed for a short period of 
time, the side-effect of the economic reform contributed to an adverse impact on the 
regime stability and even worsen the economic crisis in North Korea. Hence, since 
2005, North Korean government eventually decided to abolish the reform programs 
and re-installed the government control over the economy again, such as the 
re-announcement of the public distribution system (PDS). So, what the government 
did was followed directly on the idea of gradualist approach, which the government 
still played a monitoring and censoring role in designing the reform programs and 
carefully evaluated and assessed the reform effectiveness. Hence, according to the 
findings in this thesis, we can conclude that North Korea is following a path of 
economic reform which is performing a mixture of shock therapy and gradualist 
approach. 
1.4. Re-evaluate the importance of EU on North Korea 
In this study, one of the main foci is the relations between EU and North Korea. 
By looking back to the historical development of North Korean economy, in Chapter 
2, we realizes that North Korean economy was long to be regarded as one of the most 
isolated and closest economies in the world. However, the economy was forced to 
open up since the cut off of all kinds of economic assistance and aids from Soviet 
Union and other socialist regimes. Since then, China has been developing as the major 
player in protecting the economic development and reform in North Korea and 
providing numerous types of humanitarian assistance to the Pyongyang government. 
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From several aspects of discussion, it's unsurprisingly that there are quite a numbers 
of reasons why China should protect and sustain the existence of the North Korea, 
such as the ideological similarity and old partners and to avoid the flooding of North 
Korean refugees into the China's soil. Thus, in general belief, China is the sole tutor 
and protector on North Korea's national interest as China demonstrates as the ‘big 
brother' of North Korea. 
However, in our findings, it's usual to under-estimate and undermine the 
importance of some other alternative power which performs a similar or replaceable 
function like China on North Korea. From our discussion in Chapter 4 and 5, it's 
essential to bring-in the new variable in affecting the North Korea's economic reform 
in recent years, which is the European Union (EU). In our study, as we reviewed the 
general trend of development between the EU and DPRK relations, it shows that EU 
started to formalize their diplomatic relations with North Korea since 2000, and this 
relationship was highly developed and institutionalized. Inside their relationship, 
economic cooperation, such as trade, economic assistance, food aid and technological 
transfer, occupies a significant degree of influence in the construction of the mutual 
relations. Thus, in this thesis, one of the implications and significance is to break the 
mis-understanding on underestimating the role of EU on affecting the economic 
reform in North Korea. 
Furthermore, this thesis also serves the purpose to break another 
mis-understanding of the role of non-governmental organizations (NGOs) in the 
economic reform in North Korea. In the study of international relations, the 
importance of Non-State Actors (NSAs) was long to be undermined and marginalized 
as the predominant approach of state as the only important actor in the world politics 
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occupied the level of analysis. This situation was even polarized as the Northeast 
Asian region was overwhelmed and dominated by historical legacy, sovereignty 
conflict and territorial disputes. So, NSA was not regarded as an essential factor in 
shaping state-to-state relations. 
But, as mentioned in Chapter 3, the NGOs which are providing economic 
assistance and economic knowledge transfer to North Korea provided a 
counter-example on this issue. The Friedrich Naumann Foundation (FNF) 
demonstrates a positive and constructive example on bridging the knowledge level 
cooperation between EU and North Korea. FNF is one of the leading NGOs in 
Germany and established its branches in Korea in recent years. They kept a close and 
friendly relationship with North Korea by organizing several training camps, tours 
and workshops for the North Korea officials so as to enrich the economic knowledge 
level for them to handle the economic reform and crisis in North Korea. The ideas that 
they promoted during the two EU-DPRK workshops eventually influenced the 
mindset of the decision-makers in Pyongyang authority and formulated the policy 
outcome in regards to these. Hence, it is important re-evaluate the role played by EU 
in changing the economic policy in North Korea and in addition the significant role 
performed by the NGOs in North Korea. 
2. Conclusion 
In this Chapter, we have concluded there are several political implications in this 
thesis. In fact, expert group acts as one of the most critical factors in shaping the 
economic reform policy in North Korea. Hence, from the case that we discussed in 
this thesis, it's important to re-visit the theory itself and found that there is a new 
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amendment to his theory as the role of NGO which initiates and mobilizes the 
community can be a significant factor shaping the emergence of the expert group. 
It is true that the North Korea is building a new reform pathology with its 
characteristics, which is different from Soviet Union or China. However, no matter to 
what extend do they North Korea open its economy, the major calculation of the 
government and the meaning of reform is nothing more than to serve the regime 
stability. Thus, even though the European NGOs have been providing and suggesting 
numerous reform ideas to the North Korean officials in various circumstances, a real 
and comprehensive reform or even an institutional change should take more time to 
occur and implement. Hence, what we can expect is that through opening up 
gradually in North Korea, international forces and actors will be able to shape and 
change the mindset of the officials gradually and eventually a mild but comprehensive 
institutional change in North Korea will be result someday in the future. 
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Appendix 1 
Participants of the two EU-DPRK Workshops 
1. Dr. Dusan Triska (Czech Republic) 
Dr. Dusan Triska is currently a professor of the University of Economics, Prague. 
He was the former Deputy Minister of the Czech Federal Ministry of Finance and a 
key architect of the economic reform process in the Czech Republic that was led by 
Vaclav Klaus. One of his famous polices and important contributions to the economic 
transformation policy in Czech Republic were the idea of voucher system. Regarding 
privatization, his essential message was the need for speed. In line with a number of 
other first generation reformers in transition countries, he was convinced that a rapid, 
mass privatization was essential for the restructuring development. 
He published several academic books and journal articles related to privatization 
and development, such as ‘‘Investment Funds as Intermediaries of Privatization” and 
“Optimal Decisions in Markets and Planned Economies” etc. 
2. Dr. Geir Helgesen, Nordic Institute of Asian Studies (Denmark) 
Dr. Geir Helgesen is currently a Senior Researcher at the Nordic Institute for 
Asian Studies, Copenhagen. He obtained his master and doctoral degree in Cultural 
Sociology from the Copenhagen University in 1989 and 1993 respectively. His 
research focus is on Korean society and politics. Other than academic affiliations，he 
is also a Senior Advisor to the Danish Ministry of Foreign Affairs on Korean matters 
229 
and a Leading coordinator of the Eurasia Political Culture Research Network 
(EPCReN). 
Moreover, Dr. Helgesen also published and edited various academic books and 
journal articles which are related to North European countries and Korean affairs, 
such as he edited a book called “Politics, Culture and Self. East Asian and North 
European Attitudes “ in 2005 and written a book called “Good Government, Nordic 
East and Asian Perspectives'' in 2002. 
S. Pro fessor Dr. Ari Kokko (Sweden) 
Professor Dr. Ari Kokko is currently the professor of the Economics Institute of 
Japanese Studies (EIJS), Stockholm School of Economics, and he is also presently 
working as a visiting fellow in the Fulbright Economics Teaching Program at the 
HCM Economics University in Vietnam since 2003 and was invited as one of the 
board members in the Swedish International Development Cooperation Agency 
(SIDA) since 2000. 
In his academic teaching circumstances, he primarily teaches on subjects are 
related to International Trade Theory, Trade and Factor Mobility, International Trade 
Policy and Industrial Policy, The International Business Environment, The Economics 
of Foreign Direct Investment, Microeconomics and Economics and Business in East 
and Southeast Asia. 
As a leading scholar in the field of economic liberalization, he published 
numerous academic books and journal articles which are highly relevant to foreign 
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direct investment (FDI) and technological transfer and theirs' effect on the host and 
recipient countries. In addition, he has written a large numbers of articles which are 
specifically related to the liberalization experience in Vietnam and its possible lessons 
for other countries. 
4. Mr. Luca Brindelli, Brindelli e Associati Law Firm (Italy) 
Luca Birindelli is currently the managing partner of Birindelli e Associati, an 
Italian law firm with a strong international orientation and a distinct focus on the 
Asia-Pacific region. The core activities of the firm in Asia are in the People's Republic 
of China, Hong Kong S.A.R.，Singapore and Vietnam. 
Luca Birindelli, a Fulbright fellow, is a graduate of the Law School of Rome 
University and obtained a Master degree from New York University's School of Law. 
He is a member of the Milan Bar and was admitted as a qualified foreign lawyer to 
practice in the People's Republic of China, Vietnam, Singapore and Hong Kong S.A.R. 
Currently, Luca Birindelli is Honorary Consul General of the Republic of Singapore 
in Rome. 
Over the years, Luca Birindelli has developed an extensive practice throughout the 
Asia-Pacific region, advising clients on numerous legal matters, particularly in 
connection with manufacturing, infrastructure and telecommunication projects. He is 
also the author, amongst other publications, of ‘A Short Guide to Doing Business 
within the Japanese Legal Framework,, published by Mediocredito Centrale, the 
leading Italian medium-term credit institution. 
5. Dr Tony Michell (United Kingdom) 
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Dr. Michell is currently the CEO of the Korea Associates Business Consulting and 
the Managing Director of the Euro-Asian Business Consultancy. Prior than that, he 
has about 28 years' experience working in, observing, analyzing economic and 
political developments as well as the business operating environment in Korea and 
North East Asia. He is the founder of both Euro-Asian Business Consultancy (EABC) 
and Korea Associates Business Consulting (KABC), and advises foreign companies 
on business strategy for Korea and also works with local Korean companies and 
government departments on international issues. 
He has also authored various publications on Korea and North-east Asia including 
regular reports on chaebol reform, success factors for foreign firms investing in Korea. 
Furthermore, he also teaches at the KDI School of Public Policy and Management in 
Korea. 
6. Pro f. Ruediger Frank, University o f Vienna (Germany) 
Professor Ruediger Frank is currently the Professor of East Asian Economy and 
Society at the University of Vienna and Director of the Vienna School of Governance. 
He was an Adjunct Professor at Korea University and the University of North Korean 
Studies in Seoul, and an affiliate researcher at the Modem East Asia Research Center 
in Leiden. In his academic background, he has spent one semester as a language 
student at Kim Il-sung University in Pyongyang in 1991-1992 with support from the 
German Academic Exchange Service; his last visit to North Korea was in June 2007. 
His current research focus is the transformation of socialist systems in Europe and 
East Asia. He has further published on South Korean politics and on the political and 
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economic system of North Korea. 
He published various books which are related to Korea affairs, such as ‘‘The GDR 
and North Korea: The Reconstruction of Hamhung 1954-1962”, “Regulation in the 
Republic of Korea: Characteristics, Reforms and the Telecommunications Sector”, 
and “Democratic People 's Republic of Korea: Politics and Society at a Crossroad'. 
7. Mr, Abu Selim (UNDP) 
Mr. Abu Selim is currently the Country Director for the DPRK in the United 
Nations Development Programmes (UNDP). Before this appointment, he was the 
Senior Deputy of Resident Representative in Sri Lanka and successfully finalizing the 
Agreement for the Micro-Enterprise Development Project for women in Matara 
District, in the presence of a representative of the External Resources Department of 
the Ministry of Finance and Planning. 
8. Ms. Nicole Risse (KETES) 
Ms. Nicole Risse is the Director of the Europe-Korea Foundation and the 
Korea-Europe Technology and Economy Services (KETES). As an activist in Korea 
domestically, she oversaw the academic and cultural exchange programmes by the 
Europe-Korea Foundation. In addition, in 2004, she also launched a scholarship 
program for North Korean students and experts to study various subjects in Europe, 
such as economics, business and international law. 
9. Mr. Ulrich Niemann (Prosram Director for Korea, the Friedrich Naumann 
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Foundation) 
Mr. Ulrich Niemann was the Resident Representative of the Friedrich Naumann 
Foundation in Korea from 2003-2007. He was the Director of the Department 
People-to-People Exchanges of the Asia-Europe Foundation in Singapore from 
1997-2002 and worked as a senior advisor on European Politics and on Economic 
Cooperation and Development Policy in the German Federal Parliament from 1994 to 
1997. Mr. Niemann was the Deputy Head of Division for Economic Policy at the 
Chancellor's Office in Germany from 1992-1994 and Member of Division for 
Regional Development at the Federal Ministry of Economics from 1991-1992. 
Academically, Mr. Niemann is an expert of economic policy and international 
cooperation. 
10. H.E. Radinck Van Vollenhoven (Netherlands/Dutch EU-Presidency) 
Mr. Radinck J.van Vollenhoven was the Dutch EU Presidency and the ambassador 
of Netherlands to the North Korea from 2004 to 2006. As a diplomatic representative 
in Korea, he promoted largely on the importance of civic groups' social roles in the 
road of consolidating democracy and supported on the overseas aids implementation 
under civic groups' leads have been effective and efficient in reducing global poverty. 
Also, he worked deeply on the communication with the North Korean government. 
In 2005, he met Mr. Kim Yong Nam, president of Presidium of the DPRK Supreme 
People's Assembly and conducted a diplomatic visit to Pyongyang. 
11. Mrs. Castillo Fernandez (European Commission) 
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Mrs. Castillo Fernandez is currently the Desk Officer for Korea at the External 
Relations Directorate of the European Commission. She is responsible for collecting 
information and data about the development of North Korea. In addition, she detailed 
the economic developments taking place and EU activity in food and humanitarian aid 
to the DPRK. 
Workshop in 2005 
1. Professor Dr. Ari Kokko (Sweden) 
For details, please read the previous part about the Workshop in 2004 
2. Dr. Dusan Triska (Czech Republic) 
For details, please read the previous part about the Workshop in 2004 
3. Mr. Max Van Der Sleen, ECORYS Grouv (The Netherlands) 
Mr. Max Van Der Sleen is currently the chair of the board of management in 
ECORYS Group. ECORYS is an international group of companies specializing in 
economic and social development. Thee work with clients in the public, private and 
not-for-profit sectors and apply our expertise to improve the economic and social 
conditions of: The countries in which we live and have our offices, The European 
Union and its neighboring states, and Developing countries, especially for poverty 
alleviation 
235 
In 1999，he was appointed Manager of the Macro & Sector Policies Division. In 
2001, he was appointed as member of the ECORYS Netherlands Board of Directors 
and in July of the same year he was appointed chairman of the Board of Directors. In 
January 2005，he was made a member of the ECORYS Group Board of Management. 
As chairman of the Board of Managers of the ECORYS Group, Max van der Sleen 
will succeed Hugh Williams, who is retiring. 
4, Dr. Andrea Szalavetz, Institute for World Economics (Hungary) 
Dr. Andrea Szalavetz is currently the Research Director of the Institute for World 
Economics of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences. In his main research fields, he 
interested in the microeconomic factors of competitiveness, the role of FDI in the 
modernization of the Hungarian economy regional development policy and regional 
patterns of economic development. 
In regards to his academic publications, he published books and articles which are 
related to economic reform, restructuring, privatization, and the role of foreign 
capitals in assisting the local reform development, for example, he wrote a book 
named as ‘Technology Transfer, Innovation and Modernization: The Example of 
German-owned Hungarian Engineering Firms Weltforum Verlag 
5. Dr. Jacek Mironski, Warsaw School of Economics (Poland) 
Dr. Jacek Mironski is currently the head of Business Communication Department 
at Warsaw School of Economics (SGH) in Warsaw (Poland). In his academic 
background, He graduated from the Foreign Trade Department at SGH and his Ph.D. 
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thesis is called 'Mass Media Marketing Through Magazines'. Currently his research 
and teaching interest focuses on Organizational Behavior and Management. 
Other than academic affiliation, he conducted many training and consulting 
projects for Polish and foreign companies, e.g. Canal Plus, PZU, Bosch, Samsung. He 
was also employed by Procter & Gamble Polska and worked as a Director of the 
Promotion Department in the biggest Polish radio station - Radio Zet. For academic 
publication, he is an author of many papers, articles, textbook and books, e.g. 'Power 
and politics in enterprises'. 
6. Prof. Dr. Bruno Dallaso，University of Trento (Italy) 
Bruno Dallago is the professor of Political Economy and Comparative Economic 
Systems at the Faculty of Economics in the University of Trento since 1988. He 
received his PhD in Economics at the Hungarian Academy of Sciences in 1980. 
Currently, he is also the Director of the Masters in Local Development for the Balkans 
and the author and editor of numerous books and articles and has been a consultant to 
many international organizations. 
In his academic publications, he published a lot of books which are related to 
economic reform and liberalization in the Eastern Europe, for example the 'Economic 
Planning in Transition \ ‘Socio Economic Development and Planning in Post-
Socialist and Capitalist Societies ‘ and 'Economic Institutions, Markets and 
Competition: Centralization and Decentralization in the Transformation of Economic 
Systems 
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7. Dr. Brisitta Kauers, Federal Ministry of Finance (Germany) 
Dr. Brigitta Kauers is currently the Head of Division at Germany's Federal 
Ministry of Finance. She is one of the leading experts in Germany in the field of 
economic reform and privatization. 
8, Prof. Dr. Michael P. CUDDY, National University of Ireland (Ireland) 
Professor Michael Cuddy is currently the professor of the Department of 
Economics from the National University of Ireland. He has been a visiting professor 
at the Universities of Aix-en-Provence, Rennes, Bonn and Arizona. He obtained his 
doctoral degree at North Carolina State University. His research has been mainly in 
the fields of regional and rural development, agricultural economics and transition 
economics. 
Other than academic field, he has worked as an economic adviser and consultant 
for all of the ministries and agencies in Ireland with responsibility in regional, rural 
and local development and in numerous international agencies and institutions 
including the EU Commission (various Directorates) and the EU Social and 
Economic Committee and European Parliament, the World Bank, the United Nations 
and OECD. 
He published various books in the field of economic transformation, such as 'The 
Rural Economy: Value Added Creation, Market Sustainability and the Limits of Policy 
Measures' in 2005. Other than books, his academic work has been published in 
journals such as The Economic and Social Review, Social Studies, The European 
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Review of Agricultural Economics, The Journal of Economic Development, The 
Journal of International Economics and The International Statistical Review, 
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Appendix 2 
Debate between shock therapy and gradualism approach in economic 
transformation 
After the end of the Second World War, the path of development in our world was 
divided into two divergent roads. With the lead of the United States, we had the 
capitalist bloc which widely promoted the value of free market economy and the 
importance of private property ownership. Simultaneously, with the pilot of Soviet 
Union (USSR), we also had another set of value of communist bloc which vigorously 
promoted on government planned economy and public ownership of property. This 
opposite path drove the political and economic development for more than 3 decades. 
However, this situation was dramatically altered in the mid-1980s, just months 
after the new Soviet leader, Mikal Gorbachev, taking the power in 1985. He 
conducted a package and a series of economic and political reforms in the Soviet 
Union. This great and shock transformation de-stabilized not only the ruling and 
authority capacity of the Communist party in the Soviet Union, but also continued to 
spread into other Socialist regimes in Eastern Europe as well，including Poland, 
Hungary, Romania and Yugoslavia etc. The reformist and citizens in these countries 
followed the path of reform in the USSR and the later Russia, which pursued a quick, 
shock and complete transformation of its economy from a central planned economy to 
market-oriented economy without any pre-condition and reservation. 
When comparing with the Russian (or East European) transformation model, there 
was another set of path of economic reform which was developed by China and 
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Vietnam since the late-80s and early-90s. The communist leaders in those countries 
developed their form of reform policy after learning and absorbing the problems and 
lessons from the USSR and Eastern Europe. So, the transformation strategy was 
naturally and philosophically rooted in a gradual, evolving and incremental approach 
to transform the economy. 
There are an enormous number of contributions published on the issue of 
transformation, but only a few of these explicitly start from a theoretical viewpoint. 
So, in the study of transitional development, traditionally, there was a lack of 
theoretical debate within it. But there was a dramatic shift of focus of analysis during 
the late-80s when the Soviet Union and China began to implement their restructuring 
policy. A great debate developed between the idea of shock therapy, which was 
pursued by the USSR, and the gradualist reform approach, which was the reform 
strategy performed by the Chinese government. 
1. Shock therapy 
The idea and essence of this radical approach on economic transformation can be 
illustrated primarily in this quotation: 
“Oh those advisors, those advisers!" he said. “If we had listened to them we'd 
still be in Turkey: we should not have made peace, and the war would not be 
over. Always in haste, and the more haste the less speed..." (War and Peace, 
Tolstoy, 1968, pp. 895-6) 
228 Hoen. Herman W. The Transformation of Economic Systems in Central Europe. Cheltenham, UK: 
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The discussion of the shock therapist on the economic transformation was not to 
examine the existing institutional structures and to think of how to change them to 
reach the goal, but rather to focus on the ways, the methods, and the strategies to 
replace the structures entirely^^^ within a given a short period of time through a 
revolutionary and rapid change of the economic structure from a socialist nature 
economy into a capitalist one. 
There were a wide range of academic scholars who supported this transformation 
approach, such as Jeffrey Sachs, David Lipton, Anders Aslund, Maxim Boycko, 
Andrei Shleifer, Robert Vishny, and Andrzej Rapaczynski. 
1.1. Agent analysis 
By using the analytical framework of the structural and agency debate to analyze 
the shock therapy approach, on one hand, the agency side believes a rational agent 
shapes the design of the economic reform, rather than the historical process or 
institutions controls the environment and direct the reform pathology. Therefore, in 
influencing the economic transformation, agency should play a much more effective 
and essential role the entire programs than the structural factors. 
It is believes that government officials，or technocrat, has precise knowledge of 
how to construct successful economic institutions. Concurrently, there is also an 
assumption that the technocrat's creations will have a powerful and salutary influence 
229 Lipton, D. and J. Sachs. 1990. Creating a Market Economy in Eastern Europe: The Case of Poland. 
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on economic development. Therefore, agency, in this sense, is expected to have an 
absolute power on designing and establishing the formal structures, such as new 
institutions, new laws, or credible policies. After that, these structures shape the path 
of development of the society and these can be removed and abolished whenever the 
agent decides to re-establish a new structure. Hence, in this perspective, agent 
dominates the reform path and shapes the societal development. 
1.2. Programs analysis 
The nature of these reforms is well-known and the essentials would not vary 
widely between countries. At their center is the quick conversion of the state sector 
into a decentralized, market sector, through swift and comprehensive policy changes 
that give shock therapy its name. This is necessarily followed as soon as possible by 
forced privatization. 
1.2.1. Price liberalization 
The shock therapy economists are in favor of an adjustment approach based on 
prices, which involves an instant and immediate jump to the market price level. With 
the abolition of state-controlled price and the idea of transitional price, it will make 
available resources in the budget to finance social programs, including welfare. 
Moreover, the un-distorted price (more close to the market level with higher price) 
also encourages the development of new enterprises and competition because under 
these conditions profits are possible to be made. 
1.2.2. Privatization 
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Privatization and financial restructuring are portrayed as one of the most 
important steps in the entire economic reform programs. Once transformation took 
place, the dominant form of ownership had to be private, and the dominant form of 
organization especially for large enterprises should be a corporate structure, as 
experienced in a mature market economies. 
The importance of a private ownership economy is simply that it constitutes the 
private (individual) control on individuals' own property, equity and capital，which 
can be freely transferred, transacted and exchanged. Once a private economy has 
developed, a new class of capitalists will also emerge consequently as they are going 
to represent the interests of capital. At the same time, firms can also be able to 
control their equity and profit and reduce their obligation on social budget constraint. 
1.2.3. Institutional design 
The aim of the transition was not only to elucidate the unreasonable distortions 
of the state allocation of resources, but also to establish the appropriate institutions in 
organizing the new market mechanism for allocating resources. During the 
transitional period, as the shock therapists argued, the market was not left 
un-controlled and based completely on self-interested individual behavior. However, 
it had to develop some defined rules, regulations or even institutions in order to 
protect the property rights and obligations of all individuals within the economy. 
Markets require a definite assignment of entitlements and procedures 
guaranteeing the execution of contracts. Transition economies, as shock therapists 
231 Sachs, J. 1993. Poland's Jump to the Market Economy. The MIT Press, Cambridge, MA. p. 29. 
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define, have to set up appropriate laws and institutions, such as clear property rights 
and well-protected rules of contracts, to protect the benefits which associated with the 
market process. Therefore, without laws, there can be no property rights and without 
these there can be no real economic stabilization or development.^^^ 
1.2.4. Monetary policy 
Financial stabilization was extremely essential and urgent because it was a 
OH 
prerequisite for social stability and for many other reforms. As a result, a 
well-defined and organized monetary policy was central in achieving financial 
development. 
Central Bank plays an important role during the financial restructuring. An 
effective central bank should be able to control the money supply and regulate several 
individual (regional) banks. The very first thing that central bank has to handle is to 
stabilize the currency and ensure hyperinflation will not happen. Through controlling 
the money supply, central bank should not unconditionally finance the central 
government's budget and safeguard the interest rate. 
1.2.5. Fiscal Policy 
Since the budget is the main source of money creation, and hence inflation, the 
reduction of the budget deficit was at top of the agenda of any economic reform 
Aslund, A. 1995. How Russia Became a Market Economy. Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. 
p.l4 
Sachs, J. 1996. The Transition in the Mid Decade. American Economic Review Papers and 
Proceedings 86, 2: 131. 
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plan.234 
In regards of this, there were several ways in order to lower down the budget 
deficit during the transformation process, such as contracting military expenditure, 
extinguishing subsidies, eliminating enterprises investment financed by government 
expenditure and reducing state administration. 
From some of the studies on this issue, it is widely accepted that the budget 
deficit is directly linked to the inflation rate, as the higher the budget as a percentage 
of GDP, the higher the inflation rate. In this sense, the most important step towards 
monetary stabilization is, in most cases, not really monetary policy, but fiscal policy. 
Therefore, a balanced budget, which is promoted by IMF and other international 
organizations, can substantially reduce the deficit and negative effect in the 
transformation process. 
1.2.6. International trade 
The shock therapy approach is in favor of complete liberalization of the 
international trade sector by currency devaluation to the black market level and 
O � 
removal of trade barrier. Radical trade liberalization can install a successful and 
real foreign competition and this experience will be fruitful for domestic market 
development. 
234 Fedorov, B. 1992. Monetary, Financial and Foreign Exchange Policy. In A. Aslund. ed., The 
Post-Soviet Economy. Soviet and Western Perspective. New York: St. Martin's Press, p.105 
235 Marangos, John. 2002. The Political Economy of Shock Therapy. Journal of Economic Surveys 16, 
1: 58. 
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Since the transition economies were dominated by all-powerful monopolies with 
economic and political power, competition with foreign firms would critically reduce 
the power and monopolistic control of them. Moreover, with the invitation of foreign 
firms' investment, it stimulates not only export growth, but also supply of technology, 
managerial expertise, organizational techniques and financial capital. 
In addition, a freely floating exchange rate should also be developed in order to 
reduce inflation and maintain the currency can be exchanged unrestrictive. 
It is believes that the analysis used by the shock therapy model is regarded as the 
neoclassical economic analysis. Consequently, freedom, market-oriented and 
privatization are the core study in this perspective. 
1.3. Ideas analysis 
First, in order to build a fair, free and privatized society, a shock therapy policy 
should be implemented to increase the power of market and at the same time decrease 
the control of state as soon as possible. Inside this rationale, economists believe that 
planning and markets are not compatible coordinating mechanisms and planning can 
only eventually lead to coercion. 
Second, the promotion of private property is the foundation of economic freedom 
and an essential ingredient for the efficient operation of the market. A society with 
economic freedom will involve in providing law and order, institutions, providing 
fiscal and monetary balance, infrastructure to protect the environment, and promote 
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public health and education and the safety net.^^^ 
Third，the shock therapy model highlights the interdependent, mutually 
supportive and interactive character of economic relationships, and as such reforms 
should be introduced simultaneously. Piecemeal changes cannot be possible in 
bringing a concrete, comprehensive and constructive reform for the transition 
economies. As one Polish economists argued, "you don't try to cross a chasm in two 
jumps" , the reform program that they pursue is known and described as “shock 
therapy" and “big bang". 
The underlying rationale in this point is that every step in this reform should be 
carried out as quickly as possible, without any hesitation and simultaneously. Based 
on the shock therapy model, any restructuring cannot take place without an effective 
price system; an effective price system cannot exist without a convertible currency; a 
convertible currency is impossible without opening the economy to international 
competition; international competition cannot be effective without restructuring. 
Therefore, in the idea of this school，they believe the above sequence can be handled 
simultaneously with logical sense. By looking at those countries carefully, they were 
all experiencing such severe macroeconomic imbalances and they could not afford to 
reform slowly. So, 'they need a strong dose of medicine quickly' and the 
macroeconomic stabilization and microeconomic reforms must go conjointly. 
Fourth, the gradual process of transition is undesirable because it ignores the 
236 Aslund, A. 1997. Russia 's Economic Transformation in the 1990's. London: Pinter, p. 12. 
237 Marangos, John. 2002. The Political Economy of Shock Therapy. Journal of Economic Surveys 16, 
1: 62.. 
238 Marangos, John. 2002. The Political Economy of Shock Therapy. Journal of Economic Surveys 16， 
1: 62. 
239 Thomas, V. and Wang Y. 1997. East Asian Lessons from Economic Reforms. In W.T. Woo, S. 
Parker and J.D. Sachs, eds., Economies in Transition. Comparing Asia and Europe. Cambridge, 
Massachusetts: MIT Press, p. 217. 
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links between reforms, increased transition costs, damaged the credibility of the 
process, restricted individual behavior and allowed the formation of special interest 
groiips.240 
Within the discussion of economic reform, almost most of the reform procedures 
within the transition period will be inter-linked and irreversible. The deliberate 
separation will eventually distort the whole restructuring process, and even contribute 
to the failure. 
Moreover, in order to keep the state control on the pricing system and 
international trade barrier, the gradual reform strategy will only encourage activities 
such as speculation, diversion of state supplies and corruption.241 Due to the partially 
liberalizing reform, gradualism will only result in a badly operating and controlling 
market, refrain foreign investment and uneven distribution of wealth. Therefore, in 
their belief, they regard a slow reform as a failure in any sense. 
2. Gradualism 
On the contrary, there is another set of approach which studies how socialist 
countries can transform their economy into a capitalist one, other than using a radical 
or so called ‘big bang' approach, by a gradual and incremental approach. The gradual 
school emphasizes the need to clear the way for radical steps through intermediate 
242 ones, so as to minimize the economic and social costs of the transition. Thus, in 
240 Aslund, A., Boone P.P. and Johnson S. 1996. How to Stabilize? Lessons from Post-Communist 
Countries. Brooking Papers on Economic Activity 1: 272. 
241 Aslund, A. 1995. How Russia Became a Market Economy. Brooking Institute, Washington D.C. 
p. l4 
242ofer，Gur. 1992.Stablizmg and Restructuring the Former Soviet Economy: Big-Bang or Gradual 
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terms of every aspect, gradualism and shock therapy approach arc in the polar 
position of the argument standing. 
In the basic understanding on gradualism, one of the most obvious ideas is that 
during the economic reform, there should be some kinds of sequence and procedure 
which formulate an order gradually. For example, sequence of price liberalization 
should accompany a certain form of privatization and to what extent is progress on 
one front a necessary condition for proceeding on the other. In each case, in addition 
to the internal economic logic of each sequence, account must also be taken of its 
likely effects on production and unemployment, on economic pressures exerted on the 
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population, and on the political endurance under such pressure. Therefore, the 
macroeconomic stabilization was a major element in the structural reform on every 
steps of reform program. 
2.1. Agent analysis 
One of the most argumentative debate in this approach is that whether elites in a 
government can 'lead' and 'occupying' the reforms and under valuing the power and 
effectiveness of the system itself. In the shock therapy approach, it is believed that 
technocrats in the regime take an essential role in formulating the whole 
transformation policy, and predict all the instability and radical possibility that can 
happen during the process. However, this raises the question of whether an economy 
can be effectively reformed through top-down changes devised by elite. 
Sequencing? In Michael Keren and Gur Ofer, eds., Trials of Transition: Economic Reform in the 
Former Communist Bloc. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, p. 84 
Ofer, Gur. 1992.Slablizing and Restructuring the Former Soviet Hconomy: Big-Bang or Gradual 
Sequencing? In Michael Keren and Gur Ofer, eds., Trials of Transition: Economic Reform in the 
Former Communist Bloc. Boulder, San Francisco and Oxford: Westview Press, p. 84 
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The behavior of economic agents is a product both of present incentives and of 
the historical and social processes that have shaped these agents. Any vision of how 
change may best be accomplished must take into account of the fact that economic 
agents accumulate knowledge in a leaming-by-doing process that is shaped by their 
historical experience. 
By using the law, the ruling government can effectively control over the society, 
even the law is a kind of imposition on the society. However, forceful action led by 
the elite cannot guarantee a stable and societal-oriented reform. Before adopting a 
shock therapy approach, the elites inside the government will undeniably seek to 
revise and address some of the economic problems (e.g. low productivity, corruption) 
in their socialist economy. However, it will not be wise to adopt such kind of 
approach to transform the economy as they are not trying to build a new (capitalist) 
economy with addressing the satisfaction of the societal need. Thus, due to the 
ignorance of the social need, the shock therapy approach is proved to be unsuccessful 
in bringing a real transformation on the socialist economy. 
2.2. Progress analysis 
Another basic idea related to the gradualist and evolutionary approach is that the 
progress of reform is not to be judged by the simple criterion of how many formal 
measures are introduced and how many businesses are nominally privatized.244 The 
massive changes that are needed are inevitable given the deep internal forces for 
change within society. '^^ ^The question then is how productive a government can be in 
244 Murrell, Peter. 1993. What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia? Post-Soviet 
Affairs 9, 2: 120. 
245 Papava, Vladimer. 2005. On the Theory of Post-Communist Economic Transition to Market. 
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forcing changes. Undoubtedly, the economy cannot be shocked into some new 
economic behavior without the consideration of the society itself. Institutional change 
is an intrinsically slow process, highly dependent on circumstance, and efficient only 
if it responds to real economic needs. Therefore, it requires a deep, slow and gradual 
process in order to understand and pacify what society needs and how to build a stable 
and peaceful mechanism for the transition to capitalism. 
In addition, scholars who proclaim a gradualist approach on economic 
transformation emphasize that there is a need to balance the central government 
finances before undertaking other reforms. This debate centers on the order of 
liberalization of the trade and capital accounts, with the majority scholars favoring the 
opening of the former before the liberalization of the latter in order to avoid 
undesirable capital flows. Therefore, a planned sequence of reform should be 
implemented precisely before any action to be taken, as contradicted to the idea on 
working on all kinds of aspect of reform simultaneously and instantly. 
Another argument in favor of gradualism is the nonexistence or precariousness 
of a ‘‘safety net" to smoothen the effects of massive redundancies of labor during the 
process of economic transformation?'^^ This safety net is to be understood as a public 
good needed to reduce costs such as losses of human capital. In regards of this, a 
gradual process to minimize the fluctuation on the labor market is of utmost 
importance to provide a stable transition of the economy. 
Furthermore, the viewpoint of gradualists is substantially opposing to that of the 
International Journal of Social Economics 32, 1/2: 82. 
246 Martinelli, Cesar. 1993. Essays on Political Economy of Economic Reform. Dissertation submitted 
for the degree Doctor of Philosophy in Economics, University of California, p.28 
252 
shock therapist, especially on the view of the historical legacies. According to the 
gradualists, all kinds of economic systems are shaped by its historical characteristics. 
The current systems that we notice will not be affected only by the government 
officials who promote the approach of shock therapy, but at the same time also 
affected by the originated situation of a country specifically. For example, any vision 
of how change might best be accomplished must take into account of the fact that 
economic technocrats accumulate in a leaming-by-doing process that is shaped by 
^ A n 
their historical experience. Likewise, the designation of the socialist institutions 
within a state will also be described as an institutional legacy which shapes and 
shadow the development path of the transitional policy, which can be understood as a 
'path-dependency' policy. 
Adherents to the gradualist approach believe that each phases of transformation 
should be carefully completed before the next step is undertaken. Often they are not in 
favor of adopting foreign laws; they think that only the development of a country own 
legislation can lead to optimal laws which take into account of the specific national 
circumstances. Liberalization should proceed step by step. They recommend that 
industrial enterprises should remain state-owned, but with an increase in the freedom 
to make decisions. Other stabilization policies are also advocated, such as government 
intervention on price controls, a dual trick of pricing system forcing enterprises to 
meet production quotas but allowing them to sell above-the-plan output at market 
price, foreign exchange and investment regulations. 
247 Murrell, Peter. 1993. What is Shock Therapy? What Did It Do in Poland and Russia? Post-Soviet 
Affairs 9, 2: 119. 
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